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Abstract 
 
The study explores the causes of Islamic terrorism from a Muslim youth perspective. To gain 
a better understanding of why a growing number of young Muslims from Britain are joining 
ISIS, the study utilised interviews with a sample of young Muslims from West Yorkshire – a 
geographical location that has previous links with terrorism. Using thematic analysis, the 
study revealed a wide range of factors that contribute to Islamic terrorism.  The research 
suggests that young Muslims who join ISIS have a poor grasp of the Islamic faith and are 
limited in their understanding of religious concepts such as martyrdom and jihad. The 
research also suggests that that social networks such as family, peers, mosques, schools and 
social media play a significant role in terrorism and the recruitment of young Muslims by 
ISIS. The study also questions the effectiveness of UK’s approach to combatting terrorism as 
participants felt that counter-terrorism strategies have the potential to stigmatise and alienate 
young Muslims, thereby pushing vulnerable individuals towards terrorism.  
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An Introduction to the thesis 
The growing number of young Western Muslims abandoning their homes and joining 
terrorist groups in the Middle East has caused great concern among communities in the West. 
Radicalisation of Muslims has become one of the biggest threats facing Europe as Muslims as 
young as fourteen have fled Britain to join militants in the self-proclaimed Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Statistics reveal that over 27, 000 foreign fighters have joined ISIS, 
with more than a fifth of these fighters travelling from Europe and an estimated 600 believed 
to be British (Kirk, 2016; Sharma, 2015). Up to 5000 of these foreign fighters are believed to 
have returned to Europe after training in ISIS terror camps abroad (Qatja, 2016).  Among the 
different types of terrorism motivated by religion, Islamist terrorism poses the biggest threat 
to Western societies (Franz, 2015).  Following recent terror attacks in the US and Europe, the 
UK faces a severe threat from being targeted by ISIS and other terrorist organisations alike. 
This threat is evident from The Europol Report (2016) which revealed that from the 211 
terror attacks in Europe during 2015, more than half of these were carried out in the UK. 
Furthermore, a report from the Home Office (2011) revealed that the UK had the highest 
number of terrorism related arrests (612) compared to any other country in the European 
Union between 2009 and 2010. These reports also warn of the threats the UK faces from 
Brits who return home after fighting for terrorist groups like ISIS in Syria and Iraq, stating 
that a significantly high number of these Brits are young Muslim men and women.   
 
Despite receiving global attention in the media, the answer to why British Muslims are 
joining ISIS still remains inconclusive. Following the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7 terror attacks, 
there has been a surge in interest among researchers to study the phenomenon of Islamic 
terrorism. Much of the existing literature on what motivates British Muslims to join ISIS 
focuses on “jihadism” (the ideology that the West is to blame for the oppression against 
Muslims around the world) and feelings of alienation and discrimination as common drivers 
of terrorism, particularly in second or third generation Muslims in Europe (Tibi, 2007; 
Khosrokhavar, 2009; Stroink, 2007). While there is accumulating research documenting the 
causes of terrorism among Muslim youth living in the West, there is a gap in the research for 
studies strictly dedicated to a specific community that has previous links with terrorism. West 
Yorkshire is a community that has a deep-rooted problem with Islamic terrorism, particularly 
its town of Dewsbury (Gillman, 2015). Britain’s youngest suicide bomber, 17-year-old Talha 
Asmal, who was killed whilst fighting for ISIS in Syria was from Dewsbury. The small town 
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is also home to two of Britain's 7/7 bombers including Mohammad Siddique Khan who 
organised the attacks.  By exploring the views of young Muslims living within a particular 
community that has previous links with terrorism, this may help identify underlying issues 
that are relevant to the study of Islamic extremism among Muslim youth.  
 
While studies on terrorism provide an insight into the process of radicalisation, the answer to 
why so many young Muslims are joining ISIS remains inconclusive. Currently, there are a 
limited number of studies that explore young British Muslims’ views of other young Muslims 
who have joined terrorist organisations such as ISIS. While studies on radicalisation may 
provide a useful insight into why several British Muslims have joined ISIS, they have often 
been challenged for lacking solid theoretical foundations and depth (Monoghan & Molnar, 
2016). In order to combat ISIS and Islam-inspired terrorism, it is necessary to fully 
understand the underlying factors that make British Muslims more susceptible to terrorism. 
This study attempts to further investigate attitudes towards young British Muslims who travel 
abroad and join terrorist groups. It is expected that this study will provide opportunities for 
further research and practise by developing treatment rationales for terrorism. By identifying 
the drivers of Islamic terrorism from the viewpoint of Muslim youth, this will help policy 
makers better understand the root causes of terrorism and fight radicalisation. The aim of the 
current research study is to explore the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism from a Muslim 
youth perspective to gain a better understanding of why more and more young Muslims are 
joining ISIS. The research questions for this study are:  
 
 What are young British Muslims’ views on other Muslims who join Islamic extremist 
groups and what is ISIS’ appeal for young Muslims? 
 How are Muslims being targeted by terrorist groups and what role does social media 
play in the recruitment of young Muslims? 
 How do counter terrorism strategies affect Muslim youth and what proposals to tackle 
radicalisation should be implemented in Britain?  
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Literature review 
 
This section will review the existing theory and research literature on the causes of terrorism 
in Muslim youth. After examining the ideologies of terrorist groups like ISIS, this section 
will go on to evaluate the relevant research and theory which helps explains why some young 
Muslims are drawn to terrorism.   
 
Radicalisation and its causes  
While researchers have shed some light on the underlying processes of radicalisation, 
communities are still in debate as to what ISIS’ appeal for young westerners is and why 
hundreds of Muslims have left their homes in Britain to join a callous group of terrorists. 
Over the last decade, the term radicalisation has more frequently appeared in media reports 
and political debates about terrorism among Muslim youth, particularly young men. 
Radicalisation seems to be a word that many use without stopping to consider its true 
meaning. In the literature on terrorism, radicalisation is defined as process rather than an 
event which causes individuals to adopt extremist beliefs and support terrorism, and may 
ultimately lead to participation in terrorist activity (McCaulay and Moskalenko 2008). 
However, radicalisation, although useful in providing a framework for both underlying 
causes and motivating factors of terrorism, is weak in defining concepts and the stages in 
which radicalisation occurs (Silke, 2008). The term itself is open to different interpretations 
and therefore is a concept that is essentially contestable at many levels. Explanations vary 
from radicalisation being a cause of terrorist behaviour to loosely defining it as process which 
makes Muslims more susceptible to engage in terrorist activity, to a more rigid process of 
shifting from pacifism towards terrorism (Mandel, 2009). While some see radicalisation as 
the series of events which take place prior to a terrorist attack, others describe it as the 
movement towards extremist attitudes that may or may not lead to the occurrence of a 
terrorist attack. 
 
The draw to radicalisation and terrorist behaviour among Muslim youth is described as a 
developmental process which is driven by alienation and resentment and has little to do with 
religion itself (Bizina & Gray, 2014). Young Muslims who are drawn to radicalisation wish 
to accomplish something momentous but simultaneously seek to associate themselves with a 
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religious cause. Conversely, some young Muslims adopt radical ideas in a bid to shift the 
blame for their inner suffering onto the society and others around them (Reitman, 2013). For 
example, teenage brothers Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev who were responsible for the 
Boston Marathon bombings in 2013 claimed to be motivated by extremist Islamic ideology. 
However, Reitman (2013) suggests that the marriage breakdown of the Tsarneav brothers’ 
parents which left the brothers abandoned in Boston without any social support contributed to 
their terrorist behaviour. As such, the extremist Islamic ideology provided an exit for their 
resentment towards the society that failed them and triggered a series of events which 
ultimately led to the Boston bombings. This proposition is further supported by Sageman 
(2004) who found that young Muslim men living in foreign countries felt estranged and were 
unable to secure profitable employment, and joining terrorist groups provided them with an 
escape from the anger and humiliation they felt. 
 
A similar cause for radicalisation can be seen in British Muslims who are seeking an identity 
in the West but feel that they are not accepted by society. In the wake of the 7/7 attacks, 
British leaders began to place more emphasis on Islamic terrorism being a threat to the 
British culture and stressed the need for Muslims living in Britain to adopt British values. 
Consequently, the causes for radicalisation were considered to be a result of British Muslim 
youth growing up in segregated communities. Kepel (2004) found that several multicultural 
communities in England did not integrate with other ethnic or religious communities. As a 
result, some Muslim youth may feel marginalised as they fail to mix with fellow Brits and 
this may cause them to turn to Islam in an identity crisis and subsequently become radicalised 
by other extremists (Archick, 2007). As the terms extremism, radicalisation and terrorism 
have become more commonly associated with Islam, this affiliation may fuel feelings of 
embarrassment and alienation among Muslims, making it more difficult to be a Muslim youth 
in the West. Moreover, British Muslims who have been involved in terrorism are often 
referred to as “home-grown terrorists” as they held a British nationality. In the public domain, 
young Muslim terrorists from the UK were being described as “the enemy within” (Lynch, 
2013).  In a bid to detach these terrorists from the rest of the British community, the media 
placed more focus on which country these terrorists were originally from and their ethnic 
origin as opposed to labelling them as just British (Mandaville, 2009). The ethnic background 
and foreign otherness of these terrorists then became crucial to understanding the causes of 
radicalisation. The loyalty of Muslim youth to the British culture was being questioned 
because of their ethnic background and Muslims were being asked to give priority to their 
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British identity. While the arguments on the failure of British Muslims to integrate may be 
accurate to an extent, they are challenged for being overly-simplistic. The profiles of young 
Muslims involved in terrorism are rather diverse and therefore more study is required on the 
personal and social circumstances of these young Muslims in order to understand what led 
them to become terrorists. 
 
ISIS explained: Who are ISIS and what do they want?  
ISIS can trace its origins back to 2002 when it was founded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a 
Jordanian who was responsible for a series of terror attacks in Iraq. Although Zarqawi did not 
agree with al-Qaeda’s tactic of fighting the West as opposed to leaders in the Islamic world, 
he joined forces with al-Qaeda following the US-led invasion of Iraq and formed al-Qaeda in 
Iraq (AQI). The alliance between these two terrorist groups provided Zarqawi’s group with 
the necessary resources and global recognition that they required to became a major force in 
the Iraqi Insurgency. AQI had an obvious tactic of fuelling sectarian violence between Sunni 
and Shi’ite Muslims and its main aim was to unite the Sunni community under Sunni jihadist 
groups, a tactic that is currently employed by ISIS (Lister, 2016). The ruthlessness and 
brutalities shown by AQI led al-Qaeda members to disavow AQI in the fear that such 
brutality would lose them supporters. Following the death of Zarqawi in 2006, AQI 
established another organisation called the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). As the Syrian war 
intensified, US troops took over and councils were created by Sunni tribesman in Iraq who 
rejected the group’s atrocities. This caused ISI to progressively weaken and the death of ISI 
leaders in US-led airstrikes significantly reduced the group’s competency to commit terror 
attacks. However, the group was restored in 2010 when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became leader 
and started launching terror attacks again in Iraq. In 2013, Baghdadi joined the civil war 
against President Assad in Syria and merged his forces in Iraq and Syria which led to the 
birth of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). While Baghdadi’s fighters continued to 
grow in Syria, ISIS began massacring its rivals and cleansing ethnic and religious minorities. 
After seizing and holding large parts of territory including towns and cities, ISIS formally 
declared itself as the caliphate (an Islamic nation run by a caliph – a successor of the Prophet 
Mohammed), changing its name to Islamic State (IS) in 2014. 
 
While the caliph may not hold the same status the Prophet Mohammed held as an Islamic 
leader, ISIS militants want the world to recognise the caliphate as the only legitimate state 
that Muslims must obey (Spencer, 2015).  As with most jihadist groups, the ultimate goal for 
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ISIS is to establish an effective state and eradicate competing jihadist groups in order to 
survive and grow. ISIS seeks to eliminate anything or anyone that goes against the teachings 
of Islam and believe they are uniting the Muslim ummah (community). After declaring itself 
as the caliphate, ISIS want to create a state governed by their interpretation of Islamic Sharia 
law. Unlike Western legal systems which are derived from human legislation, Sharia law is 
the Islamic law governed by teachings from the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad and 
covers how Muslims should lead all aspects of their lives in accordance to God’s law 
(Ahmed, 2013). Sharia law provides rulings on matters including crime, marriage, finances 
and government policies as well as personal issues such as health, sexual intercourse and acts 
of worship. The Sharia has been highly controversial in the UK as well as other countries in 
the West. Rashid (2014) addressed some of the stigmas associated with Sharia and argues 
that ISIS impose Islamic law on people against their will which goes against the teachings of 
the Quran. In fact, Sharia law orders Muslims to abide by the law of the country in which 
they reside and cannot be forced upon someone through government implementation (Rashid, 
2014). While many Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq 
implement Sharia law, ISIS consider Sharia law to be greater than any other government law 
and have imposed it on many cities and towns it has captured. Even leaders of Muslim 
countries are on the radar for ISIS as they have placed legal systems of the world above 
Sharia law (Goodstein, 2016). Refusal to obey the laws set by the caliphate has led ISIS to 
commit several terror attacks across the world including cities in the Middle East as well as 
Europe. ISIS has claimed responsibility for the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels which 
have left hundreds dead and many others injured. These attacks are a clear statement of intent 
which reflects ISIS’ terror threat to Europe. This leaves many perplexed by the same 
question: is the Islamic State truly Islamic or merely the result of misinterpreted Sharia law? 
 
The ideology of ISIS: Is the Islamic State Islamic? 
Sharia law is not the only aspect of Islamic texts that appears to have been misinterpreted by 
ISIS. There has been much debate about the Quran and ahadith (sayings of the Prophet 
Mohammed) as justification for the violence and brutalities against non-Muslims and 
Muslims who oppose ISIS.  Tasgin & Cam (2016) state that ISIS seek to establish a society 
which mimicks the era of the Prophet Mohammed by misinterpreting the Quran and ahadith. 
The most worrying thing for Muslims across the world is not the inhumanness of ISIS but 
rather its claim to be an Islamic group, when in fact its tactics significantly contradict true 
Islamic beliefs. Using passages from the Quran to justify their barbaric acts, ISIS have 
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executed over 10,000 Iraqis and Syrians including civilians (Kemble, 2015). The beheading 
of British aid worker Alan Henning who was delivering aid to Syria in 2014 is one of many 
beheadings of Westerners carried out by ISIS, claiming to be doing God’s work.  The 
Quranic verse “So when you meet those who disbelieve [in battle], strike [their] necks.” 
(Quran Chapter 47, Verse 4) is an example of how religious texts are taken out of context by 
ISIS. The following verse reads “Take them as captives when they are defeated. Then you 
may set them free as a favour to them, with or without a ransom, when the battle is over.” 
(Quran Chapter 47, Verse 4). It is clear from these verses that beheading innocents is not 
justified in the Quran, reinforcing the argument that ISIS take certain Quranic verses out of 
context and know very little about the fundamental aspects of Islam. There is strong evidence 
to suggest that religion is not the key trigger for joining ISIS and the most violent extremists 
are religious novices and reverts (Butler, 2015; Wiktorowicz, 2005). This rudimentary level 
of Islamic knowledge is apparent in many cases of ISIS extremists and terrorists. For 
example, the case of two young British terrorists who purchased books “Islam for dummies” 
and “the Koran for Dummies” before leaving to fight in Syria. It was also reported by 
Khosrokhavar (2009) that most European Muslims involved in terrorism in the West had 
almost no Islamic culture, were unable to perform compulsory prayers, and knew very little 
about Islamic rulings on alcohol, premarital sex and eating haram (unlawful) food. This 
reinforces the notion that terrorism is not motivated by religion and that most European 
terrorists in the West have very limited Islamic knowledge.  
 
The term Jihad is another Islamic concept which has been misinterpreted by Muslims and 
non-Muslims alike. It is derived from the word Juhd which means making an effort which is 
accompanied with some form of suffering (Al-Saidat & Al-Khawalda, 2012). In Islamic 
terminology, the meaning of jihad is primarily defensive as emphasis is placed on how 
Muslims should only fight in self-defence and not transgress their limits. It also means to 
struggle for the cause of Allah and refers to the personal struggles and hardships an 
individual may face. The term did not previously hold any negative connotations and was 
often used during wars in Islamic history. However, since the 9/11 terror attacks, the meaning 
of the word jihad has significantly deteriorated.  The media played a significant role in the 
negative representation of Islam and its attribution to violence and terrorism.  Through 
political literature and journalism, the word jihad became wrongly translated in the West as a 
‘holy war’ and terrorist Muslims were referred to as jihadis (McCabe, 2009). ISIS militants 
may have adopted the term jihadi but this is merely to make Jihad seem “cool” in order to 
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recruit globally. ISIS refuses to acknowledge the historical context of jihad and manipulate 
religious texts regarding jihad for their own political means (Ekici, Akdoğan, Ragab, Ekici, & 
Warnes, 2016).  
 
While Islam may help legitimise ISIS’ cause, the motivation for ISIS’ recruits is attributed to 
other social and political factors. For example, Khosrokhavar (2009) found that almost all 
terrorists from European countries were first and second-generation immigrants who 
described feeling isolated, marginalised and stigmatised. Research has also found that 
marginalisation and discrimination leads to greater support for radicalisation among Muslim 
immigrants in the US (Lyons-Padilla, Gelfand, Mirahmadi, Farooq, & van Egmond, 2015). 
This has provided ISIS and affiliates with a platform to reach out to potential recruits by 
inciting feelings of suffering and humiliation. According to Lyons-Padilla, Gelfand, 
Mirahmadi, Farooq & van Egmond (2015), ISIS intentionally target first and second-
generation Muslims living in the West in a bid for them to return to the Muslim world and 
pursue jihad against the “enemy”. Thus, it is vital for researchers to focus on how immigrants 
manage their social, cultural and religious identities. Moreover, ISIS propaganda invoking the 
suffering and perceived maltreatment of the Muslim community can make Muslims feel like 
they have no self-worth, thereby attracting Muslims to violent extremist groups which give 
them a sense of meaning and purpose. By committing to ISIS’ extreme definition of Jihad, 
Muslims in the West see this as a way of regaining status and a sense of belonging 
(Kruglanski, Gelfand, Bélanger, Sheveland, Hettiarachchi & Gunaratna, 2014). Hogg, 
Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, (2007) found that those who joined a group with a 
clear ideology were more likely to remain in the group as the divide between “us” and “them” 
gives people a clear understanding of what to believe and what to expect from those who do 
not belong to their group. As terrorist organisations may offer a clear sense of identity, this 
may explain why terrorist organisations like ISIS appeal to some Muslim immigrants. This 
poses serious implications for researchers and police who are looking for ways to reduce this 
risks of Islamic terrorism and highlights the need to examine who may potentially face an 
identity crisis and hence be at greater risk of supporting extremism.  
 
Is there a difference between the motives of ISIS foreign male and female recruits?  
Much of the research on ISIS’ Western fighters has predominantly focused on the motivating 
factors of Muslim men. However, ISIS has attracted the highest number of Western women 
than any other extremist group. Despite publicly committing atrocities such as beheadings, 
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sexual slavery against disbelieving women and acid attacks on women who do not wear the 
veil, the number of ISIS’ female fighters is rapidly growing. While the exact figure is 
unknown, over 550 Muslim women from European countries have travelled to Syria to join 
ISIS (Perešin, 2015). In the media, such women have been labelled “jihadi brides” - a term 
that implies young Western Muslim women are being lured by ISIS fighters to support a 
cause that they do not fully comprehend. There is a great deal of variation in the ethnic, 
educational, and religious backgrounds of ISIS’ Western female fighters, making it difficult 
to profile which women are at a greater risk of becoming radicalised via ISIS. The majority 
of these women are aged between 16 and 24, classed as second or third generation Muslim 
immigrants, and maintain high academic performance (Perešin, 2015). For example, the three 
teenage girls from East London who joined ISIS in 2015 were straight-A students (Shackle, 
2016), and 20-year-old Aqsa Mahmood from Scotland who married an ISIS fighter in Syria 
was a privately educated radiography student (Cowood, 2014). As many Muslim women are 
being trained to return to their Western country and facilitate terrorist attacks, it is vital to 
understand what factors motivate Western Muslim women to join ISIS in the first place. 
 
Much of the literature on what motivates Muslim men to join ISIS focuses on “jihadism” – 
the ideology that the West is to blame for the injustices and oppression being carried out 
against Muslims around the world (Tibi, 2007; Winter, 2015; Weenink, 2015).  Similarly, 
many Western women feel a religious duty towards the self-proclaimed caliphate. Although 
many women report religion as being the key motivator (Perešin, 2015; Barrett; 2014), there 
are also political motives present. Some women are angered by images of civilians suffering 
because of the Syrian war and feel that they must help relieve the crisis. For example, 20-
year-old Aqsa Mahmood from Scotland who married an ISIS fighter in Syria told her parents 
that she wanted to help those affected by the Syrian war. Some observers argue that ISIS’ 
online propaganda is an intentional tactic to brainwash young women and turn them into 
religious extremists. This political motivator is supported by Horgan (2008) who found that 
young Muslims were more likely to engage in violent extremism if they identified with the 
Muslims that are suffering across the world and disapproved of their own county’s foreign 
relations toward Muslim countries. Moreover, restrictions on freedom of religion have led 
many Muslim women to believe that they are being attacked by the West. For example, the 
veil ban in France restricts Muslim women from practicing their faith, making them feel 
unaccepted in Western society. Consequently, ISIS recruiters exploit the anger felt by 
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Western Muslims and offer them a life of equality and religious freedom under the Islamic 
State. 
 
Driven by more personal factors, many young Muslim girls whose families originate from 
conservative countries such as Bangladesh and Pakistan struggle to find a balance with the 
modern values of the West.  ISIS take advantage of their identity struggle by offering them a 
sense of belonging to the sisterhood that is going through the same struggle (Kneip, 2016). 
For example, Hoda, a Muslim girl from America who left her family and joined ISIS came 
from a family where the father was stricter with his daughters than sons and the women were 
not allowed to access social media. After secretly setting up social media accounts, Hoda 
became attracted to ISIS propaganda and later married an ISIS fighter in Syria (Buner, 2016). 
By joining ISIS and choosing her own husband, this may have been a way for Hoda to find 
her own identity and independence. Some also suggest that like young men, young women 
too are attracted to the idea of being involved in this exciting and adventurous movement that 
will be recorded in history (Hoyle, Bradford, & Frenett, 2015; Perešin, 2015). However, 
others still believe that the driving motivator for young women is their desire to marry a 
courageous Islamic fighter and raise future jihadists (Saltman & Winter, 2014; Khaleeli, 
2014). Driscoll (2015) found that many impressionable young girls hold a very romantic view 
of jihadism as one radical teenager told in an interview “you think with your head, we think 
with our hearts”. Some may argue that a motivation based solely on the desire to marry an 
ISIS fighter is weak; it requires strong willpower for young women to leave their friends and 
families and migrate to a war zone. Thus, such strong motivation must be accompanied with 
other factors.   
 
Other motives cited by young women include isolation, discontentment, poor family 
relations, and rebelling against cultural values (Perešin, 2015; Perisin & Cervone, 2015; 
Schmid, 2014).  Although religion is central to their participation in violent jihad, it is a 
combination of these personal, political and religious factors that motivate young western 
Muslims to join ISIS. While some Western women are leaving their countries for a better life 
under Islamic law, others are seeking an identity and acceptance. This makes it difficult to 
establish which is the most significant motivator for young women joining ISIS. Perešin 
(2015) suggests that ISIS recruiters deliberately employ a propaganda strategy that appeals to 
the diverse motives of young Western women, offering something to almost everyone. The 
individual motives of young women may gradually change with their experiences whilst 
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living in Syria. Women who wished to participate in suicide bombings and gain martyrdom 
by fighting “enemies” of religion later adopted more traditional gender roles such as cooking, 
cleaning and home-making (Saltman & Winter, 2014). By leaving their Western homes to 
marry ISIS fighters and giving birth to future jihadists, Muslim women believe that not only 
have they fulfilled their religious duty towards the caliphate, they have also secured their 
rewards in the eternal afterlife.  
 
Theories of terrorism 
Psychological theorists have proposed two main frameworks to help explain terrorist 
behaviour: top-down theories and bottom-up theories. Top-down theories explore the root 
causes of terrorism in political, social and economic contexts whereas bottom-up theories 
focus on the characteristics of an individual or group. The oppression theory is an example of 
a top-down theory as it posits that oppressive authoritarianism carried out by the government 
incites political violence which may facilitate terrorist activity (Schmid, 1983). Post, Sprinzak 
&Denny (2003) found that in sectarian and ethnic violence related terrorism, terrorist 
organisations often held the government responsible for taking way their sense of identity, 
self-respect and freedom. The counter-terrorism legislations imposed by the British 
government also appear to have detrimental effects on the Muslim community. Choudhry & 
Fenwick (2011) found that counter-terrorism legislations which allowed authorities to stop 
and question passengers at airports without a requirement of reasonable suspicion had the 
most negative impact on Muslim communities.  Muslims reported being questioned about 
their views on jihad, polygamy and how often they prayed. This made Muslims feel like they 
were suspected targets and that the police would use this information to profile them and the 
Muslim community. While oppression is a common theme in terrorism literature and 
regarded to be a motivating factor, there are currently no valid measures of perceived 
oppression or any empirical evidence to support the assumption that oppressive 
authoritarianism is a motivator of terrorism (Vicktoroff, 2005). Oppression is a concept that 
is subjective and therefore difficult to assess; thus, it is necessary to examine perceived 
oppression as a factor contributing to the rise of terrorism. Moreover, it is highly unlikely for 
terrorist organisations to succeed under oppressive governments. Since only a small minority 
of “oppressed” individuals become terrorists, this raises the question of why other 
“oppressed” individuals living in repressive regimes do not become terrorists. Thus, more 
study and development is required in order to understand the relationship between oppression 
and terrorism. 
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Psychoanalytical explanations of terrorism demonstrate a bottom-up approach. According to 
the psychoanalytic theory first proposed by Freud (1923), behaviour is a result of the 
interactions between the three components of the mind: the id, ego and superego. Personality 
develops during childhood through psychosexual stages of development and sexual fantasies 
are the main driver of personality development (Gabbard, 2000). Psychological distress is 
rooted in the unconscious mind and occurs as a result of unconscious conflict regarding those 
sexual fantasies. There are two themes from this theory that are central to understanding 
terrorist behaviour: (1) hostility towards one’s parents is an unconscious motivator for 
terrorism and (2) terrorism is a result of childhood abuse and trauma (Borum, 2004). The 
assumption that terrorism is motivated by childhood abuse was first proposed by Feuer 
(1969) who construed terrorism in males as being rivalry with their fathers; a concept central 
to the Oedipus complex. However, as with most variants of the psychoanalytic theory, this 
theory is underpinned by non-scientific concepts such as the unconscious mind which are 
difficult to assess.  
 
An alternative theory of terrorism proposes that partakers of terrorism tend to be young 
individuals who lack self- esteem and are struggling to establish an identity (Fischer, Haslam 
& Smith, 2010). The social identity theory first developed by Erikson (1959) suggests that 
social groups influence cognitive processes and perceptions of events, thereby influencing 
identity formation. Unlike the social learning theory which focuses on the environment of an 
individual or group, the social identity theory places more emphasis on the individual’s sense 
of personal identity and joins the gap between the individual and the environment. Social 
identities represent the different social categories to which people belong such as religion, 
ethnicity and gender. According to Fischer, Haslam & Smith (2010) behaviour is driven by 
the beliefs and values held by these social categories and when a social identity is salient, the 
perception of threat to that identity is more likely to cause reactive violence.  
 
A fundamental view in terrorism literature is that identity crises among young Muslims are 
caused by the perceived threat to Islam. Ysseldyk, Matheson & Anisman (2011) provide 
empirical support for the assumption that when a social identity such as religiosity is more 
powerful, responses to perceived threats are more likely to be retaliatory. Catholic, Protestant 
and Muslims participants were exposed to a fictious article in which the majority of 
Canadians felt coldly towards the participants’ religion. The article also intended to threaten 
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participants’ religious group by stating that the regional government would use data from the 
study to reduce financial support for their religious group. Participants were appraised on 
their coping responses to the threat, negative emotions and action intentions. Findings 
revealed that participants who considered religion essential to their identity exhibited higher 
levels of anger and were more supportive of confrontational action. Ysseldyk, Matheson & 
Anisman (2011) concluded that cognitive appraisals play a vital part in demonstrating how 
perceived threats to one’s religious identity can trigger negative emotions and increase 
intentions for aggressive responses. These findings provide a useful insight into how young 
Muslims may turn to terrorist violence in the search for an identity. For example, a young 
Egyptian Muslim, Sayyid Qutb, who travelled to America to study was shocked by American 
values such as gender-mixed dancing and women wearing revealing clothing which went 
against the traditional Islamic laws he was accustomed to. Qutb started to display radical 
views upon his return to Egypt, and began to see these American values in Egypt which 
incited further radicalisation, leading him to join a terrorist organisation (Wright, 2007). One 
explanation for this change in behaviour is that American values had shaken Qutb’s identity 
and so he began to express these role confusions in the extremist group that offered him with 
an instant sense of identity (O’ Brien, 2010). Similarly, many young British Muslims of 
Asian and Eastern backgrounds are faced with the predicament of adopting Western values 
which are conflicting with the values of Islam. As such, the dynamics of social identities and 
the pressure for young Muslims to belong is essential to the study of terrorism. While the 
social identity theory has been applicable to the biographies of many terrorists, there are 
currently no empirical studies which have tested the validity of this theory to young terrorists. 
Thus, further research is required to fully understand the relationship between identity crises 
and Islamically-inspired terrorism among Muslim youth. 
 
There are, however, conceptual overlaps between top-down and bottom-up theories as some 
take into consideration the interaction between environmental contexts and the individual 
who engages in terrorism. For example, the rational choice theory assumes that terrorist 
behaviour stems from a rational and deliberately planned decision to engage in terrorist 
activity as a means of achieving a socio-political objective (Wilson, 2000). Unlike other 
psychological theories which explain why individuals may be predisposed to a type of 
behaviour, the rational choice theory assumes that terrorism may not necessarily reflect 
psychopathological or irrational behaviour, but instead represents the best strategy to obtain a 
particular goal. According to the theory, changes to the rules of the "game" played between 
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terrorists and targeted governments may help predict and subsequently change behaviour. As 
concepts of the theory focus on both circumstantial changes and behavioural responses to 
these changes, this demonstrates a combination of the top-down and bottom-up approach. 
Game theory, derived from the rational choice theory, has been used to predict how effective 
pro-active defence measures which reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack being successful 
are (Sandler & Siqueira, 2009).  There has been much empirical support for the game theory, 
particularly from the prisoner’s dilemma game in which participants play against opponents 
to maximise goals subject to constraints (see Tucker, 2001). The relevance of this to terrorism 
is that similar techniques can be applied to understand the interdependent relationship 
between terrorists and their targets; it helps reveal any implications when both “players” 
execute actions based on their judgment of what their opponent is thinking. If game theory is 
applied in terrorism research, it can help predict the utility of anti-terrorism policies and 
determine whether a terrorist act is likely to maximise goals for the perpetrator (Sandler & 
Arce, 2003). Support for this theory is offered by Wiktorowicz (2005) who studied members 
of an extremist group in Britain promoting the use of violence to create an Islamic state and 
claimed that the young men involved were informed and their behaviour seemed rational if 
seen from their point of view. The notion that terrorist behaviour is “rational” is reinforced by 
several studies which have found that terrorists do not usually display any sign of mental 
disorders (see Post, Sprinzak, & Denny 2003; Post & Gold, 2002; Horgan, 2003). 
 
While the rational choice theory provides a useful insight into the factors underlying the 
actions of terrorists and targeted governments, the approach is not without its limitations. 
Some of the actions of terrorists challenge the assumption that terrorist activity represents the 
best strategy to obtain a socio-political goal. Brannan, Eslerm, & Anders Strindberg (2001) 
argue that terrorists’ goals are not always plausible and terrorist acts do not always guarantee 
that desired goals will be attained and therefore cannot be considered a rational approach for 
pursuing these goals. Another limitation of the theory is that it fails to explain why only a 
small proportion of British Muslims become terrorists. Instead, the theory focuses on what 
terrorists are likely to do in different circumstances. It does not take into consideration how 
individual emotions, experiences and circumstances may influence rationality (Victoroff, 
2005). Thus, only these individual experiences can explain why only a small minority of 
Muslims among many others living in similar conditions leave the UK to engage in terrorism. 
Moreover, if terrorism was indeed rational, it should be expected that terrorist organisations 
will disperse once they have accomplished their goals. However, research suggests that 
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terrorists often deliberately obstruct their own victory just moments before reaching an 
agreement with the other party. This allows terrorists to uphold their existence as part of a 
group and continue to engage in violence to satisfy other individual needs. Thus, the game 
theory requires further development in terms of understanding the impact of individual 
differences and how these may contribute to terrorist behaviour.  
 
Much research has focused on the social, political and psychological factors contributing to 
terrorism and little has been studied on how cultural factors may influence terrorist activity. 
According to Weinberg and Eubank (1994), there are cross-cultural differences in the 
behaviour of terrorists. Collectivistic cultures such as Pakistan, for example, stress the 
importance of giving priority to group goals over individual goals and value cohesion within 
social systems. Conversely, in individualistic cultures such as the US, society is centred 
around the self and personal goals. Weinberg & Eubank (1994) compared psychological 
rankings of participants from different countries such as Pakistan, Israel and the US to a 
terrorist activity report database. They suggest that individuals from collectivistic cultures are 
more likely to attack innocent out-group members whereas those from individualistic cultures 
are more likely to attack members of other individualist cultures than innocents. However, 
their study is flawed in that participants may not fully represent the culture to which they 
belong and therefore cannot be accurately classified into individualistic or collectivistic 
cultures. There are also subgroups within cultures that differentiate from the larger culture 
and the study fails to acknowledge that terrorists may originate from such subgroups. 
Moreover, the theory fails to explain why those from individualistic cultures carry out 
terrorist attacks on out-group members. Nevertheless, the notion that cultural differences 
exist in the expression of terrorism is supported by more recent studies. Cultures which hold a 
strictly traditional view of gender roles and believe their life and destiny is preordained tend 
to display higher rates of terrorism (Aycan et al. 2000; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & 
Gupta, 2004). Research has also found that terrorism rates are higher for cultures in which 
deviation from the norms, beliefs and values leads to punishment (Gelfand et al 2011). As an 
increasingly large number of British Muslims have left the UK to fight for ISIS are originally 
from nations higher on collectivism (e.g. South Asia and the Middle East), it is essential to 
examine the cultural factors influencing extremism in order to understand, predict and 
combat the prevalence of terrorist attacks. 
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The Social media strategy of ISIS 
Social media has played a crucial role in the rise of ISIS and its Western recruits. The launch 
of this social media campaign which started with an execution video of James Foley, a British 
journalist, has redefined ISIS propaganda. ISIS is not the first terrorist group to use social 
media to achieve its goal. Militants from terrorist group Al-Shabaab used Twitter to 
intimidate opponents by live-tweeting the shooting of civilians in a mall and Lashkar-e-Taiba 
use intelligence gathered from Google Earth and mobile phones to aid its attack on Mumbai 
(Farwell, 2014). But what makes ISIS stand apart is the group’s carefully-calculated 
strategies and selectivity with what content is posted online. The main aim of ISIS’ 
propaganda is to expand its war beyond Iraq and Syria and attract potential recruits in the 
West.  Ignoring the reality that ISIS is a brutal terrorist group responsible for the killing of 
innocent men, women and children, ISIS uses social media to portray life under ISIS as better 
than life in the West. As the group floods the internet with propaganda and encourages 
supporters to share content online, this is what provides ISIS with a platform to reach out to 
the world, particularly to young Muslims.  
 
Through various social media networks such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Ask.Fm, 
Tumblr, WhatsApp and YouTube, this campaign is being promoted in several different 
languages. ISIS promoters have even released videos in English and French which include 
testimonials from foreign fighters about their journeys (Farwell, 2014). Consequently, 
supporters from across the world have been inspired to participate in the production and 
distribution of ISIS’ narrative, including those from the UK, US and Europe. Testimonials 
from jihadi brides posted on blogs such as tumblr have also proven to be a very effective 
strategy in attracting young Western women (Blaker, 2015). By communicating the high 
living standards of women married to ISIS fighters, online recruiters are conveying a life of 
happiness under the rule of ISIS. Discussion boards such as ask.fm give potential applicants 
the opportunity to ask fighters and jihadi brides questions about their daily routines. 
Supporters who have already joined the group in Syria are able to offer tips to westerners 
planning to travel such as advice on what type of clothing to bring, what vaccinations are 
required before travelling, and how to contact their families back home once they reach their 
destination (which is of course very important for teenagers). After “educating” vulnerable 
recruits and reassuring them that this is right thing to do, ISIS militants advise those seriously 
interested in travelling to Syria to use encrypted messaging services such as WhatsApp to get 
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more detailed information. In cases where it is difficult to travel, recruits are encouraged to 
carry out terrorist attacks in their home country.  
 
Execution videos and images gone viral via Facebook and YouTube serve as a means of 
spreading fear among opposing parties and mobilising support from prospective recruits 
(Weiman, 2015). On the other hand, ISIS have posted images of its fighters eating foods from 
familiar brands such as Nutella. This is believed to be a modern marketing technique to 
appeal to potential recruits and assure them that they will lead a life of luxury if they join 
ISIS (Vergani & Bliuc, 2015). More friendly images have also been released of ISIS fighters 
playing with cats, a reference to the Prophet Mohammed who was very fond of cats (Farwell, 
2014). Again, this is considered a well-planned strategy to convey the message that as well as 
having its roots in Islam, ISIS believes in promoting the wellbeing of its followers, not in 
harming them. Although the release of such images may seem like a good tactic, the 
emotional impact of propaganda endorsing the killing of innocents will most likely backfire 
according to Farwell (2014). The extreme brutalities of ISIS led even the quite radical al-
Qaeda members to disavow the group in the fear that such brutality would lose them 
supporters. However, ISIS militants have responded to such backlash by utilising social 
media to promote a more positive image of the group. For instance, ISIS have used social 
media to announce that they have opened English-language schools for foreign fighters’ 
children in the Islamic State. Not only do these schools offer education for both boys and 
girls, there are also job opportunities for English-speaking teachers at the schools too (Blaker, 
2015). 
 
Twitter, however, remains ISIS’ main weapon in this war of social media. Not only is it easy 
for online recruiters to hide their true identities, users are able to share content with a large 
number of people and twitter accounts can be easily recreated if they are closed down 
(Klausen, 2015). The twitter app, ‘The Dawn of Glad Tidings’ also known as ‘Dawn’, 
released by ISIS is a more sophisticated social media strategy enabling users to keep up with 
the group’s latest news (Farwell, 2014). Once signed up, the app posts tweets including links, 
images and hashtags which have been composed by ISIS to every users account so that they 
trend on twitter. Consequently, ISIS is able to magnify its message and intimidate opponents. 
For example, ‘Dawn’ app users posted over 40, 000 tweets in one day during an offensive 
which saw ISIS march into a city in Iraq, including an image of an armed ISIS fighter 
captioned “We are coming, Baghdad”.  The high volume of these tweets caused this 
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particular image to show up first in search results for Baghdad, which was undoubtedly a 
method of instilling fear in the city’s residents (Vitale & Keagle, 2014). Furthermore, twitter 
has empowered ISIS fighters to spread images and videos of brutalities such as beheadings to 
youth, particularly to young men, who are fascinated by the excitement and adventure 
associated with war. Captivated by the idea of fighting for Allah to attain paradise and an 
eternal afterlife, ISIS fighters glorify jihad to make fighting in Syria seem more exciting than 
being “bored” in their home countries (Perisin, 2015). 
 
There is, however, a drawback to this social media strategy. While ISIS may boast about its 
violent atrocities through images and videos shared online, such propaganda can be used by 
opponents to combat the group’s extremist narrative and dissuade prospective western 
recruits. For example, the US State Department mocked ISIS by releasing a graphic video on 
YouTube which contained footage originally posted by the group itself of a 
mosque being blown up and a body with a severed head, ending with a sarcastic note for 
prospective recruits:  ‘Travel is inexpensive, because you won't need a return ticket!’ 
(McShane, 2014). Another example is the BBC’s comedy drama mocking British jihadi 
brides in an attempt to highlight the risks Western women face of being groomed online to 
become ISIS suicide bombers. However, this does not mean that the journey to combat ISIS 
will be easy for opposing parties. ISIS militants appear to understand that social media can 
have both favourable and unfavourable consequences. As counter-terrorism agencies have hit 
back at ISIS by identifying and closing down their social media accounts and websites, the 
group aims to guard its identity and location by reducing the use of cyber-technology among 
members and sending operational messages by hand (Farwell, 2014). Essentially, social 
media is retained for carefully-planned propaganda.  Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
ISIS’ social media operations are immune to online attacks as technological advances and 
hackers pose threats even for government agencies. Ultimately, it is necessary for authorities 
to focus energies on discrediting ISIS and withdrawing its association with Islam in order to 
destroy the brutal terror group. 
 
The UK’s counter-terrorism strategy 
Following recent terror attacks in the US and Europe, the UK faces a severe threat from being 
targeted by ISIS and other terrorist organisations alike. The UK has launched international 
strategies which involve troops being sent to the Middle-East to fight ISIS, and the US and 
other nations continue to launch air strikes in Iraq and Syria. However, many questions have 
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been raised about how effective these strategies will be in defeating ISIS and its allies in the 
long run. Although recent military campaigns have proved to be effective in weakening ISIS 
and its control over Iraqi and Syrian territories, they are not addressing the factors that uphold 
the group: its appeal to foreign recruits. Thus, it is crucial for both national and international 
governments to develop domestic strategies that fight the root causes of home-grown 
terrorism and ISIS on the whole.  
 
In order to tackle the ongoing threat from terrorism, the UK government has developed a 
domestic counter-terrorism strategy called CONTEST to protect its citizens. The aim of 
CONTEST is to identify British citizens who are at risk of being radicalised and stop them 
from becoming terrorists. The strategy is centred around four objectives: PURSUE (to stop 
terrorist attacks), PREVENT (to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism), 
PROTECT (to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack) and PREPARE (to mitigate the 
impact of a terrorist attack) (Home office, 2011b). According to Rowley, a counter-terrorism 
police officer in the UK, nearly 50 deadly terror attacks have been stopped since the 7/7 
bombings in London (Beake, 2015). The Europol Report (2016) providing statistics on foiled, 
failed and successful terrorist attacks in the EU during 2015 revealed that there although the 
number of terror attacks in the UK was that year was relatively high (103), the majority of 
these attacks did not result in any deaths and were attributed to national terrorism in Ireland. 
In light of these statistics, it appears that CONTEST is proving to be successful in mitigating 
home-grown Islamist terrorism in the UK. However, critics argue that although CONTEST 
has been highly commended because of the very few deadly terror attacks attributed to 
Islamist terrorism since 2005, the success of the strategy is questionable. As with any other 
counter-terrorism strategy, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of CONTEST since its 
success is determined by the absence of completed terror attacks (Gearson & Rosemont, 
2015).  While successful terror attacks are easy to quantify and media outlets are quick to 
circulate statistics regarding the number of causalities, fatalities, and terrorist ideologies, 
foiled attacks are more difficult to assess. Brady (2016) suggests that when examining data 
on foiled terrorist plots, it is important to consider other factors that may potentially skew 
data. For example, the motives of the person providing the data, their definition of a plot or 
an attack, or their criteria for what a foiled attack constitutes. As these factors are subjective, 
the reliability of the data being used for statistics on foiled attacks comes under scrutiny, 
making it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies. In essence, 
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until these measures are evaluated, it is difficult to accurately assess whether counter-
terrorism strategies are indeed effective. 
 
The most controversial part of the CONTEST strategy is the PREVENT component which 
seeks to identify radicalised individuals and challenge violent extremism. Working alongside 
a wide range of sectors including schools, mosques and other institutions where there are 
risks of radicalisation, the strategy is largely aimed at Muslim communities in Britain. 
Although the PREVENT strategy does not intend to discriminate, many argue that there is the 
danger that it has the potential to stigmatise Muslims communities, widening the divide 
between British Muslims and non-Muslims (Thomas, 2009; Spalek & Mcdonald, 2009; Birt, 
2009). In response to public backlash, the government revised the PREVENT document in 
2011 by addressing theoretical and practical implications of the strategy’s previous version. 
The revised version, which openly admits previous weaknesses and areas for improvement, 
changed the focus of its strategy to challenge the ideologies of terrorists, ensure that the 
appropriate advice and support is given to individuals at risk of being drawn to terrorism and 
support institutions such as schools and mosques. Critics argue that even with the revised 
version, the strategy still treats Muslims as a ‘suspect community’ and targets institutions 
which have strong relations with Muslim communities such as mosques, for example (Awan, 
2012; Bonino, 2013). Muslim councils argued that the teaching materials offered by 
authorities to imams as part of a citizenship program for teenagers insinuated that terrorists 
were working in almost every mosque in Britain (Casciani, 2014). Consequently, this made 
imams feel as though they were being closely watched and led members of the Muslim 
community to lose trust in security services and disengage with the counter-terrorism 
measures they were trying to put in place.  
 
 
Universities, as institutions where youth grow as individuals and form their sense of identity 
and belonging, have also attracted the attention of security services. Given the fact that 22-
year-old student, Waheed Zaman, found guilty of plotting to blow up a British airline was the 
president of the Islamic Society at London University, Islamic societies at universities have 
been highly scrutinised.  Among growing concerns that university students are being targeted 
for recruitment by extremist organisations, some members of Islamic Student societies feel 
that they are being unfairly targeted by counter-terrorism policies (Choudhury & Fenwick, 
2011).  Brown & Saeed (2014) report that British universities have even encouraged staff 
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members to closely watch students who look Muslim and Asian to prevent them from 
becoming extremists.  While some British Muslims have responded by engaging with policy-
makers and challenging any misunderstandings that people may have about Islam, many 
more Muslims expressed feeling alienated and isolated, and displayed increased levels of 
anxiety and vulnerability (Choudhury & Fenwick, 2011). Critics of the strategy may argue 
that on one hand, PREVENT seeks to address the argument that it marginalises British 
Muslims, yet on the other hand policymakers refuse to work with members of the Muslim 
community who may be crucial to the strategy’s success. Although some revisions to 
PREVENT are favourable, policymakers are still failing to successfully connect with Muslim 
communities without being discriminatory, and thereby run the risk of developing strategies 
that are counterproductive.  
 
The UK’s counter terrorism strategy consists of many flaws but it should not be disregarded 
as entirely problematic either. The criticisms thrown at the PREVENT component of 
CONTEST have weight but the government has displayed serious efforts to revise its 
previous versions so as to weaken associations with marginalisation and measure how 
effective the strategy is. With the growing number of young British Muslims travelling to 
Syria and joining ISIS, the motives for their actions needs to be addressed and dealt with. 
Until policy-makers can accurately assess how and why people become radicalised, what 
inspires them to leave their homes to fight for a cause abroad and potentially bring terrorism 
back to the UK, it is not possible to successfully counter the radicalisation process. The 
police and security services also run the risk of undermining trust and cooperation from 
Muslim communities. Therefore, policy-makers need to focus efforts on regaining the trust of 
Muslim in Britain as well as evaluating counter-terrorism measures in order to determine 
which is the most effective approach to counterterrorism.  
 
Summary 
The research literature and theories explored above suggest that there are a wide range of 
social, political and personal factors contributing to the involvement of young British 
Muslims in Islamic terrorism. There is a growing consensus in the research literature that the 
draw to radicalisation among young Muslims is a developmental process driven by alienation 
and has little to do with religion itself. Researchers have used exploratory studies in order to 
understand what leads Muslims to become terrorists. While some young Muslims turn to 
extremism because they are seeking an identity and acceptance in the West, others are 
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leaving Britain for a better life under Sharia law. ISIS’ social media strategy has proven to be 
very effective in recruiting young British Muslims. As the group floods the internet with 
propaganda and encourages supporters to share content online, this is what provides ISIS 
with a platform to reach out to the world, particularly to young Muslims. Although policy 
makers have tried to combat terrorism by introducing counter-terrorism strategies such as 
CONTEST, there is the danger that such strategies have the potential to stigmatise British 
Muslims. Furthermore, the profiles of young Muslims involved in terrorism are very diverse; 
there is no universal profile of Muslim terrorists. Thus, more exploratory study is required on 
the individual circumstances of young British Muslims in order to better understand the 
process of radicalisation and why young Muslims travel to Syria and join ISIS. 
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Methodology 
Research Design  
A cross-sectional qualitative research design was used as this is considered a more suitable 
approach for providing rich in-depth data. It enables researchers to understand the why and 
how through methods which generate words in contrast to the quantitative approach which 
describes numerical data (Cohen, Manion & Morison, 2000).  As the study aimed to examine 
young Muslims’ perceptions on the causes of Islamic terrorism among British youth, it used 
an empirical design which was more suited to this type of research. In light of the literature 
review, it was clear that the research topic of terrorism was complex and sensitive; therefore, 
a qualitative research method was more appropriate than a quantitative method which limits 
understanding of views, opinions and motivations that underlie behaviour (Creswell, 2013).  
When a phenomenon such as terrorism is not well defined or understood, a qualitative 
research design is more useful. For example, a qualitative method can explore the problems 
young British Muslims encounter, the needs they have but can’t communicate, or any 
misunderstandings they have about Islam. Although quantitative methods have been widely 
used in terrorism related research, there are many theoretical and conceptual implications 
with this type of method. These implications include the varying definitions of terrorism that 
lack empirical tests, the failure to distinguish between different types of terrorism, and the use 
of incorrect data analyses when designing research (Young & Findley, 2011). When trying to 
understand the process of radicalisation and how people become terrorists, a qualitative 
approach can break down the complexity of the topic being studied into more manageable 
parts. Rich and detailed data is not collected in a controlled laboratory setting but rather from 
observation and face to face interviews (Monfared & Derakhshan, 2015). Thus, studying 
young Muslims in the context and environment they are living in enables the researcher to 
better understand the causes of terrorism. Moreover, when trying to explain the reasoning or 
motivations behind certain behaviour, a qualitative approach is helpful. For example, when 
trying to establish what causes young Muslims to leave Britain and become terrorists, 
listening to young Muslims voice their opinions can help form theories and establish testable 
hypotheses. 
 
According to David & Sutton (2004), it is crucial to identify an ontology and an epistemology 
prior to carrying out research as it determines what research design is to be used. Ontology is 
the study of the nature of being and a belief system whereby individuals interpret social 
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realities as either objective or subjective (Blaikie, 2010). Consequently, objectivism (or 
positivism) is an ontological position that is external, objective and independent of social 
entities whereas subjectivism (or interpretivism) is socially constructed, subjective and may 
change (Bryman, 2012).  Epistemology (the study of knowledge and justified belief) is also 
crucial to qualitative research and informs the choice of methodology. According to 
Hallebone & Priest (2009), epistemology is concerned with natural sources and limitations of 
knowledge when carrying out research. When carrying out a research study, the research 
process may combine knowledge from various sources. For example, knowledge based on 
intuition can be used to identify an area of research and authoritative knowledge is acquired 
through reading research literature. Additionally, logical knowledge is created when 
analysing data, and findings from the study can be seen as empirical knowledge (Hallebone 
& Priest (2009). As with ontology, epistemology also offers positivist and interpretivist 
research philosophies. Since positivism relies heavily on natural science, it has come under 
intense scrutiny for disregarding beliefs, morality and values (Dieronitou, 2014). Unlike 
quantitative research which is objective and follows a fixed process of data collection and 
analysis, qualitative research is subjective and the research process changes as the researcher 
learns more about the topic being studied. Consequently, the current study adopted an 
interpretivist ontological and epistemological position as this stance enables the researcher to 
seek the truth in people’s lived experiences through comprehensive interpretation (Byrne-
Armstrong, Higgs & Horsfall, 2001).   
 
Method  
The study used individual semi-structured interviews (see appendix 1). According to 
(Whiting, 2008), in-depth semi-structured interviews allow the interviewees to express their 
opinions, interests and feelings. The responses generated from structured interviews lack 
detail as they rely on the use of closed-end questions which produces quantitative data, 
thereby limiting our understanding of why individuals act in a certain way. In contrast, a 
semi-structured interview enables the conversation to flow and gives the interviewer liberty 
to explore views and opinions in more detail than a questionnaire or structured interview 
(Bryman, 2008). Interviewing is a form of ethnographic methodology which focuses on 
learning about people and their culture (Berkwits & Inui, 1998). This ethnographic approach 
to qualitative research allows the researcher to become immersed in the environment of the 
group being studied in order to understand the behaviour, thought processes and any other 
topics of interest pertinent to that particular group. However, it is important to be objective 
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and not look at the group of study in the same way one would looks at members of their own 
group/culture. As Qu & Dumay (2011) argue, one limitation of conducting an ethnographic 
study is that researchers may inadvertently steer participants in a certain direction if they have 
already decided what results they want to achieve from their research. Thus, it was crucial to 
put aside personal views and opinions so that participants did not become aware of the nature 
of the study and subsequently change their behaviour to fit the research aims. Nevertheless, it 
has been widely agreed by researchers that semi-structured interviews are the most suitable 
method when trying to gain a deeper understanding of participant’ views, opinions and 
experiences (Denscombe, 2007). They also possess increased validity as interviewees have 
the freedom to elaborate on their responses, clarify any uncertainties and steer the direction of 
the interview (Mcleod, 2014).  
  
According to Denscombe (2007), a limitation of interviews is that they are not reliable as the 
sample tends to be small and so the researcher has limited access to the amount of views and 
opinions. This was overcome by increasing the sample size to ten participants. While group 
interviews (i.e. focus groups) are more appropriate for a higher number of participants and 
less time consuming than individual interviews, this was not considered a suitable method of 
data collection in this study. The interviewer has greater control over the data produced in an 
individual interview than in a focus group where participants may take the lead (Gibbs, 
1997). Since focus groups encourage participants to interact with one another and express 
their views and opinions, the researcher has limited control over the discussion other than 
ensuring participants remain focused on the topic. It can also be very difficult to obtain a 
representative sample and dominant speakers may discourage others who are less confident 
from participating (Smithson, 2000). The topic of terrorism is sensitive and political and 
therefore participants in a focus group may be inclined to remain silent and feel more 
comfortable discussing the issue in individual interviews. Focus groups may also inhibit 
participants from sharing personal information with other participants. Thus, due to the nature 
of the topic being studied, the use of individual interviews was considered a more suitable 
approach in this research study. 
 
The interview consisted of a series of questions relating to various topics of interest identified 
within the research literature including views on men and women who join ISIS, the meaning 
of jihad, ISIS’ appeal for young British Muslims, the influence of social media on terrorism 
and counter-terrorism strategies. While the interview questions were prepared prior to the 
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interview, the interviewer was still able to follow topical issues in the discussion that diverted 
away from the original set of questions when considered appropriate by the interviewer. 
Consequently, some questions were created during the interview as new ideas emerged, 
enabling the interviewer and interviewee to go into further detail on an emerging topic. As 
stated by Miller & Dingwall (1997), interviews are intentional opportunities to facilitate the 
interviewee to express their views about a subject that they may be hesitant to speak about. 
Thus, it was necessary to ask interviewees direct questions that had been pre-planned to 
enable the interview to remain focused on terrorism among British Muslims.  
 
 
Sampling 
Participants were recruited through purposive and snowball sampling. The research study 
selected young British Muslims from West Yorkshire according to the aims of the study 
which wanted to focus on young Muslims who live in a community which has previous links 
with Islamist terrorism.  The sample consisted of 10 Muslims (five males and five females) 
who were aged between 18 and 24. Participants were of either Indian or Pakistani ethnic 
background and lived in one of the following districts in West Yorkshire: Dewsbury, Batley, 
Leeds or Bradford. Snowball sampling was also utilised as participants helped identify and 
recruit other participants who were willing to take part in the study. As purposive and 
snowball samples mean that the sample is not randomly selected, these sampling methods are 
open to selection bias and may lead to a sample that is not representative of the target 
population. Nevertheless, these methods are appropriate when random sampling is not 
suitable for the study, when the research is focused on a small population, or when the study 
is exploratory (Schutt, 2009). Furthermore, snowball sampling is time-effective and 
facilitates quick recruitment of participants. Purposive sampling makes it easier to generalise 
the findings of the study to the wider population compared to random sampling where every 
participant may not possess characteristics that are imperative to the study. Moreover, not 
being able to generalise the research findings of a qualitative study is not usually a cause for 
concern; generalisability is not a prerequisite when the aims of the research are to understand 
a phenomenon in a specific population or ethnic group (Leung, 2015).  
 
Many researchers agree that sampling becomes more difficult when the research topic is 
sensitive as potential participants will have more reason to hide their actions (Lee, 1993; 
McCosker Barnard & Gerber, 2001; Faugier & Sargeant, 1997). As the topic of terrorism was 
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sensitive and controversial, it was necessary to address any issues regarding psychological 
safety that may arise when discussing this particular topic. Some members of the sample had 
personally known a Muslim student from Dewsbury who was killed whilst fighting for ISIS 
in Syria. McCosker, Barnard & Gerber (2001) suggests that when conducting an interview on 
a sensitive subject, the interviewer may be required to adopt the role of a counsellor. Failure 
to acknowledge any emotional or psychological distress shown by the interviewee may lead 
to a loss of trust, and subsequently alter the significance and meaning of the data (McCosker, 
Barnard & Gerber, 2001). As some of the participants were the interviewer’s friends, this 
helped to build a good relationship between the interviewer and interviewee, allowing 
participants to feel more comfortable to disclose information related to a sensitive topic. 
Furthermore, as the interviewer shared the same ethnic and religious background (Asian and 
Muslim) as participants, interviewees may feel more safe to discuss their views on terrorism 
than they would with somebody from a different background.  While using an interviewer 
who is from a similar ethnic/religious background as the participants may have its 
advantages, it is not without its limitations. Confirmation bias may occur as the researcher 
interprets the raw data based on their own individual beliefs and culture (Stenbacka, 2001). 
The researcher may only pay attention to certain responses that they deem relevant to their 
research hypotheses, disregarding any information that does not confirm their hypotheses. In 
order to minimise confirmation bias, it was necessary for the researcher to consciously assess 
and evaluate the raw data and challenge any pre-existing beliefs and hypotheses. 
 
Procedure  
A pilot study consisting of two participants was carried out which revealed that some of the 
interview questions were similar and therefore the interview was revised and questions were 
modified in order to prevent the same responses from being generated. The pilot study also 
found that writing notes down on paper during the interview resulted in inadequate data for 
analysis and hindered the interviewer from building a rapport with the interviewee. Cohen & 
Crabtree (2006) suggest tape recording interviews as semi-structured interviews contains 
open-ended questions which may result in new questions emerging during the interview. As 
development of rapport is essential in interviews, it was decided that the most appropriate 
method to record the data was to use a dictaphone and transcribe the data afterwards for 
analysis. 
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Permission was taken from the president of the Islamic society (ISOC) at the University of 
Huddersfield to hand out information sheets which gave a brief description of the study to 
potential participants (see appendix 2). The same information sheet was sent out via emails to 
other potential participants. If participants agreed to take part in the study, they were invited 
to attend an interview in a meeting room at either the university or in a friend’s business in 
Batley. Prior to the interview, the participant was asked to signed a consent form (see 
appendix 3). Interviews lasted between 16-45 minutes. Once the interview was complete, the 
participants were given a debrief form (see appendix 4). The interviews were recorded on a 
dictaphone and stored on a password protected computer file. The audio recordings were 
deleted once the interviews had been transcribed. 
 
Data Analysis  
Thematic analysis was used to analyse the research data collected in the current study. 
According to Braun & Clarke (2006), thematic analysis is a method that all qualitative 
researchers should learn first as the skillset acquired can be utilised in other qualitative 
methods of analysis such as grounded theory and interpretative phenomenological analysis 
(IPA). Although thematic analysis is used to identify, analyse, and report recurring themes in 
a given data set, the method goes beyond simply describing words or phrases and provides a 
detailed interpretation of certain codes/themes identified within the data. One strength of 
thematic analysis is that it has more theoretical flexibility than other qualitative methods of 
data analysis. While IPA and grounded theory take the same concept of examining themes 
within the data, both methods are theoretically restricted. IPA is rooted in phenomenological 
epistemology and grounded theory requires the researcher to select an existing theoretical 
framework first and then collect data to show how the theory is relevant to the research topic 
(Holloway & Todres, 2003).  Other methods such as discourse analysis and conversation 
analysis are underpinned by a specific theory of language when looking for patterns in a data 
set. Thematic analysis, on the other hand, is suitable for a wide range of theoretical 
frameworks and epistemologies including both essentialist and constructionist research 
paradigms. This theoretical independence means that thematic analysis may be an easier 
method to learn, especially for those who are new to qualitative research (Braun & Clarke, 
2006). Consequently, thematic analysis was considered the best method for analysis in this 
study as not only does it serve as a flexible research tool which is independent of theoretical 
knowledge, it is a more accessible form of analysis for students. It can be applied to research 
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questions that focus on the experiences and understandings of people in regard to a particular 
subject, making it suitable for studying people’s views on terrorism. As thematic analysis is 
suitable for large data sets and can be used to generate analyses that are underpinned by data 
or theory, this method was deemed the most appropriate for this study.  
 
Ethical considerations 
Ethical clearance was approved by the School of Human and Health Sciences Research 
Ethics Panel (SREP) at the University of Huddersfield. In order to address any ethical 
concerns in the current study, ethical guidelines set by the British Psychological Society were 
followed.  Informed consent to participate in the study was obtained from participants after 
they were provided with an information sheet on the study and given the opportunity to ask 
questions. Participants were given the right to withdraw at any point prior during the study 
without giving a reason.  By giving each participant a false name rather than their real name, 
this enabled their identity to remain anonymous. Participants were informed that the 
information disclosed within the interview will be kept confidential, unless they indicated 
that they or anyone else was at risk of serious harm, in which case this information would be 
reported to the authorities in accordance with counter terrorism legislations. The research 
topic of terrorism was sensitive so it was necessary to protect participants from psychological 
harm. This issue was addressed by providing participants with a debrief sheet with contact 
details for helplines which would offer support to participants if they experienced any 
psychological distress or discomfort whilst undertaking part in the study. The debrief 
explained that the aim of the research was to explore young Muslims’ views of other 
Muslims who have been linked with terrorist organisations to gain a better understanding of 
why Muslim youth may be drawn to Islamic terrorism. There was no deception involved as 
the true research aims were presented to participants in the information sheet prior to taking 
part in the study. The debrief document informed participants that if they wished to have their 
data retracted and destroyed, they would need to contact the researcher before a certain date.  
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Findings and Discussion 
 
This section presents the findings and key themes identified from participant interviews using 
thematic analysis. The four themes identified in this study are explored and discussed in 
detail with reference to existing theory and research literature. The themes identified in the 
analysis explore the views of young Muslims regarding the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism. 
These include views on religion and how interpretation of Islam may influence the decision 
to participate in extremist violence. The role of social networks and how parents, peers and 
other social interactions can contribute to terrorism is explored as well as psychological 
vulnerabilities that may influence young Muslims to join ISIS. Lastly, the ways in which 
perceived injustices and discrimination against the Muslim community may impact the lives 
of Muslim youth in Britain are also discussed.  
 
Theme 1- Poor grasp of Islamic faith  
 
Lack of religious knowledge 
One of the underlying themes that emerged from the data was lack of religious knowledge. 
Many participants believed that Muslim youth who join Islamic terrorist groups like ISIS do 
not fully understand certain concepts within Islam: “They think they’re going into a place that 
Allah thinks is right for them. So they think they’re going towards Islam but they’re going a 
completely wrong way.” (Interview 9), “They think it’s Islamic but it’s not and because 
they’re young and naïve, they’re easily influenced.” (Interview 4). In line with the research 
discussed in the literature review, the current study supported previous findings which 
confirm that while the ideology of ISIS may be underpinned by the group’s misinterpretation 
of Islam (Neuman, 2013), most young Muslims who join ISIS have little or no Islamic 
knowledge (Butler, 2015; Wiktorowicz, 2005). This view was expressed throughout the 
interviews as participants described how young Muslims have a lack of knowledge on Islam, 
ISIS and the war crisis in Syria: “They are easily impressionable people who don’t have an 
accurate representation of Islam maybe or what ISIS even stands for.” (Interview 8), “I think 
they’re very misguided. Those that join the war in Syria don’t really know what’s going on 
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there.” (Interview 7), “They have a warped perception of Islam…they’ve got the wrong idea 
of it basically.” (Interview 8). One participant even refused to accept these young people as 
Muslims: “If they knew Islam, they’d know it’s not about violence. They’re not Muslims.” 
(Interview 7).  
 
Khosrokhavar (2009) provides further support for the assumption that many extremists and 
terrorists have a rudimentary level of Islamic knowledge. He found that most European 
Muslims involved in terrorism in the West had almost no Islamic culture, were unable to 
perform compulsory prayers, and knew very little about Islamic law. Furthermore, an 
analysis of over three thousand leaked ISIS recruitment documents revealed that although 
many Western recruits were well-educated and several had even attained university degrees, 
their knowledge of Islamic law was very basic (Batrawy, Dodds & Hinnant, 2016). These 
findings challenge the misconception that religion is the key motivator for joining a terrorist 
group.  Many researchers conclude that religiosity is a poor predictor of whether someone 
will join ISIS (Yu & Hoque, 2016; Mousseau, 2011). Several Islamic leaders and institutions 
have expressed disapproval of ISIS and its ideologies; the majority of Western Muslims do 
not join terrorist groups; and even though some Muslims may hold extremist Islamic beliefs, 
only a minority of those will act on their beliefs and join a terrorist group (Yu & Hoque, 
2016). This reinforces the notion that terrorism is not motivated solely by religion and most 
terrorists from the West have very limited Islamic knowledge.  
 
Spiritual reward, Heaven and the afterlife 
There was a strong agreement among participants that young Muslims who join ISIS thought 
that they were fighting for a good cause: “They think they’re doing a good thing, almost like 
a charity and they’ll be rewarded for it by God.” (Interview 9), “[they] believe that they’re 
doing something good but these young people don’t do their own research.” (Interview 7), 
“They think they’re doing something good.” (Interview 5), “They think they’re pleasing 
God.” (Interview 6). Previous research has found that young Muslims who joined ISIS 
reported feeling a religious duty towards the self-proclaimed caliphate (Perisin, 2015; Hoyle, 
Bradford, & Frenett, 2015). This is consistent with the findings in the current study as many 
participants felt that those who join ISIS are seeking spiritual reward. When asked whether 
men and women have different motives for travelling to Syria, participants felt that men and 
women play different roles under the rule of ISIS but they are motivated by the desire to help 
the Muslim ummah: It boils down to the same motive of helping ISIS and trying to fight 
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against non-Muslims. The same motive is there but they do it in different ways. 6. I think they 
both want to help other Muslims around the world that they believe are oppressed or 
suffering.8. This finding is supported by Esposito (2015) who states that young Muslims who 
are drawn to radicalisation wish to accomplish a political goal but simultaneously seek to 
associate themselves with a religious cause. Much of the literature on what motivates Muslim 
youth to join ISIS supports that Muslims feel a religious duty towards other Muslims that are 
suffering (Tibi, 2007; Winter, 2015; Weenink, 2015).  However, the current findings also 
support the view that while religious reward may be a motivator of terrorism, it is usually 
accompanied by other political factors (Horgan, 2008). This is evident in the current study as 
participants felt that “young men would be attracted to this whole idea of fighting because it’s 
masculine.” (Interview 5) and “These girls are nurturing children so they can grow them into 
soldiers for ISIS. Because women can’t physically fight, by marrying ISIS fighters, they feel 
like they’re contributing.” (Interview 6). Moreover, it was suggested that women may be 
driven more by personal factors: “For women, it’s different. Depends on their background 
and what they’re running from. I think they’re unhappy with their own lives and that’s why 
they go.” (Interview 3). These findings reinforce that although religion is often cited as a key 
motivator for joining terrorist groups, there will always be social, political and personal 
motives present (Peresin, 2015).  
 
The notion of being rewarded in Jannah (heaven) and the afterlife by fighting for ISIS was a 
common theme across the dataset. Participants felt that one of the key motives for young 
Muslims to join ISIS was the belief that they were securing their place in Heaven and their 
rewards in the afterlife: “They get promised that they’re gonna go to heaven if they go there 
and fight but when they go there they get forced to do things that they don’t necessarily want 
to do.. they want a fast ticket to heaven” (Interview 2), “[ISIS] tell them that they’ll go to 
Jannah if they go fight.” (Interview 5), “Maybe he [Asmal] thought he would be benefitting 
his religion or his afterlife. Or maybe he would get rewarded for it in some way.” (Interview 
8).  This is supported by previous research which has found that the desire to participate in 
suicide bombings and gain martyrdom by fighting “enemies” of Islam is common amongst 
young Muslims and some have even taken to social media to express this desire  (Saltman & 
Winter, 2014). Martyrdom was found to be a key concept across the dataset: “They think if 
they die, they die a martyr and go straight to heaven.” (Interview 7), “They think they’re 
gonna get rewarded for what they’re doing in that they’ll go to Jannah. They think they’re 
going to be martyrs.” (Interview 10). Dawoody (2016) suggests that youth are easily 
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attracted to and motivated by ideologies such as martyrdom, fighting against disbelievers, 
helping the Muslim ummah and being cleansed of previous sins. The major strength of 
terrorist organisations is the misinterpretation of Islam which is reflected in their ideologies. 
As demonstrated by ISIS leaders, male recruits are often paid a salary and rewarded with 
sexual slaves (Dawoody, 2016). The incentive of being rewarded in both this life and the 
afterlife makes it problematic for policy makers trying to tackle radicalisation. Not only are 
ISIS recruiters presenting a distorted and contradictory version of Islam through religious 
ideologies such as martyrdom, they also offer worldly pleasures such as women and money 
to attract further support among young Muslims.  
 
Misinterpretation of Jihad and the Quran  
There was a strong sense that Jihad was perceived as an “internal struggle for the sake of 
God” (Interview 8) and participants associated it with the personal hardships an individual 
may face: “to me as a Muslim, it’s defeating your inner demons.” (Interview 9), “It’s striving 
for God.” (Interview 1), “Fighting with your inner self.” (Interview 4) and “Fighting one’s 
desires.” (Interview 6). Despite one of the most common definitions of jihad being the inner 
struggle against oneself, this interpretation is not widely recognised by non-Muslims 
(Hathout, 2002). Another issue highlighted by Hathout (2002) is that Muslims feel that Islam 
and Jihad is being defined by everyone but them. This was reflected in the current study as 
one participant suggested that the media was to blame for the negative connotation of the 
word Jihad and its incorrect translation: “Now even my brain thinks of it in a negative way.. 
It’s not a negative thing but it’s wrongly translated in the climate we’re in and through the 
media and films.” (Interview 7). Many participants felt that the term jihad had lost its historic 
meaning was being misused and misinterpreted by ISIS: “The meaning has completely 
changed. It means to struggle and fight but not for the wrong reasons or for murdering 
innocent people.” (Interview 7), “Now it’s associated with violence but that isn’t the real 
meaning.” (Interview 4),  “Terrorists only look at the literal meaning and think they need to 
go out and physically fight.” (Interview 6), “I think extremists use it as a justification for 
committing terror attacks.” (Interview 1). However, many Islamic scholars conclude that 
jihad does not mean ‘holy war’ as it is often wrongly translated in the West but instead the 
refers to the fight against the inner self (Khadduri, 2006). While most participants defined 
jihad as an inner and personal struggle for the sake of God, there was, however, some 
discrepancy in the understanding of the term.  A minority of participants associated jihad 
with “battle, wars, fighting” (Interview 5), “fighting for your beliefs” (Interview 10) and 
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“giving your life for religious reasons” (Interview 3). The variations in the definition of the 
term jihad may be problematic for not only Muslims themselves, but also other around them. 
Thus, as suggested by Hathout (2002), some Muslims, particularly those who may be drawn 
to extremism, may need to educate themselves more about Islamic concepts such as Jihad to 
prevent any misunderstandings of their own religion.  
 
The consensus of participants was that certain texts from the Quran are misinterpreted by 
extremists and terrorists: “People make their own meanings and its misinterpreted.” 
(Interview 4), “I think they’re going too deep into it and taking the meaning literally.” 
(Interview 1), “Someone with bad intentions can take something and go to someone who’s 
vulnerable or impressionable and say look this is why you need to fight. It’s people with 
wrong intentions who misinterpret.” (Interview 7). Several researchers support the argument 
that texts from the Quran are often misinterpreted by extremists for their own political means 
(El-Saeed, 1996; Hafez, 2003; Loza, 2007).  Participants believed that specific teachings 
from the Quran were being taken out of context by ISIS to manipulate young Muslims:  “It’s 
clear cut but people may manipulate others into believing this is what the Quran says.” 
(Interview 2), “People pick and choose which parts of the Quran they want to follow and 
take them out of context.” (Interview 8).  Yilmaz & Ekici (2009) argue that the reason Islam 
has become so commonly associated with words such as ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalism’ and 
‘extremism’ is because terrorist groups cherry pick certain texts from the Quran to fit their 
purpose. Referring to a particular verse from the Quran, two participants reinforced the view 
that Islam does not promote violence: “There are verses in the Quran that talk about fighting 
enemies but for every verse like that, there’s another verse that will negate it. Like there’s a 
verse in the Quran that says if you were to kill one innocent person, it’s like you killed all of 
mankind.” (Interview 8), “They ignore the ayahs (verses) that say if you kill one innocent 
person, then it is like you have killed the whole of mankind.” (Interview 7). Although 
participants agreed that ISIS is not representative of true slam, there was the notion that some 
Muslims, particularly young people, are still inclined to ISIS’ ideologies that are backed with 
distorted Quranic texts. Thus, it is important for researchers to move beyond the idea that 
ISIS are misinterpreting verses from the Quran and investigate how ISIS are misusing them 
to identify and stop those who are treading towards violent extremism.  
 
The was a considerable amount of agreement among participants that texts used by terrorists 
to justify acts of terror were written in a historic period that has little or no relevance to 
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Muslims in the West today: “The literal words of the Quran were written in a time where it 
was completed different to our life today.” (Interview 9), “Back in those days when there 
were wars, it was understandable because non-Muslims were killing Muslims but right now, 
it’s not relevant.” (Interview 5), “There’s stories in the past during the Prophet’s time when 
there were wars going on but there’s nothing in the Quran that can justify what ISIS and 
these terrorists are doing.” (Interview 2). According to Yilmaz & Akici (2009), ISIS leaders 
exercise the Salafi interpretation of the Quran which prescribes that Muslims must practice 
Islam in the exact same manner as the first three generations of Muslims since the Prophet 
Mohammed. Muslims who follow Salafism believe that humans do not have the capacity to 
understand the hidden meanings of Quranic verses and should therefore rely on literal 
interpretation of the Quran. Consequently, it can be argued that followers of the Salafi branch 
of Islam interpret the Quran incorrectly because the socio-political pressures surroundings 
Muslims today differ to those during the time of the Prophet Mohammed. Nevertheless, 
Yilmaz & Akici (2009) argue that it is important to distinguish between traditional Salafis 
who interpret the Quran in its literal meaning to minimise the risk of misinterpretation and 
Jihadi-Salafis who are biased in their interpretation of the Quran for political motives.  
 
Theme 2 - The influence of social networks on terrorism  
 
Family  
It has been widely reported that religious beliefs are transmitted directly and indirectly to 
children through family practices (Smither & Corsandi, 2009). One noteworthy issue here is 
that conformity and obedience to parents and other family members may prove harmful in 
some cases; family members with extremist Islamic views may pass these views on to future 
generations. This assumption was reflected in the current study as one participant suggested 
that Asmal “might have had some family members who shared the same views” (Interview 
4). According to Petrosino, Derzon, Lavenber (2009), parental attitudes toward violence play 
a critical role in determining juvenile delinquency and subsequent criminal behaviour in 
adulthood.  Another participant revealed that Asmal’s friend, Hassan Munshi, who 
accompanied him on his journey to Syria was the brother of Hammad Munshi – Britain’s 
youngest convicted terrorist. The notion that crime runs in families is supported by 
Farrington, Barnes & Lambert, (1996) who found that having a convicted family member 
was a predictor of a boy’s own convictions. Moreover, if the convicted family member was 
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of the same sex or an older sibling, this significantly increased the likelihood of a male 
becoming a juvenile delinquent (Farrington, Barnes & Lambert, 1996). 
 
Many participants thought that Muslim youth who become radicalised and join ISIS were 
likely to have experienced a poor upbringing and unstable family relationships: “A lot of it 
comes down to upbringing.” (Interview 6), “I think it’s how you’re brought up and the values 
you’re brought up with. If you have an unstable environment and upbringing, that triggers 
it.” (Interview 3). Research has shown that the type of parenting style employed by parents 
can have a dramatic impact on a child’s psychological and social development (Bornstein, 
2002). Parents who use an authoritarian approach place emphasis on the need for children to 
be obedient and follow rules without questioning or challenging them). As authoritarian 
parents often use harsh discipline and in some cases, physical abuse, this may result in hostile 
and aggressive behaviour in children which can ultimately lead to criminal behaviour in 
adulthood (Ingram, 2011). On the other hand, parents who adopt a permissive parenting 
approach do not offer discipline to children but instead are psychological controlling through 
behaviours such as emotional neglect, guilt inducing and withdrawal of love (Botha, 2009).  
Consequently, children who grow up with permissive parents are more likely to be 
disobedient towards authority. The notion that parenting styles can contribute to criminal 
behaviour was supported by a study of the al-Shabaab Islamist terrorist group which found 
that 71% of al-Shabaab respondents indicated that they were physically punished by an 
authoritative family member and 14% were emotionally punished (Botha, 2009).  
 
Another study found that students who expressed a lack of closeness with parents were more 
likely rebel against the political viewpoints of their parents than those who reported being 
emotionally close with parents (Middleton & Putney, 1963). Highlighting an issue with the 
Asian Muslim community, one participant felt that parents needed to build stronger 
relationships with their children: “I think in Asian communities, I don’t think they have strong 
relationships. So parents need to be close to their kids so they could never feel like they want 
to leave you.” (Interview 7). This view was echoed by other participants who stressed the 
need for parents to communicate with their children and offer them the necessary support: 
“So parents need to speak about it and teach their kids about how bad it is.” (Interview 6), 
“You can’t tell parents what to do and how to raise kids but they’re an important a factor. If 
parents give you the right guidance, they can go the right way.” (Interview 10). According to 
Malik (2010), Asian families tend to be very large and therefore communication between 
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parents and children can be problematic. A study found that children from Pakistani families 
with a higher number of children were more likely to suffer psychological abuse and neglect 
than families with a smaller number of children (Malik, 2010). As a result, parental rejection 
may bear negative consequences on the psychological development of children. Such 
findings highlight the need for parents, particularly those from Asian backgrounds, to build 
good relationships with children as they are more likely to be obedient and better adjusted if 
they have a strong emotional attachment (Laible, Carlo & Raffaelli, 2000).  
 
Theories of desistance from crime propose that changes in circumstances that strengthen the 
bond between an individual and society such as marriage, having children and gaining 
employment play a significant role in abstaining from criminal behaviour (Laub & Sampson, 
2001; Laub, Nagin & Sampson, 1998). This view was supported by a participant in the 
current study who felt that for young Muslims who did not have any strong attachments with 
their families or other commitments, the decisions to join ISIS behind would become easier: 
“They don’t see themselves tied to anything here where they’ve got a good job or their family 
is close which makes it easier for them to go. If they were close to their families, maybe they 
wouldn’t do that.” (Interview 7). However, competing theories of crime argue that such life 
changes make very little difference to desistance from crime as criminality is shaped by early 
childhood experiences (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). Furthermore, it is argued that criminal 
behaviour remains fairly stable throughout one’s life but the opportunities to engage in crime 
reduce (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990).  
 
Peers  
When asked about Asmal and the three school girls from London who joined ISIS in Syria, 
participants felt that peers had a strong influence on terrorism among Muslim youth. It was 
believed that those who had left the UK to join ISIS may not have initially had bad intentions 
but got involved in the wrong crowd: 
 
“Siblings and friends are a big influence too.” (Interview 3), “It might be due to peer 
pressure like those three school girls left together and the two boys from Batley were friends. 
I think men also get influenced and wrapped up in it especially if their friends are doing it.” 
(Interview 7), “I think it’s more to do with the people you’re surrounded by. A lot of my 
friends have travelled to Syria to deliver human aid but there’s also a small minority of 
people who want to do good but end up meeting the wrong people.” (Interview 2), “They go 
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out seeking answers themselves and get caught up in the wrong crowd of people.” (Interview 
9).  
 
In terrorism literature, the social learning theory of terrorism suggests that terrorist behaviour 
is learned in the same way any other form of criminal behaviour is learned (Akers & 
Silverman, 2004). By applying the social learning theory to terrorism, it is necessary to 
understand that terrorism is not a result of mental disorders or innate aggressive tendencies, 
but rather a consequence of social and individual learning experiences (Schmid, 2005).  As 
more and more young people are witnessing their friends leaving their homes in Britain to 
commit terror attacks in Syria, this may lead some individuals to imitate terrorist behaviour, 
or even learn such behaviour from the glorification of terrorism through the media. For 
example, ISIS recruiters often use propaganda to glorify martyrdom and the role of females 
in ISIS (Peresin, 2015; Majeed, 2016). The belief that that ISIS glorify martyrdom to attract 
young men was reflected in the current study: “I could see how they might make it seem 
attractive, kind of like how young men are encouraged to join the army and fight for their 
country. In the same way, ISIS may be glorifying fighting.” (Interview 7), “They must think 
that there’s so many men out there fighting for Islam and dying, they need to go out there and 
play their part.” (Interview 9). Similarly, participants felt that the glorification of jihadi 
brides was attracting young women to travel to Syria. Participants considered social media a 
very effective tool in attracting young Muslims because it is more commonly used by young 
people and they are also easily influenced and more impressionable than older people. While 
ISIS’ social media strategy and propaganda has played a significant role in the recruitment of 
foreign fighters, peer pressure and real-life social networks are understood to play a greater 
role in the radicalisation of young Muslims (McVeigh, 2014).  
 
Older Muslims 
Older Muslims were believed to have an influence on young Muslims who become 
radicalised. Many participants thought that it was not just Muslims from Syria who were 
influencing younger Muslims to join ISIS but there were older Muslims from Britain 
involved too:  
 
“They’re are definitely older Muslims that are cowards. They can’t go themselves so they use 
these young people and send them over.” (Interview 3), “I think there are older Muslims 
involved whether it be here or in Syria and they’re just looking for an extra pair of hands to 
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be used.” (Interview 2),  “There’s people in this country that are targeting Muslims and not 
just doing it from Syria.” (Interview 7). 
 
The assumption that younger Muslims are being recruited by older Muslims is supported by 
an undercover investigation which found that four British mothers in London were recruiting 
young girls for ISIS (Whitehead, 2015).  The female Muslim TV reporter who went 
undercover for a year, wearing the face veil to conceal her identity, revealed that a secret 
Islamist group run by these four British women was encouraging support for terrorism and 
telling young women that ISIS is the new caliphate. Quoting verses from the Quran and 
hadith, the older women encouraged younger women to travel to Syria, stating that Britain 
was at war against Muslims (Whitehead, 2015).  The current findings reinforce the idea that 
older Muslims play a role in the recruitment of young Muslims as participants believed that it 
was difficult for younger Muslims to make the move to Syria without any assistance: “You 
have to go through a lot of obstacles to get there which I don’t think these young people can 
overcome by themselves. Maybe they had an older influencer.” (Interview 8), “How would a 
young person even go to ISIS? Obviously someone is telling them to come to this place and 
where to meet.” (Interview 5). One participant thought that young Muslims were more likely 
to listen to older Muslims who are respected in society:  “If it comes from an older man, who 
is respected, you’re more likely to believe. So they must have older Muslims that are 
recruiting and they’re the leaders.” (Interview 1). As posited by the social learning theory 
(Bandura, 1977), behaviour is more likely to be learned and imitated if the behaviour is 
rewarded and carried out by a respected figure. As older Muslims are more likely to be 
perceived as respected figures, particularly religious leaders, younger Muslims are more 
likely to acquire and imitate their behaviour.  Thus, policymakers need to further investigate 
the role older Muslims with extremist views play in the recruitment of younger Muslims as 
this area is lacking in research. 
 
Social media   
There was a strong view that young Muslims were being groomed on the internet by ISIS 
recruits. Social media networks such as Facebook, Twitter and Whatsapp were considered 
some of the major platforms used to manipulate young Muslims: “ISIS have tweets and they 
see people and message them in a manipulative way.” (Interview 6), “They’re talking to 
people on Facebook and maybe it does start off with a genuine religious conversation and as 
the person gets to know more about you, it all switches and they take advantage.” (Interview 
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2), “I’ve heard that there’s a lot of stuff online like encrypted messages where others can’t 
pick up on what they’re saying and apps like whatsapp.” (Interview 7). As discussed in the 
literature review, there is a plethora of research which supports the notion that the internet 
serves as a useful tool for grooming young people for terror (Weiman, 2015; Farwell, 2014; 
Vergani & Bliuc, 2015). Twitter, in particular, has been ISIS’ main weapon in this war of 
social media (Klausen, 2015).  This is reflected in the present study as participants believed 
that ISIS recruiters were using twitter to portray a false image of what life in Syria is really 
like. One participant reported that he came across a video on twitter in which foreign fighters 
in Syria were answering questions for potential recruits:  “They make videos of people from 
ISIS talking and promotional videos. I’ve actually seen one myself on twitter. I saw a video a 
few years ago of live chats where people from ISIS were answering questions for people. I 
don’t think it’s the beheading videos that attract people, it’s the videos that promote the good 
things about living in Syria is what attracts them and the lifestyle.” (Interview 9). According 
to Blaker (2015), online testimonies of foreign fighters have proven to be a very effective 
strategy in attracting Muslim youth to Syria, particularly young women. As ISIS recruiters 
flood the internet with propaganda and portray life under ISIS as better than life in the West, 
this poses serious problems for those trying to tackle radicalisation among Muslim youth in 
Britain.  
 
The findings from the present study were consistent with previous research which has found 
that propaganda promoted by terrorist groups appeals mainly to young, lonely and 
marginalised people who are seeking an identity and belonging (Lamberg, 2001, Blazak, 
2001). One participant felt that ISIS recruiters were posting content that invokes feelings of 
anger and make Muslims feel like they are hated by the West: “ [ISIS] might post something 
that a Muslim can relate to and make them think that it’s about us and look what the West is 
doing to us and make them think that Islam is hated.” (Interview 6). As Weimann (2006) 
suggests, ISIS propaganda which invokes the oppression and mistreatment of Muslims can 
make some Muslims angry, and this may ultimately draw them to terrorist groups that offer 
them a sense of purpose and belonging. Conway (2006) illustrates an example of how some 
people may be “groomed” online through emotional arousal. He suggests that posting graphic 
images to prompt sympathy from young people is a tactic often employed by terrorists. For 
example, ISIS recruiters often post graphic pictures of young children and women massacred 
in the Syrian war as part of their social media strategy to invoke feelings of anger and gain 
support from other Muslims.   
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While participants believed that social media was the easiest way for ISIS to attract younger 
people, the consensus among participants was that young people must show some interest in 
ISIS and its cause first for them to be targeted. Participants felt that ISIS seek Muslims out 
based on the type of content they search and what they post online:  
 
“Young kids must be initiating it themselves. How would a radical get in touch with them? 
People get in touch with you if you’re posting or tweeting the same views as them.4. If they’re 
searching for certain things online relating to ISIS, then they’re bound to come under the 
attention of ISIS. Those kids aren’t going to get a random message from ISIS unless they’re 
on a platform which allows ISIS to seek them.” (Interview 1), “Like I don’t see how someone 
could come up to me and be like do you want to go to Syria. I would have to contact them.” 
(Interview 7), “I think these people must show interest to these groups first for ISIS to track 
them down. But I don’t think it’s difficult for ISIS to seek vulnerable people out either.” 
(Interview 8),  “If someone doesn’t show any interest, they’re not going to get influenced. It’s 
when people start looking into it, they become victim to ISIS.” (Interview 9), “People who 
have strong opinions about something may posts their opinions online and ISIS use that as a 
gateway for people to reach them.” (Interview 10), “They know who to target because of 
what people search on the net.” (Interview 9), “Like I said, normal people will express their 
views say there’s a major terror attack and they tweet about it, they might be sympathetic 
towards why someone did what they did and ISIS could message them and say I agree with 
you.” (Interview 10).   
 
Conway (2006) provides an example of how some Muslims may become involved with 
terrorists online based on the type of websites they visit. The Islamist terror group Jemaah 
Islamiyah posted a link to an Islamic charity on their website to make followers believe that 
their cause was legitimate. This illustrates how online activity and social networking of 
young Muslims may put them at risk of being identified and targeted by ISIS. Similarly, 
participants felt Asmal was misled via social media and perhaps his interest in Islam and the 
desire to help Syrians was what caused him to come under the attention of ISIS: “He got 
talking to someone on social media and that person led him to believe he was gonna fight for 
a good cause and when he went there, they explained to him what was gonna happen and it 
wasn’t what he went for.” (Interview 2), “I knew that Talha was Islamic and wanted to help 
the Syrians so maybe that’s why he was targeted because he expressed those views.” 
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(Interview 5). While social media may serve as way of attracting support from potential 
recruits, critics argue that it is difficult to establish the extent to which social media 
influences users to become radicalised. Some argue that social media is not increasing 
terrorism and exposure to terrorist propaganda does not mean that people will become 
terrorists (Awan, 2007; Benson, 2014). Instead, it is argued that use of the internet by terrorist 
organisations is more likely to reinforce pre-existing views in young Muslims rather than 
radicalise them (Awan, 2014).  As suggested by Awan (2014), many terrorists that post 
extremist views online usually have a small number of followers and many do not aspire to 
reach a wider audience, thereby indicating that terrorists may simply be preaching to those 
that already have extremist views. It is easier to place the entire blame on the internet and 
social media for the growth of terrorism; however, Jihadist propaganda has been distributed 
in the past through other forms of media such as books and publications. Moreover, it is 
argued that although social media has facilitated the distribution of ISIS’ extremist narrative, 
there are also some unfavourable consequences for the group. Not only is it easier for the 
government to monitor online extremist activity and subsequently stop terror attacks, 
advances in technology mean that ISIS’ social media operations are exposed to the threat of 
online hacking.  
 
Mosques 
Mosques and institutions where young Muslims develop and learn about their religion, were 
considered to play a crucial role in shaping attitudes towards Islamic extremism. While 
participants felt that most Muslims in Britain are disciplined and receive a good education in 
mosque, many expressed the need for mosques to teach more to young Muslims about the 
dangers of radicalisation:  
 
“I think mosques have a responsibility. They shouldn’t just be there to learn the basics. 
Mosques should be the place where you do talk about religion and all forms of it.” (Interview 
8), “They’ve changed a bit now because before we just used to go pray Quran and come 
straight home. But I think now they’ve started teaching more stories about Islam and what it 
says about violence. They need to do it more. Islam isn’t just about praying Quran; it’s more 
than that.” (Interview 1).  
 
Unlike mosques in Muslim countries, there is no universal governing body for mosques in 
Britain to supervise imams. Consequently, mosques are regulated by several different 
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organisations and there are no official standards for who can become an imam or religious 
teachers and what type of material should to be taught to students. While some see multiple 
governing bodies as a more useful approach when trying to understand Islamic rulings on a 
particular subject, this may potentially increase the proliferation of extremist beliefs. Social 
learning of extremist views may occur in religious institutions such as mosques and Islamic 
schools. Although mosques and Islamic schools have been around since the time of Prophet 
Mohammed, the number of religious institutions have dramatically increased over the years 
since the rise of radical Islam, potentially increasing the proliferation of extremist attitudes to 
Muslims worldwide (Armstrong 2000). This is evident in some cases of well-known 
international terrorists where they were taught extreme jihadist views as young boys in 
religious institutions (Sageman, 2004; Victoroff, 2005). Findings from the current study are 
consistent with previous research as some participants felt that mosque leaders may even be 
involved in the radicalisation of young Muslims: “There will be certain people at mosque 
that are teaching younger people and if they have extreme views, they’ll pass them onto 
young people.” (Interview 9), “There could be an ISIS member running a mosque so I think it 
would be difficult to stop people from being radicalised.” (Interview 10). In light of these 
findings, it is important for mosques and Islamic institutions to be regulated by the British 
government to stop the spread of Islamic extremism, thereby reducing the threat of terror 
attacks.  
 
The current study found that Talha Asmal, a suicide bomber from Dewsbury was a “Quran 
Hafiz” (a person who has memorised the Quran).  Although no empirical evidence has 
confirmed a direct link between those who memorise the Quran and extremist behaviour, 
some researchers, however, have suggested that having experienced harsh and physically 
abusive punishment in mosque may result in the development of maladaptive personality 
disorders (Khan, 2012). Moreover, a leaked ISIS documents revealed that a small minority of 
young recruits had also memorised the Quran (Batrawy, Dodds, & Hinnant, 2016). Evidence 
suggests that children in mosques are often made to read the Quran for several hours a day 
and many are subjected to physical disciplining if they underperform (Sodiq, 2011). A study 
investigating the recruitment strategies of Boko Haram, a terrorist group in Nigeria, found 
that the country’s religious learning system was limited to memorising the Quran (Omilusi, 
2015). Young Muslims who are subjected to harsh disciplining may build resentment towards 
authority, experience identity foreclosure and develop low self-esteem (Khan, 2012). 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine the circumstances of Muslim youth, particularly in the 
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context of religious institutions, that enable terrorist groups to exploit the anger felt by 
vulnerable Muslims and ultimately lead some to commit terror attacks.  
 
While some argue that Islamic leaders who use harsh discipline or promote extremist views 
in mosques may influence some Muslims to join terrorist groups, others suggest that 
terrorism is a consequence of interacting and building unintentional friendships with people 
who hold extremist religious views (Sageman, 2004).  In the current study, one participant 
suggested that ISIS are more likely to target Muslims in areas such as “Bradford, Dewsbury, 
Birmingham because there’s a high population of Muslims.” (Interview 2).  Another 
participant who also lived in Dewsbury felt that Asmal may have been targeted by ISIS 
because “he’s from a Muslim area. There’s a big famous mosque there – Markaz. So he’s in a 
situation where it’s really easy to meet the wrong people.” (Interview 6). These findings 
suggest that social interactions may influence young Muslims to become extremists which is 
supported by previous research which found that 68% of 168 Muslims who joined al-Qaeda 
reported that friendship was the biggest factor influencing their decision to join the terrorist 
group (Sageman, 2004). While terrorist behaviour may be learned from observation and 
imitation of family members, friends, religious leaders and other social relationships, critics 
of the social learning theory argue that it does not explain why only a small minority of the 
1.6 billion Muslims become terrorists. As stated by Sageman (2004), not every Muslims who 
has been exposed to the same extremist Islamic teachings or were friends with people who 
later joined ISIS become terrorists themselves. While the social learning theory of terrorism 
gives an insight into the profile of those who may predisposed to terrorist behaviour, it fails 
to account for why some people become terrorists. Thus, it is necessary to seek other 
contributing factors that explain the causes of terrorism. 
 
Schools 
While some participants expressed their concern for mosques being target spots for ISIS 
recruitment, others disapproved of the way religious education was being taught in schools 
and felt that non-Muslims did not have enough knowledge about Islam and its views on 
violence and terrorism:  
 
“Schools don’t do enough. We only learn the basics.” (Interview 7), “They’re should be 
more youth clubs, more teaching in schools. If children are getting this information from a 
young age, maybe it would reduce terrorism.” (Interview 6), “I think in schools they need to 
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teach religious education in a better way. They need to teach Islam to non-Muslims too and 
what it’s really about. They need to know because they don’t really know much. I don’t think 
schools teach the right thing.” (Interview 1), “Kids are unaware and don’t even know the real 
meaning of terrorism so yeah more needs to be taught at school.” (Interview 4), “I don’t 
think you should say don’t do this and don’t go to Syria and join ISIS. But you need to teach 
them more about what Islam really says about violence.” (Interview 9).  
 
The way in which religious education is taught in British schools has come under scrutiny for 
misrepresenting the nature of religion and for being incapable of challenging racism and 
religious intolerance (Barnes, 2006). While most children will usually have some knowledge 
about different religions prior to studying religious educations at schools, they are likely to be 
more acquainted with Islam due to the widespread coverage of Islamist terrorism in the media 
and through other factors such as families (Berkson, 2005). Consequently, teachers may find 
it challenging to teach Islam to students who are misinformed about Islam. Revell (2010) 
interviewed 116 predominantly white primary school children in year 4 to explore their 
understanding of Islam and found that many children viewed Islam as ‘foreign’ and ‘alien’. 
Many children felt that Muslims were fighting against the British army and associated Islam 
with terrorism and war. Moreover, some children expressed racist views and several believed 
that Muslim women were forced to wear the veil and hijab. These findings hold implications 
for teachers as what children learn about Islam outside of school influences the way they 
respond to teachings of Islam in schools. Revell (2010) suggests that if schools wish to 
enhance the relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim communities, then teachers need 
to address any preconceptions children may have learned about Islam outside of school. This, 
however, does not mean that teachers should advocate an inaccurate or idealised version of 
Islam and ignore the negative side of Islam shown in the media as this would lead to further 
misunderstandings and misrepresentations. Instead, schools should challenge any 
misunderstandings as failure to do so may result in children internalising the view that 
Muslims are socially and culturally ‘different’. 
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Theme 3 – Psychological vulnerabilities of Muslim youth 
 
Psychopathology 
There was some degree of variation regarding views on the mental health of terrorists. Some 
participants felt that there must be underlying psychopathological issues that contribute to the 
involvement of terrorism among Muslim youth: “It must be combination of factors like 
upbringing and also your mental health. You’ve got to be deluded. I think it’s a psychological 
thing and you’ve got to be a very special kind of person to go over there and do this.” 
(Interview 7), “I think there’s a mental breakdown somewhere for someone to have courage 
to do that, your mind can’t be in the right place.” (Interview 3), “Anybody in their right mind 
wouldn’t do it.” (Interview 4), “I think they’re not very smart.” (Interview 9). On the other 
hand, some felt that Muslim youth who travel to Syria are intelligent and making a well-
informed decision: “Some make very intelligible choices and do it on purpose but others get 
caught in the hype, but I think that a lot of them are making a well informed decision.” 
(Interview 8), “Talha was very clever. He didn’t let anyone that he was speaking to someone 
and he was using code language so that the police couldn’t track them. He looked into it and 
did his research. He was a Quran hafiz so he wasn’t thick.” (Interview 3).  
 
According to the mental disorder perspective of terrorism, terrorists carry out extremely 
violent acts which suggests that their behaviour is motivated by psychopathological factors as 
opposed to socio-political factors (Cooper, 1978). This explanation of terrorism proposes that 
terrorists are psychopaths who use political violence to release their aggressive impulses. The 
mental disorder explanation also proposes that many terrorists are driven by the desire to die 
because they wish to overcome the trauma that they may have experienced as a child and this 
is made possible through thrill-seeking and taking control over their lives. However, critics of 
this perspective argue that while some terrorists may indeed have personality disorders and 
psychopathic traits, the mental disorder perspective is only applicable to a small minority of 
terrorists (Corrado, 1981); therefore, it cannot be generalised to the wider population of 
terrorists. While it appears that terrorists are commonly perceived to be psychotic and insane, 
very rarely do they meet the psychiatric criteria for insanity (Victoroff, 2005). This is 
supported by a plethora of research studies which have found that terrorists do not usually 
display any sign of mental disorders (Post, Sprinzak, & Denny 2003; Post & Gold, 2002; 
Horgan, 2003), rather they are rational individuals motivated by a socio-political goal 
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(Corrado, 1981; Ruby, 2002). Unlike other psychological theories which explain why 
individuals may be predisposed to a type of behaviour, the rational choice theory assumes 
that terrorism may not necessarily reflect psychopathological or irrational behaviour, but 
instead represents the best strategy to obtain a particular goal. Moreover, the rational choice 
theory has been used to predict how effective anti-terrorism policies are and in determining 
whether a terrorist act is likely to maximise goals for the perpetrator (Sandler & Arce, 2003). 
While the rational choice theory provides a useful insight into what motivates some Muslims 
to join ISIS, the theory fails to explain why only a small proportion of British Muslims 
become terrorists. Instead, the theory focuses on what terrorists are likely to do in different 
circumstances. It does not take into consideration how individual emotions, experiences and 
circumstances may influence rationality (Victoroff, 2005). By viewing terrorists as either 
completely rational or mentally disordered, this may get in the way of finding the correct 
approach to combatting terrorism. Therefore, it is necessarily to examine other psychological 
factors and individual differences that influence young Muslims to become terrorists.  
 
Brainwashed 
Participants felt that young Muslims were being brainwashed by ISIS due to their 
vulnerability and naivety: 
 
“I think they go because they’re at that point in their life where they’re the most vulnerable. 
So it’s probably vulnerability and their age and the lack of the external world really.” 
(Interview 8), “I think they’re vulnerable people that actually want to do the right thing but 
they’re misled by extremists.” (Interview 9), “Young people are naïve and easily 
manipulated and easily convinced to do stupid things.” (Interview 2), “They’re lost and 
naïve. They’re led astray because of their naive minds and they’re vulnerable.” (Interview 1), 
“They’re more naïve and gullible. Living in this generation, there’s a lot of hate against 
Islam and ISIS might use that to their advantage and say that this world isn’t for us.6 It’s 
brainwashing. They’re taking advantage of young, vulnerable people. They’re confused.” 
(Interview 3), “I do believe its brainwashing because if you knew Islam, you’d know that it’s 
not about violence.” (Interview 7), “These extremist groups target young and naïve people 
and brainwash them into thinking that there’s a greater good in the hereafter when that’s not 
the case.” (Interview 6), “I think they’re brainwashed.” (Interview 5).   
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In several cases of Islamist terrorism, families of Muslims who have travelled to Syria use the 
term ‘brainwashed’ when trying to understand and explain why these young people join ISIS. 
Examples include the mother of 20-year-old Reyaad Khan who claimed that her son had been 
brainwashed by ISIS into thinking that he was going to Syria to help people, and the parents 
of 19-year-old Mohammed Hamzah Khan who claimed that social media was responsible for 
brainwashing their son into supporting ISIS.  While it is understandable that grieving families 
might find comfort by using brainwashing as a justification for the terrible actions of their 
loved ones, misperceiving radicalisation as brainwashing will only interfere with tackling 
terrorism (Baggini, 2014). Brainwashing (nowadays often referred to as psychological 
manipulation or thought reform in social psychology) is forcing someone to change their 
attitudes, beliefs and behaviours against their own will (Dawson, 2003).  The concept of 
brainwashing drew much attention during the Korean war when American soldiers were 
reportedly “brainwashed” by captors into converting to Communism and refused to return to 
the US upon their release. While such an explanation may seem plausible, critics question the 
reliability of brainwashing and whether it is possible to force someone to change their beliefs 
without their consent. Baggini (2014) argues that the circumstances of these American 
soldiers are not comparable to those of most British Muslims that lead them to fight in Syria. 
For example, parents of some Muslim youth claim that their children joined ISIS of their own 
will and did not discuss their plans with anyone among fears that they would be stopped from 
going. Moreover, by saying that young Muslims are being brainwashed implies that they are 
victims and play a passive role in their acts of terrorism. This argument is supported by 
findings from the current study which revealed that while most participants agreed that ISIS 
were preying on the vulnerabilities of young Muslims and leading them astray, some felt that 
it was wrong to completely remove all responsibility for their actions: “I think they must 
already have some extremist views to get brainwashed because if someone was trying to 
brainwash me on Facebook, I’d block them.” (Interview 5), “I don’t think it’s purely young 
Muslims being targeted. These young Muslims must be showing some interest in ISIS for 
them to be picked out.” (Interview 1). As suggested by Zablocki & Robbins (2001), a more 
suitable approach to understanding “brainwashing” in religious cults would be to view it as a 
form of social influence that incorporates elements of social psychology including 
compliance, conformity and persuasion. If researchers are to understand why young Muslims 
are drawn to violence, it is important for them to properly define concepts such as 
brainwashing and radicalisation. Failure to properly understand the context of these terms and 
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what is meant by them will result in an inadequate explanation of how and why some young 
Muslims might become terrorists.   
 
Sense of identity and belonging  
Participants thought that Muslim youth living in the West may join terrorist groups because 
they feel lost and want a sense of belonging. There was a strong view that young Muslims 
struggle to manage their Western and religious identities. Feelings of alienation, isolation and 
confusion were also cited as common factors influencing Muslim youth to join ISIS: 
 
“I think he [Talha] might have wanted a sense of belonging8. I think they’re lost and they’re 
trying to find some sort of comfort and belonging. I think they feel that they don’t belong here 
and they’re led astray.1He might have been seeking his own place in religion and a sense of 
belonging but he got caught in the wrong group.” (Interview 4), “They feel like they don’t fit 
in the western world. Maybe they want to go to a place that they feel like they belong to for a 
sense of identity. I think a lot of people that join ISIS feel alienation.” (Interview 8), “So if 
young people feel lonely or isolated, they’re more likely to join ISIS.” (Interview 7), “I think 
they’re really confused because I don’t understand the logic behind it.” (Interview 8), “I 
think they’re trying to look for answers. Like in the case of my friend, he was looking for 
answers from knowledgeable people and they couldn’t give him a response.” (Interview 3). 
 
Previous research supports that that British Muslim youth who join ISIS are not psychopaths, 
but rather, vulnerable young people going through an identity crisis (Ysseldyk, Matheson & 
Anisman, 2011). The findings from this study are consistent with the social identity theory of 
terrorism which suggests that terrorists tend to be young individuals who are struggling to 
establish an identity (Fischer, Haslam & Smith, 2010). According to this theory, when one’s 
religious identity is more powerful than other social identities, responses to perceived threats 
are more likely to be aggressive. Empirical support for this theory was provided Ysseldyk, 
Matheson & Anisman (2011) who found that participants who considered religion essential to 
their identity displayed higher levels of anger and were more supportive of aggressive 
confrontation when their religion was perceived to be in danger than those who did not 
consider religion as their most powerful social identity. These findings provide a useful 
insight into how young Muslims may turn to terrorist violence in the search for an identity. 
Many young British Muslims of Asian backgrounds are faced with the predicament of 
adopting Western values which are conflicting with the values of Islam. Similarly, 
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participants in the current study felt that British Muslims may resort to terrorist violence 
because they struggle to manage their Muslim and Western identities. While the social 
identity theory has been applicable to the profiles of many terrorists, there are currently no 
empirical studies which have tested the validity of this theory to young terrorists. Thus, 
further research is required to fully understand the relationship between identity crises and 
terrorism among Muslim youth. 
 
Research suggests that ISIS intentionally target first and second-generation Muslims living in 
the West in a bid for them to return to the Muslim world and pursue jihad against the 
“enemy” (Lyons-Padilla, Gelfand, Mirahmadi, Farooq & van Egmond, 2015). This is 
supported by Khosrokhavar (2009) who found that almost all terrorists from European 
countries were first and second-generation immigrants who described feeling isolated and 
marginalised. Moreover, British Muslims who have been involved in terrorism are often 
described as “home-grown terrorists” and the “the enemy within”, and the media tends to 
place more focus on their ethnicity to separate them from the British community 
(Mandaville, 2009). As terrorist organisations may offer a clearer sense of identity, this may 
explain why ISIS appeals to some Muslim immigrants. By committing to ISIS’ extreme 
definition of Jihad, Muslims in the West see this as a way of regaining status and a sense of 
belonging (Kruglanski, Gelfand, Bélanger, Sheveland, Hettiarachchi & Gunaratna, 2014). 
Moreover, research has found that those who join a group with a clear ideology are more 
likely to remain in the group as the divide between “us” and “them” gives people a clear 
understanding of what to believe and what to expect from those who do not belong to their 
group (Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2007). This poses serious 
implications for researchers and police who are looking for ways to reduce this risks of 
Islamic terrorism and highlights the need to examine who may potentially face an identity 
crisis and hence be at greater risk of supporting extremism. Given that the majority of 
Muslims living in Britain are first or second-generation South Asian immigrants, it is vital for 
researchers to focus on how such individuals manage their social, cultural and religious 
identities.  
 
Sympathy  
Many participants expressed some degree of sympathy for young Muslims who had travelled 
to Syria and felt that they were not entirely to blame because they are young and misguided. 
Participants who personally knew Asmal were more sympathetic because they believed that 
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he was not fully aware of the consequences of his action and only those who have bad 
intentions should be punished: 
 
“They’re kids, I see my sister as a kid. My sister is 16 and if she was to do something like 
that, she wouldn’t but if she was, I would argue that she is too young to understand and be 
held responsible.” (Interview 7), “Because I knew Talha, I had sympathy for him because I 
thought that’s not him and maybe he got brainwashed. But people that have extreme views 
and know what they’re doing, I don’t have any sympathy for them. People that go and change 
their mind, I do have sympathy for them.” (Interview 5), “Talha might have gone there and 
committed a terror attack but I know he wasn’t like that. I’ve met him and he was a good kid 
with good intentions. I don’t think he had a choice to escape once he got there.” (Interview 
2), “I feel sorry for them because they don’t know that they’re being fooled and tricked into 
it.” (Interview 6).  
 
There has been much controversy in the media surrounding the issue of British Muslims 
sympathising with Jihadists.  Following the Paris attacks, the Sun newspaper headline 
sparked anger among British Muslims after it reported that one in five ‘British Muslims 
sympathise with Jihadis’. However, Melley (2015) points out that the term “jihadis” was not 
used in the question during the survey; instead, Muslims were asked whether they had “a lot, 
“some” or “no” sympathy for young Muslims who left the UK to fight in Syria. This is a 
valid point as not all Muslims who travel to Syria are going to join ISIS; some may be going 
to do humanitarian work or even fight against ISIS (Melley, 2015). Thus, it is important to 
look at the context in which the word “sympathy” is used and what British Muslims mean by 
it.  For example, the survey found that while some Muslims stated that they felt sympathy 
towards young Muslims who go to Syria, this did not indicate that they support jihadists or 
terrorism, rather they thought young Muslims were being brainwashed and felt sorry for 
them; hence, respondents described feeling “some” or “a lot” of sympathy” for these 
individuals. Similarly, participants in the current study did not support the actions of young 
Muslims going to Syria but they were forgiving and sympathetic. When asked whether 
Muslims should be allowed to return to the UK if they were remorseful, the majority of 
participants felt that they should be given another chance. Participants believed that 
punishing those who had travelled to Syria and preventing them from coming back to their 
homes would not only be detrimental to Muslim youth themselves but also to other people:  
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“I don’t have as harsh of a viewpoint as the majority of Britain would where in that case of 
the three girls, people were saying don’t let them come back and that isn’t going to solve the 
problem.” (Interview 7), “I think that they should be allowed back because if they have gone 
and seen the wrong message and they regret it and want to come back, they should be 
allowed back instead of pushing them away which could have a more negative impact on 
them and others. It could lead to another terror attack so we could essentially be saving 
lives.” (Interveiw 1), “They should be allowed to come back. The longer the stay there, the 
more chance of something bad happening to them. At the end of the day, they’re only human 
and everyone deserves a second chance.” (Interview 2).   
 
There are several issues highlighted here. Firstly, the question that arises here is why is the 
media so quick to portray British Muslims in a negative light and as supporters of Islamist 
extremism? Saeed (2007) argues that the media is responsible for the rise of Islamophobia as 
it misrepresents Islam and Muslims, often portraying them as an “alien other” (an issue that 
will be discussed in further detail in the next theme). Secondly, this alienation, anger and 
resentment felt by British Muslims because of biased media representation may even push 
some British Muslims towards extremism and terrorism (Richardson, 2004). Finally, by 
preventing people from coming back home or giving them a harsh punishment may be unfair 
and detrimental to young Muslims. Researchers at the King's College London's International 
Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence reported that many young 
Muslims who left to join Syria thought that they were going to fight against President 
Assad’s regime but instead got forced into fighting with ISIS (Spillet, 2015). It was reported 
that many of these young Muslims wished to come back but felt trapped because they feared 
being jailed if they returned to Britain.  As documented in previous research, it is the 
vulnerabilities of young Muslims, driven by peer pressure, ISIS’ propaganda and the search 
for belonging and identity that attract British Muslim youth to Syria.  Therefore, it is 
important to take these vulnerabilities into consideration when deciding what punishment 
should be given to British Muslims who wish to return to the UK.  
 
While the current findings and previous research suggest that many British Muslims are 
sympathetic towards young Muslims, it is important to understand that this does not imply 
that they are supportive of their actions. In fact, while most participants were forgiving, there 
were concerns that Muslim youth who had joined ISIS and wanted to return to their homes 
may pose a threat to the UK: “I think there’s a massive risk with that because if they’ve gone 
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to Syria, you don’t know what kind of extremities they’ve been exposed to, what they’ve seen 
or how far they’ve been radicalised. But it shouldn’t be completely non- negotiable.” 
(Interview 8), “It’s very scary for them, to be let back into the country because of what 
they’re capable of.” (Interview 6). Research has shown that many Muslims are being trained 
in Syria to come back and commit terror attacks in their own countries (Qatja, 2016). This 
holds serious implications as the decision to let radicalised Muslims back into the UK may be 
detrimental to the safety of others. Nevertheless, some participants saw this as an opportunity 
to reach those responsible for radicalising youth and subsequently put an end to terrorism: 
“You could probably use them to identify other terrorists and stop other Muslims from being 
radicalised.” (Interview 9), “They should be put under interrogation to see why and use them 
to our advantage and find out what’s actually happening in Syria and if they have any 
contacts and to get to the bottom of it.” (Interview 6). Moreover, jihadists who were regretful 
for their actions could be used as an example to show others who are thinking of travelling to 
Syria that the reality of life under ISIS does not match the image portrayed through ISIS 
propaganda.  
 
Theme 4 - Perceived injustices against the Muslim community 
 
Blame  
Some participants referred to the 9/11 terror attacks and held the US government responsible: 
“I think it’s too late and deep and goes back too far to the 9/11 and the American 
government. I think the American government have created their own problems and they’re 
creating anger amongst Muslims by bombing innocent people.” (Interview 3), “It’s not 
simple as let’s get rid of ISIS. It’s all come from 9/11.” (Interview 7). These findings are 
consistent with a survey poll of 3040 British Muslims which found that nearly one third of 
respondents thought that the US government was responsible for 9/11 (Goins-Phillips, 2016). 
Islamophobia has significantly increased since the 9/11 which has caused much anger among 
Muslim communities. Another participant blamed the Syrian president for the killing of 
innocent people and felt that something needed to be done about corrupt world leaders and 
the Syrian conflict: “The governments need to address why Muslims are so angry. Innocent 
people are dying in Syria every day and it’s not a clear battle. President Assad is a joke. 
These leaders should be going to jail for war criminal charges.” (Interview 7). As Kumar 
(2012) argues, not only do many Muslims feel that political leaders are to blame for the rise 
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in Islamophobia, they are also angry for being expected to condemn terrorism and apologise 
on behalf of Muslim terrorists.  
 
The frustration-aggression hypothesis, first proposed by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer & 
Sears (1939), illustrates how anger and frustration regarding a political situation may lead 
some young Muslims to terrorism.  This hypothesis is underpinned by key concepts of the 
relative deprivation hypothesis which suggests that when an individual faces perceived 
injustice, discrimination, political oppression and low social status, this may cause them to 
engage in violence (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006). While the frustration-aggression 
hypothesis has been widely used in criminological literature, its application to the study of 
terrorism is flawed for many reasons. Critics argue that the hypothesis is overly-simplistic 
and assumes that violence is always a consequence of frustration. There are many people in 
situations that are frustrating but this does not necessarily mean that they will be violent 
towards others or become terrorists. Instead, frustrated individuals may isolate themselves 
from society and seek to achieve their goals using non-violent approaches (Kruglanski & 
Fishman, 2006).  While frustration may indeed contribute to political violence, the 
frustration-aggression hypothesis alone is not enough to explain the causes terrorism. This is 
not to say that frustration driven by conditions such as perceived injustices, discrimination, 
and political oppression have no relevance to terrorism. However, the hypothesis fails to 
explain the process by which people become terrorists and therefore it is necessary to 
differentiate between causal factors and contributing factors to better understand terrorism.  
 
Blame was also attributed to the media for primarily associating the words extremism and 
terrorism with Muslims and Islam: “In the media if you see extremist or terrorist, you 
automatically think Muslim. And I think the media is to blame for that.” (Interview 7), “You 
automatically think of Islam when you hear these words. There’s other groups like IRA trying 
to radicalise other people but now the way it has been perceived in the media, people only 
associate these words with Islam.” (Interview 9). The view that media played a significant 
role in the negative view representation of Islam and its attribution to violence and terrorism 
was reinforced by another participants who stated: “When I hear radicalisation, I just think of 
bombs and suicide bombers and Muslims, killing and violence.” (Interview 6). As discussed 
earlier, several researchers agree that that the media is responsible for the rise of 
Islamophobia in Britain (Saeed, 2007; Richardson, 2004; Kumar, 2012).  Portraying British 
Muslims as “alien” and not a part of the mainstream British culture through biased media 
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representation not only alienates and stigmatises the Muslim community, but also has the 
potential to push young Muslim towards terrorism.  
 
Political revenge 
When asked about the reasons for why Asmal travelled to Syria, participants thought that the 
suffering and oppression of Muslims around the world may have been a significant 
contributor: 
“I think ISIS use the suffering of Muslims and the fact that Muslims are dying across the 
world, in Syria.” (Interview 9), “I get upset and annoyed when I read the news and feel that 
there are many injustices so maybe he [Asmal] felt the same but it might have just been that 
he wanted to make a difference. He might have been upset and angry at what is going on over 
there. I see what’s going on in Syria and Yemen and it makes me really upset and I feel 
helpless. Maybe he felt like that was his only option to help and do something for the 
ummah.” (Interview 7).  
There is a plethora of research which contends that political revenge is a driver of terrorism 
(Schmind & Jongman, 1988; Crenshaw, 1981; Cota-McKinley, Woody & Bell, 2001; 
Richardson, 2006). As suggested by a participant in the current study, Muslims are “killing in 
revenge for bad things that have happened to other Muslims.” (Interview 2). Juergensmeyer 
(2001) states that if Muslim believes that the ummah is oppressed or has been wronged by 
those in power, this may create feelings of humiliation and revenge, thereby pushing some 
Muslims towards political violence. Revenge has been cited as a motivator for terrorism by 
many suicide bombers who felt that Muslim countries were being mistreated and oppressed 
by foreign political leaders. For example, the suffering of innocent Muslims in Palestine at 
the hands of the Israeli Defence Force which provoked feelings of humiliation and revenge in 
Muslims worldwide, leading some to carry out suicide bomb attacks (El-Sarraj, 2002). The 
notion that perceived injustices can lead Muslims to terrorism is supported by research which 
found that Islamic terrorists are usually exposed to graphic images of massacred children and 
women in Muslim countries (Weimann, 2006), and Muslims were more supportive of 
martyrdom and expressed willingness to participate in suicide bombing after viewing images 
of dead Muslims (Pyszczynski, Abdollahi, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen, & Weise, 
2006).While several researchers suggest that perceived injustices against Muslims by 
political leaders motivate Muslims to join terrorist organisations, it is difficult to measure 
feelings of oppression and humiliation; therefore, more empirical research is required to 
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support this assumption. Even if perceived oppression did lead people to terrorism, this 
theory alone fails to explain why only a small minority of people become terrorists and not 
others who are faced with similar political grievances.  
 
Discrimination post 9/11 
The data revealed that discrimination against Muslims was recognised as a contributor of 
Islamist terrorism. Participants felt that stopping people who looked Asian or Muslim at 
airports without a valid reason was racist and targeted Muslim communities: “I think some 
people just use it to be racist. How many terrorists have they actually managed to stop with 
this strategy. I think it can intimidate innocent muslims.5 It could be beneficial but is also 
racist. I have friends who have beards and they’re more likely to get stopped. Research has 
found that Muslims are more likely to be racially profiled and face discrimination at airports 
than non-Muslims. For example, a focus group study by Choudhry & Fenwick (2011) 
revealed that several Muslim participants reported being stopped on domestic and 
international flights whereas none of the non-Muslims participants had any negative 
experiences or recalled being stopped at airports. Nagra (2011) found that all thirty 
participants in a study of young Canadian Muslims had reported being extensively 
interrogated and searched at airports. Similarly, a participant in the current study expressed 
her annoyance at getting stopped randomly at an airport with her family when “the whole 
plane was full of white people and they didn’t stop anyone but us” (Interview 7). The same 
participant also felt that Sikhs were getting stopped at airports because they resembled people 
of the Muslim faith due to their beards or turbans and this was causing them to become 
“annoyed because people think they’re Muslims and they hate that because they don’t want 
to be associated with us. This is why there’s so many Sikhs in UKIP and EDL because they 
want everyone to know that they’re not associated with Muslims.” (Interview 7).   
 
Many studies confirm that that following the 9/11 terror attacks, there has been a rise in 
Islamophobia and Muslims in the West have been subjected to intense scrutiny and 
discrimination (Fekete 2004; Stein, 2003; Helly, 2004). Nagra (2011) found that post 9/11, 
there was a significant increase in the number of Muslims that had been victims of hate 
crime, received racist comments and struggled to gain employment because of their faith. 
Consequently, Muslims began to fear for their safety, struggled to make friends and felt that 
they no longer belonged in the West. While one would expect that Western Muslims would 
detach themselves from Islam in a bid to avoid such discrimination, research has found that 
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this is not the case. Instead, many young Muslims in Britain try to fight this negative 
perception of Islam by reclaiming their faith and strengthening their religious identity (Nagra, 
2011). For example, some Muslims may start dressing more religiously, learning more about 
their religion, and building stronger relationships with fellow Muslims. Portes and Rumbaut’s 
(2001) theory of reactive ethnicity suggests that when people face discrimination, they tend to 
establish a closer relationship with their ethnic group as a way of dealing with the perceived 
discrimination. Unfortunately, some alienated Muslims may end up going to the wrong 
people while seeking knowledge about Islam. The present findings support this in that 
participants believed that discrimination can alienate young Muslims, thereby allowing ISIS 
to exploit their feelings and widen the divide between Muslims and non-Muslims: “Say if 
people get stopped, it’s making it easier for ISIS to seek out people. It’s giving ISIS another 
thing to play on. That is helping ISIS’ cause of creating that us and them divide.” (Interview 
9), “It’s hurtful and can isolate young muslims.” (Interview 6). Referring to the US travel 
ban which banned nationals from seven Muslim-majority countries from travelling to the US, 
another participant criticised the ban and felt that this would make Muslims even more angry: 
“Like the Trump travel ban is taking away people’s rights and its discriminatory. I think 
rules like that are a bigger threat than ISIS because that is what allows anger and terrorism 
to breed in young Muslims.” (Interview 8). These findings are supported by previous research 
which has found that feeling of isolation and alienation resulting from discrimination are 
motivating factors for joining terrorist groups (Silke, 2008; Spalek, 2008).  
 
The labelling theory of crime (Becker, 1963) proposes that crime is not a consequence of 
one’s social background or behaviour, but rather a social construction. According to this 
theory, when authorities label individuals as deviants or criminals based on stereotypical 
assumptions, this creates a self-fulfilling prophecy and leads such individuals to deviancy and 
crime (Marx, 1981).  The labelling theory supports the current findings as participants felt 
that by discriminating against Muslims and treating them all as suspect communities may 
even cause some Muslims to become terrorists: “For you to pinpoint somebody out and target 
them will build resentment I think. Some people might think well if you think I’m a terrorist, I 
might as well be like that because you’re treating me like that anyway.” (Interview 8), “I 
think it’s racist and may even push people towards terrorism.” (Interview 3), “They can’t 
assume that if you’re wearing a Muslim attire or have a beard you’re a terrorist because that 
could make Muslims feel like they’re being targeted and may cause them to become 
terrorists.” (Interview 4). When applying this theory to terrorism, it is important to bear in 
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mind that a person who commits an act of terror may not even recognise it as such. Terrorism 
can be carried out by both the government or its citizens; thus, the definition is ultimately 
dependent upon the political context (Zulueta, 2006). As illustrated by the saying ‘one man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’, Yasser Arafat is one example of a person who was 
considered a terrorist by many people but followers of the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
considered him a true leader of the Palestinians (Lafree & Duggan, 2007). This example 
reinforces a key concept of the labelling theory that an act is considered a crime based on the 
process of social interactions. The theory also provides an insight into why some young 
Muslims who join ISIS may not recognise their behaviour as terrorism. Highlighting the 
dangers of discrimination and stigmatisation of innocent Muslims as potential terrorists, the 
application of the labelling theory to Islamic terrorism illustrates the need for authorities and 
those in power to rethink their approach to fighting the ‘war on terror’.  
 
Counter-terrorism strategies 
When asked about their views on counter-terrorism strategies, only three participants had 
heard of the PREVENT strategy. One participant was a secondary school teacher and had 
received training as part of the PREVENT programme on how to identify pupils who may be 
at risk of becoming radicalised. Although this participant thought that the workshop was 
“really good” and “eye opening”, she also felt that PREVENT could potentially bear negative 
consequences: The majority of our pupils are non-Muslim. I think that if these children were 
to see the material that we’ve seen, it might have a negative effect on non-Muslims. I was 
unaware of how people become radicalised until I watched the video and after watching it, 
non-Muslims might think is this what goes on in non-Muslim communities. I think it might 
make them think negatively of fellow Muslim pupils and incite racism.” (Interview 8). 
Another participant felt that such programs should not just be targeted at Muslims but should 
be aimed at the wider community: “I don’t think they should have programs for just Muslims 
because young Muslims that are thirteen/fourteen might not even know it’s an issue so if 
you’re going into schools to talk, you’re putting it in their heads that the issue is just with 
them and their religion and making young people want to read into even more which might 
make them feel like they’re being targeted. It’s a minority that go over so it should be 
addressed as an issue in general and not just targeted at Muslims.” (Interview 2).  
 
Appleby (2010) support’s the findings above and argues that UK’s counter terrorism strategy 
creates labels which alienate Muslims. While there is no mention of Islam or Muslims in any 
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legal documents for the PREVENT strategy, the documents produced by the government 
view extremism as an issue deep-rooted within the Muslim community. As the government 
advises British universities to prevent recruitment of extremists by monitoring students who 
look Muslim and Asian (Brown & Saeed, 2014), this places all Muslim at the centre of the 
perceived threat. Using the labelling theory, Appleby (2010) illustrates how counter-terrorism 
strategies may potentially contribute to terrorism.  He argues that the government uses the 
label ‘Muslim’ in its counter-terrorism strategies and fails to acknowledge other individual 
identities and social groups that extremists may belong to. By focusing only on Muslims’ 
religious identities, the counter-terrorism strategy ignores that there may be individuals who 
identify as Muslims but do not practice and so religion is not their strongest identity. Labels 
such as ‘British Muslims’, ‘British Sikhs’ and ‘British Hindus’ imply that people belonging 
to these labels differ to the mainstream British community (Appleby, 2010). As such, 
labelling individuals based on their religious or ethnic background prevents them from 
identifying as just ‘British’, thereby creating community division.  The labelling theory 
demonstrates how the government, through the use of labels in its counter-terrorism strategy, 
has the power to alienate Muslims and constantly remind them that they belong to the ‘other’ 
deviant community. The theory suggests that terrorist come into existence because they are 
being forced to respond to and adopt this label of the ‘other’; thus, if the government did not 
label Muslims as the other then ‘terrorists’ would not exist (Tuman, 2003).  Moreover, 
theorists argue that when authorities label people as terrorists, not only will the labelled 
indivduals embrace this label and use it to their advantage, they will use it to engage with 
other criminals and create a new identity that can speak on behalf of the ‘other’  
(Tannenbaum, 1938). Thus, it is not possible to combat terrorism if the government’s 
counter-terrorism strategies continue to emphasise that the Muslims community is ‘alien’ and 
different to the mainstream British community.   
 
While the UK’s counter-terrorism strategies is scrutinised for alienating British Muslims, the 
strategy should not be disregarded as entirely problematic either. The criticisms thrown at 
counter terrorism strategies have weight but the government has displayed serious efforts to 
revise its previous versions so as to address the issues regarding marginalisation. As 
suggested by a participant in the current study, counter-terrorism strategies need to be “more 
inclusive and don’t make it seem like it’s Muslims versus non-Muslims. Make sure that 
everyone is mixing. Every religion and race, and that will tone down all this. You see in 
schools all the time, there’s so much segregation and nothing seems to be done about it. 
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Speak to people that aren’t Muslim and see what their views on terrorism and have healthy 
debates.” (Interview 7). The growing number British Muslims travelling to Syria highlights 
the need for policy-maker to address how and why people become radicalised. As suggested 
by a participant, it would prove difficult to tackle terrorism without addressing it with the 
Muslim community: “You’ve got to be realistic too. The problem is with Muslim 
communities.” (Interview 8). Until policy-makers can investigate the causes of radicalisation 
among Muslim youth without discriminating and marginalising the wider community, it is 
not possible to successfully counter the radicalisation process.  
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of the present study was to explore the multi-faceted phenomenon of Islamic 
terrorism and gain a better understanding of why more and more young Muslims are joining 
ISIS. The research questions for this study were:  
 
 What are young British Muslims’ views on other Muslims who join Islamic extremist 
groups and what is ISIS’ appeal for young Muslims? 
 How are Muslims being targeted by terrorist groups and what role does social media 
play in the recruitment of young Muslims? 
 How do counter terrorism strategies affect Muslim youth and what proposals to tackle 
radicalisation should be implemented in Britain?  
 
Th following section will summarise the key findings from the themes identified in the 
present study. Implications for practice will be discussed alongside methodological issues and 
limitations of the current research. Taking into consideration the findings and conclusions 
from the present study, areas for future research will also be discussed.  
 
Summary of themes 
The current study identified four major themes within the analysis which explored the issue 
of terrorism from the perspective of Muslim youth in Britain. The first theme, Poor grasp of 
Islamic faith, provided an insight into the level of religious knowledge possessed by Muslim 
youth, suggesting that some young Muslims may be limited in their understanding of Islam 
and what it teaches about violence. The input of participants and their views on Jihad and 
Quranic teachings address the research questions in that they illustrated how some Muslim 
youth may be radicalised by extremists. For example, the misinterpretation of Quranic verses 
at the hands of ISIS may present a distorted and contradictory version of Islam to young 
Muslims. Moreover, the concept of being rewarded in Jannah (heaven) and the afterlife by 
fighting for ISIS helps explain why the terror group’s narrative may appeal to some young 
Muslims; not only are young Muslims being offered worldly pleasures by joining ISIS, they 
are also being promised spiritual reward in Heaven and the afterlife. Although men and 
women were understood to play different roles under the rule of ISIS, participants felt that 
both men and women are driven by the same motive – religious reward.  
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The second theme, The influence of social networks on terrorism, pointed towards a number 
of social networks and relationships that may influence young people to become terrorists. 
Family members, peers, and older Muslims were believed to play a significant role in driving 
young Muslims towards terrorism. Participants recognised poor family relationships and a 
lack of closeness with parents as a contributor of terrorism in young Muslims.  Similarly, 
peer pressure was understood to play a significant role in the radicalisation of young Muslims 
as was the influence of older Muslims. Many participants thought that it was not just Muslims 
from Syria who were influencing younger Muslims to join ISIS but there were older Muslims 
from Britain involved too. Mosques and schools, where young people develop and learn 
about religion, were considered to play a crucial role in shaping attitudes towards Islamic 
extremism. Participants expressed their concerns for mosques being target spots for ISIS 
recruitment and also criticised the harsh disciplining methods employed by Islamic teachers. 
The way in which religious education was being taught in British schools was also scrutinised 
by participants for misrepresenting the nature of Islam and being incapable of challenging 
racism and religious intolerance.  
  
Social media was identified as an online social network which facilitated the grooming of 
young Muslims by ISIS. Social media networks such as Facebook, Twitter and Whatsapp 
were considered some of the major platforms used to manipulate young Muslims. While 
participants believed that social media was an effective strategy for ISIS to attract and recruit 
younger people, the consensus among participants was that young people must show some 
interest in ISIS and its cause first for them to be targeted. Participants felt that Muslims may 
become involved with terrorists online based on the type of websites they visit and the 
content they share online, thereby illustrating how online social networking may put young 
Muslims at risk of being identified and targeted by ISIS. 
 
The third theme, Psychological vulnerabilities of Muslim youth, revealed discrepancies in 
opinions regarding the mental health of young Muslims that join ISIS. While some 
participants felt that there must be underlying mental disorders contributing to the 
involvement in terrorism, others felt that Muslim youth who travel to Syria are making a 
well-informed decision. The majority of participants did, however, feel that young Muslims 
were being brainwashed by ISIS due to their vulnerability and naivety. Participants thought 
that Muslim youth living in the West may join terrorist groups because they feel lost and 
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want a sense of belonging. There was a strong view that young Muslims struggle to manage 
their Western and religious identities. Feelings of alienation, isolation and confusion were 
also cited as common factors influencing Muslim youth to join ISIS. Although there was 
strong disapproval of the actions of young Muslims who travel to Syria, participants 
expressed sympathy for such people and felt that they were not entirely to blame because 
they are young and misguided. Participants who personally knew Asmal were more 
sympathetic because they believed that he was not fully aware of the consequences of his 
action and only those who have bad intentions should be punished. The belief that some 
young Muslims who travel to Syria are psychologically vulnerable was reinforced when 
participants suggested that Muslims who are remorseful should be allowed to return to the 
UK. Participants believed that punishing those who had travelled to Syria and preventing 
them from coming back to their homes would not only be detrimental to Muslim youth 
themselves but also to society.  
 
Finally, the fourth theme, Perceived injustices against the Muslim community, brought forth 
many issues surrounding the radicalisation of young Muslims. Some participants referred to 
the 9/11 terror attacks and held the US government responsible and political leaders 
responsible for the rise of Islamophobia. Blame was also attributed to the media for 
misrepresenting Islam and associating it with extremism and terrorism, causing Muslims in 
the West to feel alienated.  Participants thought that that oppression of Muslims worldwide 
may invoke political revenge and push young Muslims to join terrorist groups. Perceived 
discrimination was identified as a significant contributor of Islamist terrorism. Counter-
terrorism strategies were believed to be discriminatory and targeting Muslim communities, 
further widening the gap between Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Instead, 
participants felt that counter-terrorism strategies should not just be targeted at Muslims but 
should be addressed with the wider community as discrimination not only has the potential to 
alienate young Muslims, it further allows young Muslims to be exploited by ISIS.   
Implications for practice 
The findings from the current study illustrate that there are several factors influencing the 
process of radicalisation in young Muslims. The study reinforces the common view that most 
terrorists who join ISIS have a poor grasp of the Islamic faith. As ISIS offers young Muslims 
the incentive of being rewarded in both this life and the afterlife, this highlights some issues 
policy-makers may face when trying to tackle terrorism. Misinterpretations of Islamic 
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concepts such as jihad and martyrdom are not only problematic for the Muslim community, 
but also for others around them. As Hathout (2002) suggests, it is vital to educate Muslims, 
particularly those who may be at increased risk of radicalisation, about what Islam teaches 
about violence. Failure to properly educate young Muslims about Islamic concepts such as 
Jihad and martyrdom may lead to further misunderstandings about Islam and subsequently 
increase Islamic terrorism.  
 
The present study highlights the need for parents, particularly those from Asian backgrounds, 
to build close relationships with children. As children are more likely to be obedient and 
better adjusted if they have a strong emotional attachment with parents (Laible, Carlo & 
Raffaelli, 2000), helping families improve relationships among themselves may help young 
people desist from criminal behaviour.  Given that Munshi who travelled to Syria with Asmal 
was the brother of Britain’s youngest convicted terrorist, and from Dewsbury, a town that has 
previous links with Islamist terrorism, this highlights the need for crime analysts to examine 
the demographical factors (age, ethnicity, location, family convictions etc) that may 
contribute to the involvement of young Muslims in terrorism. It is necessary for governing 
bodies to examine the material being taught in Mosques and also to ensure that young 
Muslims are not being subjected to harsh disciplining as this may build resentment towards 
authority, and subsequently allow terrorist groups to target vulnerable Muslims. As the 
present research suggested that Muslim leaders may hold extremist views, it is important for 
mosques and Islamic institutions to be regulated by the British government to stop the spread 
of Islamic extremism. Moreover, intelligence agencies need to further investigate the role 
older Muslims may play in the recruitment of younger Muslims for ISIS, particularly in 
mosques and areas with a high population of Muslims. Schools also have a duty to enhance 
the relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim communities to stop young Muslims from 
feeling alienated. Therefore, it is necessary for teachers to challenge any misunderstandings 
children may have learned about Islam outside of school as failure to do so may result in 
children internalising the view that Muslims are socially and culturally different. 
 
Social media, as a recruitment tool for ISIS, poses many challenges for those trying to tackle 
radicalisations. Other than monitoring online activity, there is not much more governments 
can do to stop the proliferation of ISIS propaganda to prospective recruits. Nevertheless, as 
Awan (2007) argues, the use of the internet by terrorist organisations is more likely to 
reinforce pre-existing views in young Muslims rather than radicalise them. While ISIS’ social 
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media strategy and propaganda has played a significant role in the recruitment of foreign 
fighters, peer pressure and real-life social networks are argued to play a greater role in 
radicalising of young Muslims (McVeigh, 2014). Therefore, it is important to exercise more 
efforts into finding the root causes of extremism rather than the methods used to facilitate 
recruitment.  
 
In relation to the psychological vulnerabilities of Muslims in Britain, researchers need to look 
at which individuals are at an increased risk of facing an identity crisis, particularly in the 
Asian community. Moreover, there is a need for the British government to carefully examine 
the media representation of Islam and Muslims as the portrayal of British Muslims as the 
“alien other” not only gives rise to Islamophobia, it also has the potential to push young 
Muslim towards terrorism. Lastly, the government needs to rethink its approach to fighting 
terrorism as counter-terrorism strategies stigmatise Muslims and continue to emphasise that 
the Muslims community is ‘alien’ and different to the mainstream British community.  As 
discrimination and alienation are key drivers of Islamist terrorism, it is important for 
government leaders to distance terrorism from Islam by removing the labels that create the 
association between Muslims and terrorism. 
 
Methodological Considerations and Research Limitations  
While the present study provides a useful insight into why several British Muslims might join 
ISIS, the research is not without its limitations. The study explored terrorism from the 
perspective of British Asian Muslims from West Yorkshire, and not from the perspective of 
terrorists themselves; thus, the reliability of the findings and generalisability to the wider 
Muslim community can be questioned. However, it would prove difficult to obtain data 
directly from young Muslims involved in terrorism due to legal reasons as many of these 
young Muslims are under 18 years of age. Silke (2004) supports that it is difficult to obtain 
data directly from terrorists themselves and therefore a limitation of terrorism research is that 
it relies heavily on the use of secondary data analysis.  
 
Another limitation of the present study was that the researcher shared the same ethnic and 
religious background (Asian and Muslim) as participants which could potentially cause 
confirmation bias. Confirmation bias occurs if the researcher interprets the raw data based on 
their own individual beliefs and culture (Stenbacka, 2001). The researcher may only pay 
attention to certain responses that they deem relevant to their research hypotheses, 
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disregarding any information that does not confirm their hypotheses. Although a conscious 
effort was made by the researcher to assess and evaluate the raw data and challenge any pre-
existing beliefs, it is difficult to completely eradicate confirmation bias. However, the current 
research may not have obtained the same quality of data if the researcher was from a different 
religious background as interviewees may have felt less comfortable discussing their views 
on terrorism.  
 
One strength of thematic analysis is that it has more theoretical flexibility than other 
qualitative methods of data analysis. This theoretical independence means that thematic 
analysis may be an easier method to learn, especially for those who are new to qualitative 
research (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Consequently, thematic analysis was the best method for 
analysis in this study as not only did it serve as a flexible research tool which is independent 
of theoretical knowledge, it was a more accessible form of analysis for the researcher. It can 
be applied to research questions that focus on the experiences and understandings of people 
in regard to a particular subject, making it suitable for studying people’s views on terrorism. 
As thematic analysis is suitable for large data sets and can be used to generate analyses that 
are underpinned by data or theory, this method was deemed the most appropriate for this 
study. 
 
Recommendations for future research 
The present study emphasises the need for researchers to investigate the role older Muslims 
with extremist views play in the recruitment of younger Muslims as this area is lacking in 
research. While the current research suggested that men and women have similar motives for 
travelling to Syria, future research could focus solely on the motivating factors of young 
women as terrorism research has predominantly focused on young men. Moreover, focus 
group studies of young Muslims could be carried out to obtain qualitative data on a larger 
scale. Another area for research could be to explore the experiences of family members of 
those who have left Britain and joined Syria as this may provide a better insight into the 
background of such individuals and the motivating factors that influence them to become 
terrorists. Lastly, further research is required regarding the efficacy of UK counter-terrorism 
strategies as many Muslims do not consider this approach beneficial; rather, it bears negative 
consequences for not only Muslims communities, but also for others around them.   
 
Key conclusions  
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This study has shown that the phenomenon of terrorism among Muslim youth is rather 
complex. This research has contributed to the existing literature on the topic of Islamic 
terrorism by exploring a wide range of factors including religion, social networks, 
psychological vulnerabilities and discrimination that underlie terrorist behaviour of young 
Muslims. By identifying the drivers of religious extremism from a Muslim youth perspective, 
this will enable policy-makers and researchers to better understand the root causes of 
terrorism and fight radicalisation. It is hoped that by providing young Muslims with a voice, 
terrorism researchers will be more informed of the factors contributing to terrorism among 
Muslim youth. It is expected that this study will provide opportunities for further research 
and practise by developing treatment rationales for terrorism. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 – Interview transcripts 
Interview 1  
ISIS & Syria 
I: Are you aware of the current situation in Syria and the terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS? 
P: Yes 
I: What are your views on men/women who join Islamic extremist groups such as ISIS? 
P: I feel that they are deluded and also misguided and they’re very naïve because they take the 
information the wrong way and they go too far with it. 
I: What do you think is the main reason behind young Muslims travelling abroad and fighting in 
Syria?  
P: Naivety. I think they’re all naïve and that one bit of miscommunication can take them the wrong 
way. 
I: What do you think are the key motivators for joining such groups? 
P: I think they they’re lost and they’re trying to find some sort of comfort and belonging. I think they 
feel that they don’t belong here and they’re led astray.  
 
Jihad & religion 
I: What is your understanding of the terms radicalisation and extremism? 
P: radicalisation is when someone becomes too radical and extreme in their views. And radicalisation 
is when people are too extreme and take their views to another level of extremity.   
I: What does the word jihad mean to you? 
P: striving for God. I think extremists use that as justification for committing terror attacks.  
I: Yeah some terrorists have used extracts of the Quran to justify acts of terrorism, do you think 
that it is in any way understandable? 
P: No. I think they’re going too deep into it and taking the meaning literally. When they’re trying to 
seek the truth about their religion, they’re going to the wrong people or going onto dodgy websites.  
I: Do you think there are any Islamic teachings that may be interpreted in such a way that they can 
be used to justify Islamic terrorism? 
P: I don’t think the Quran promotes violence. If that was the case, then all Muslims would be 
terrorists. I think there are certain texts in the Quran that speak about war and fighting but that’s in 
reference to history and doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s relevant to this day and age.  
 
Examples of young people  
I: Why do you think some young men decide to join ISIS?  
P: I think they feel like they don’t belong anywhere and perhaps they find comfort in groups like ISIS. 
They’re lost and naïve. They’re led astray because of their naive minds and they’re vulnerable. 
I: What is Isis’ appeal for young people? Why does Isis appeal to teenage girls and boys? 
P: Young people are more vulnerable and older people have found what they are looking for in life 
whereas young people might be looking for a purpose or some sort of adventure. And ISIS may seem 
like they’ll give them a good life and by joining ISIS they think that they are pleasing their lord. 
I: Have you heard of Talha Asmal from Dewsbury who joined Syria in ISIS? 
P: Yeah. 
What do you think led him to do what he did? 
I think the wrong crowd because him and his friend went right? So yeah I think the wrong crowd. 
And the way them two went about things, I think they were lost. They didn’t belong to anything. And 
when you’re lost, you’ll do anything to make yourself feel comfortable. 
P: Have you heard about the 3 school girls from east London who went to Syria?  
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No  
I: Well there’s been speculations that these girls and many other young girls have left the UK to 
marry ISIS fighters in Syria. Do you think men and women have different motivations for joining 
ISIS? 
P: I don’t think it’s a case of men and women. I just think younger people aren’t as knowledgeable 
like they’re still young and they haven’t got much life experience and they’re more vulnerable. The 
older you are the more you know. 
I: Why do you think it is that only some men/women leave for Syria and not the vast majority of 
young Muslims?  
P: I feel that most people are grounded and disciplined and they have a good education. They’re 
taught well in mosque but there’s a small minority that don’t have that and they might not be 
grounded and disciplined. I think It depends on your upbringing. If you have a good education, which 
most of us do have, I don’t think you will go on this path to Syria.  
I: What do you think should be done with people who go to Syria but then wish to return back to 
the UK? 
P: I think that they should be allowed back because if they have gone and seen the wrong message 
and they regret it and want to come back, they should be allowed back instead of pushing them 
away which could have a more negative impact on them and others. It could lead to another terror 
attack so we could essentially be saving lives.  
I: Do you have any sympathy for these young people? 
P: no I don’t but with the right teaching and communication, these people could be educated and 
stopped from becoming terrorists.  
Do you think these people are being groomed or do you think that they are fully aware of the 
consequences of their actions? 
I: that could be a possibility. There’s so much awareness out there and people know it’s wrong so I 
think they do know what they’re doing. You know what’s right and wrong, they should know better.  
 
Social Networks 
I: How do you think young Muslims are being targeted by terrorist groups? 
P: I don’t think it’s purely young Muslims being targeted. These young Muslims must be showing 
some interest in ISIS for them to be picked out. If they’re searching for certain things online relating 
to ISIS, then they’re bound to come under the attention of ISIS. I think it’s equal parties to blame. For 
a terrorist to groom somebody, they must have been searching on sites and chats in the first place to 
get in contact with ISIS. I think they phrase things in a way which make people think that they’re 
doing something good for their religion. They portray things in a way that makes these people think 
they’re doing something better than what they really are doing. I think by saying that they’re being 
targeted takes away the responsibility from young Muslims. I do think they play an equal role. Those 
kids aren’t going to get a random message from ISIS unless they’re on a platform which allows ISIS to 
seek them.  
I: What part do you think older Muslims play in the recruitment of younger Muslims? Do you think 
they have any role? 
P: older muslims are the ones that have a stronger influence. If it comes from an older man, who is 
respected, you’re more likely to believe. So they must have older Muslims that are recruiting and 
they’re the leaders. The youngsters are just being used to fulfil ISIS’ actions.   
 
 
Counter-terrorism strategies 
I: What proposals to tackle radicalisation among young Muslims should be implemented in 
Britain?  
P: more bans on website. There’s too much access to certain things on the internet.  They need to 
monitor what’s being searched by people. 
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I: Have you heard about the UK counter-terrorism strategy called PREVENT? Like stop and search 
laws of stopping and searching people. What are your views on it? 
P: I think they’re good because terror attacks are becoming more and more frequent but people are 
also misusing their powers and stopping every Asian man at the airport that look Muslim. But it’s a 
good idea because it can prevent terror attacks.  
How would you approach reducing this idea of radicalisation and what would you do to counter 
the threat from terrorism? 
P: I think in schools they need to teach religious education in a better way. You have to have 
discipline and grounding from a young age. Even in mosques. They’ve changed a bit now because 
before we just used to go pray Quran and come straight home. But I think now they’ve started 
teaching more stories about Islam and what it says about violence. They need to di it more. Islam 
isn’t just about praying Quran; it’s more than that. They need to teach Islam to non-Muslims too and 
what its really about. They need to know because they don’t really much. I don’t think schools teach 
the right thing. If you have a strong foundation, then you’re less likely to go astray. They need to 
encourage learning about the meanings of texts so people don’t misinterpret. There must be more 
underlying problems. Like your friends and siblings have a big influence on you so looking at the 
crowd young people are in.  
Can parents/schools/mosques do more to prevent youth from being radicalised? 
P: just more education. The more you push someone to do something, the more it pushes them 
away. So it has to be someone who is close to the child that can educate them like the parents, the 
friends or siblings. Someone that hits home for them. If you bring a stranger to their house, they’re 
less likely to listen. They can always do more. You spend so much time with parents, school, 
mosques so it’s really important to teach kids and give them a good upbringing. They need to take it 
upon themselves to do more and shape their children to be good representatives of Islam. 
 
Interview 2  
ISIS & Syria 
I: Are you aware of the current situation in Syria and the terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS? 
P: Yeah. 
I: What are your views on men/women who join Islamic extremist groups such as ISIS? 
P: I think they are innocent people that are brainwashed into thinking out religion says something 
else. They end up doing something that they shouldn’t thinking our religion allows it like blowing 
themselves up and killing innocents.   
I: What do you think is the main reason behind young Muslims travelling abroad and fighting in 
Syria?  
P: I think they go over because they talk to someone or get in contact with someone and that person 
convinces them that they’re doing a good thing. And they’re killing in revenge for the bad things that 
have happened to other Muslims. 
I: What do you think are the key motivators for joining such groups? 
P: They get promised things that don’t happen. Like they get promised that they’re gonna go to 
heaven if they go there and fight but when they go there they get forced to do things that they don’t 
necessarily want to do.  
 
Jihad & religion 
I: What is your understanding of the terms radicalisation and extremism? 
P: I don’t know 
I: What does the word jihad mean to you? 
P: To do something for your religion. 
I: Yeah some terrorists have used extracts of the Quran to justify acts of terrorism, do you think 
that it is in any way understandable? 
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P: No it’d clear cut but people may manipulate others into believing this is what the Quran says and 
get them to do things that they wouldn’t do. 
I: Do you think there are any Islamic teachings that may be interpreted in such a way that they can 
be used to justify Islamic terrorism? 
P: no, theres stories in the past during the prophet’s time when there were wars going on but 
there’s nothing in the quran that can justify what isis and these terrorists are doing. 
 
Examples of young people  
I: Why do you think some young men decide to join ISIS?  
P: they want a fast ticket to heaven. They think theyre fighting for a good cause but theyre actually 
not. 
I:What is Isis’ appeal for young people? Why does Isis appeal to teenage girls and boys? 
P: because young people are naïve and easily manipulated and easily convinced to do stupid things. 
I: Have you heard of Talha Asmal from Dewsbury who joined Syria in ISIS? 
P: Yeah he was friends with my brother. 
What do you think led him to do what he did? 
P: He got talking to someone on social media and that person led him to believe he was gonna fight 
for a good cause and when he went there, they explained to him what was gonna happen and it 
wasn’t what he went for. He went there thinking that he was going to help people but he was 
strapped to a bomb and forced to blow himself up. And he was talking to someone from there 
through Facebook. He told my brother he was going on a holiday and then my brother found out and 
we saw it all over the news that he’d blown himself up. 
I: Have you heard about the 3 school girls from east London who went to Syria?  
P: yeah  
I: There’s been speculations that these girls and many other young girls have left the UK to marry 
ISIS fighters in Syria. Do you think mean and women have different motivations for joining ISIS?  
P:  I think the media portrays things differently. I don’t know to be honest I’ve not really thought 
about that. Yeah and no.  I think they have similar motives but some things men can do and women 
can’t.   
I: Why do you think it is that only some men/women leave for Syria and not the vast majority of 
young Muslims? 
P: I think it’s more to do with the people you’re surrounded by. A lot of my friends have travelled to 
Syria to deliver human aid but there’s also a small minority of people who want to do good but end 
up meeting the wrong people.   
I: What do you think should be done with people who go to Syria but then wish to return back to 
the UK? 
P: They should be allowed to come back. The longer the stay there, the more chance of something 
bad happening to them. At the end of the day, they’re only human and everyone deserves a second 
chance. 
I: Do you have any sympathy for these young people? 
P: Yeah. Like Talha might have gone there and committed a terror attack but I know he wasn’t like 
that. I’ve met him and he was a good kid with good intentions. I don’t think he had a choice to 
escape once he got there. Once he got there. It was game over for him. 
Do you think these people are being groomed or do you think that they are fully aware of the 
consequences of their actions? 
No they’re not fully aware of what they’re getting themselves into and when they get there, they’re 
just seen as an extra pair of hands. Wherever they’re needed, they’ll be used. 
 
Social Networks 
I: How do you think young Muslims are being targeted by terrorist groups? 
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P: I think through social media. They’re talking to people on Facebook and maybe it does start off 
with a genuine religious conversation and as the person gets to know more about you, it all switches 
and they take advantage. 
I: Are young Muslims being targeted on the internet through social media networks? 
Yeah. From areas like this such as Bradford, Dewsbury, Birmingham because there’s a high 
population of Muslims.   
I: What part do you think older Muslims play in the recruitment of younger Muslims? Do you think 
they have any role? 
P: I think there are older Muslims involved whether it be here or in Syria and they’re just looking for 
an extra pair of hands to be used. 
 
 
Counter-terrorism strategies 
I:What proposals to tackle radicalisation among young Muslims should be implemented in Britain? 
P: I’m not sure. Monitor social media more because people are having conversations that they 
shouldn’t be having.  
I: Have you heard about the UK counter-terrorism strategy called PREVENT? Like stop and search 
laws of stopping and searching people. What are your views on it? 
P: I don’t think its fair because not all Muslims are like that and there’s a few but Muslims as a whole 
are seen in a bad way. I think they need to be thorough with everybody and not just people that look 
muslim or like a terrorist. 
How would you approach reducing this idea of radicalisation and what would you do to counter 
the threat from terrorism? 
P: Monitor social media and maybe monitoring the type of things people teach at mosques.  
I: What actions do you think should be taken to stop young men and women from going to Syria 
and joining ISIS? 
P: Keeping an eye on them more and parents should know exactly where their child is. If they’re 
going on holiday, they should have all the details of their flight bookings. 
I: Can parents/schools/mosques do more to prevent youth from being radicalised? 
P:  they need to make them more aware of the dangers because it’s becoming more and more 
common.  People get groomed on facebook in sexual ways and its quite similar in that sense so they 
need to be made more aware. I don’t think mosques teach a lot about radicalisation so they need to 
talk to the kids more and let them know what’s going on. 
 
Interview 3  
 
ISIS & Syria 
I: Are you aware of the current situation in Syria and the terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS? 
P: Yeah. 
I: What are your views on men/women who join Islamic extremist groups such as ISIS? 
P: I don’t support it. I think it’s wrong and shouldn’t be encouraged. 
I: What do you think is the main reason behind young Muslims travelling abroad and fighting in 
Syria?  
P: It’s brainwashing. They’re taking advantage of young, vulnerable people. They’re confused. 
I: What do you think are the key motivators for joining such groups? 
P: I think they’re trying to look for answers. Like in the case of my friend, he was looking for answers 
from knowledgeable people and they couldn’t give him a response. So that kind of cemented in his 
mind that what he’s doing is right if scholars don’t have the answers to his questions. 
 
Jihad & religion 
I: What is your understanding of the terms radicalisation and extremism? 
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P: The first thing that comes to mind is Muslims and brown people. It’s become associated with 
Islam. So when I hear those words, I think of my own people and colour. 
I: What does the word jihad mean to you? 
P: Giving your life for religious reasons. 
I: Yeah some terrorists have used extracts of the Quran to justify acts of terrorism, do you think 
that it is in any way understandable? 
P: No not at all because the Quran was written over 1400 years ago and the situation was different. 
You can’t take that conext and apply to today and use it as a justification for terrorism. 
I: Do you think there are any Islamic teachings that may be interpreted in such a way that they can 
be used to justify Islamic terrorism? 
P: I think if you look at one particular part of the quran you might think that’s justification for me to 
go and commit a violent act but if you look at it in its entirety, you’ll see that islam is about peace 
and love and bringing people together. But if you’re looking at segments, then you’re taking it out of 
context.  
 
Examples of young people  
I: Why do you think some young men decide to join ISIS?  
P: Young people are more impressionable. It’s confusion. I think there’s a mental breakdown 
somewhere for someone to have courage to do that, your mind can’t be in the right place.  
I: What is Isis’ appeal for young people? Why does Isis appeal to teenage girls and boys? 
P: They’re more vulnerable. 
I: Have you heard of Talha Asmal from Dewsbury who joined Syria in ISIS? 
P: Yeah he was my friend. 
What do you think led him to do what he did? 
P: He looked into it and did his research. He was a Quran hafiz so he wasn’t thick. I think it was the 
people that he was talking to. He just started digging deeper and deeper and his mind was boggled. 
His whole mind couldn’t see the other side of the argument. Obviously I didn’t know he was going to 
do it till after he went so I was really shocked. Had I known he was going to leave, I would have done 
everything I could to stop him. 
I: Have you heard about the 3 school girls from east London who went to Syria?  
P: yeah  
I: There’s been speculations that these girls and many other young girls have left the UK to marry 
ISIS fighters in Syria. What is your view on women wanting to become jihadi brides.  
P:  There’s nothing good coming from that. 
Do you think mean and women have different motivations for joining ISIS?  
Yeah. I think once their brainwashed, men just want to go and fight. I think its different when they 
get there and realise there’s no going back. For women, it’s different. Depends on their background 
and what they’re running from. I think they’re unhappy with their own lives and that’s why they go.  
I: Why do you think it is that only some men/women leave for Syria and not the vast majority of 
young Muslims? 
P: I think it’s how your brought up and the values you’re brought up with. If you have an unstable 
environment and upbringing, that triggers it. Siblings and friends are a big influence too.  
I: What do you think should be done with people who go to Syria but then wish to return back to 
the UK? 
P: Its more subjective. I think you can’t really change someone’s views but you should give them a 
chance but offer them rehabilitation than just throw them in prison and let them out a few years 
later even more damaged.   
I: Do you have any sympathy for these young people? 
P: Yeah. I don’t think they’re entirely to blame 
Do you think these people are being groomed or do you think that they are fully aware of the 
consequences of their actions? 
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Groomed. 
 
Social Networks 
I: How do you think young Muslims are being targeted by terrorist groups? 
P: The person must go asking questions themselves first or even the media like bbc news which 
peaks people’s interests. Talha was very clever. He didn’t let anyone that he was speaking to 
someone and he was using code language so that the police couldn’t track them.  There’s people in 
this country that are targeting muslims and not just doing it from Syria.  
I: do you think they’re older Muslims? 
They’re definitely older Muslims that are cowards. They can’t go themselves so they use these young 
people and send them over.  
I: Are young Muslims being targeted on the internet through social media networks? 
You don’t just trust a stranger from across the world. But social media is being used by people living 
here to target young Muslims.  
 
Counter-terrorism strategies 
I:What proposals to tackle radicalisation among young Muslims should be implemented in Britain? 
P: I don’t think they should have programs for just Muslims because young Muslims that are 13/14 
might not even know it’s an issue so if you’re going into schools to talk, you’re putting it in their 
heads that the issue is just with them and their religion and making young people want to read into 
even more which might make them feel like they’re being targeted. It’s a minority that go over so it 
should be addressed as an issue in general and not just targeted at Muslims.  
 I: Have you heard about the UK counter-terrorism strategy called PREVENT? Like stop and search 
laws of stopping and searching people. What are your views on it? 
P: I think it’s racist and may even push people towards terrorism.  
How would you approach reducing this idea of radicalisation and what would you do to counter 
the threat from terrorism? 
P: I don’t know. I think it’s too late and deep and goes back too far to the 9/11 and the American 
government. I think the American government have created their own problems and they’re 
creating anger amongst Muslims by bombing innocent people. 
 
I: What actions do you think should be taken to stop young men and women from going to Syria 
and joining ISIS? 
P: I don’t think you should say don’t do this and do go to Syria and join ISIS. But you need to teach 
them more about what Islam really says about violence. 
 
Interview 4  
ISIS & Syria 
I: Are you aware of the current situation in Syria and the terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS? 
P: Yes 
I: What are your views on men/women who join Islamic extremist groups such as ISIS? 
P: I think they are extreme and classed as terrorists. 
I: What do you think is the main reason behind young Muslims travelling abroad and fighting in 
Syria?  
P: I think they’re naïve and get brainwashed easily. 
I: What do you think are the key motivators for joining such groups? 
P: They think it’s Islamic but it’s not and because they’re young and naïve, they’re easily influenced. 
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Jihad & religion 
I: What is your understanding of the terms radicalisation and extremism? 
P: It’s when somebody is imposing their views on someone. 
I: What does the word jihad mean to you? 
P: Fighting with your inner self but now it’s associated with violence but that isn’t the real meaning. 
I: Yeah some terrorists have used extracts of the Quran to justify acts of terrorism, do you think 
that it is in any way understandable? 
P: No 
I: Do you think there are any Islamic teachings that may be interpreted in such a way that they can 
be used to justify Islamic terrorism? 
P: People make their own meanings and its misinterpreted. Only qualified scholars have the right to 
interpret. And if they’re interpreting it wrong, then we have a big problem.  
 
Examples of young people  
I: Why do you think some young men decide to join ISIS?  
P: They’ve got nothing better to do with their lives. Lack of education. Islamically and academically. 
I: What is Isis’ appeal for young people? Why does Isis appeal to teenage girls and boys? 
P: Young people are eager to learn more about islam but I think it depends on the kinds of people 
they speak to and if it’s a radical person, they’ll just see that as the truth because they’re more 
vulnerable. As you’re growing, you learn but these young people haven’t had the chance and are 
being thrown into the deep end by these radicals. If violence was what Islam taught, then every 
Muslim would be fighting in Syria right now. 
I: Have you heard of Talha Asmal from Dewsbury who joined Syria in ISIS? 
P: Yeah I have. 
What do you think led him to do what he did? 
A range of factors. He might have had some family members who shared the same views. He might 
have been seeking his own place in religion and a sense of belonging but he got caught in the wrong 
group. 
P: Have you heard about the 3 school girls from east London who went to Syria?  
yeah 
I: There’s been speculations that these girls and many other young girls have left the UK to marry 
ISIS fighters in Syria. Do you think mean and women have different motivations for joining ISIS? 
P: It’s ridiculous. I think they must have the same motive – religion. 
I:Why do you think it is that only some men/women leave for Syria and not the vast majority of 
young Muslims? 
P: The minority don’t have an understanding of Islam.  
I: What do you think should be done with people who go to Syria but then wish to return back to 
the UK? 
P: Depends on what they’ve done. If they have, then no. If they haven’t done anything, they need to 
educated.  
I: Do you have any sympathy for these young people? 
P: It depends on their intention. If they have gone with the intention to help people, then yeah. But 
just to cause violence then no. 
Do you think these people are being groomed or do you think that they are fully aware of the 
consequences of their actions? 
I: No. Anybody in their right mind wouldn’t do it. 
 
Social Networks 
I: How do you think young Muslims are being targeted by terrorist groups? 
P: Young kids must be initiating it themselves. How would a radical get in touch with them? People 
get in touch with you if you’re posting or tweeting the same views as them. 
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I: What part do you think older Muslims play in the recruitment of younger Muslims? Do you think 
they have any role? 
P: Younger ones are physically stronger. Older Muslims are the leaders and might make the calls but 
put these young people forward.  But you can never be sure because if we knew, it wouldn’t be 
happening.  
 
 
Counter-terrorism strategies 
I: What proposals to tackle radicalisation among young Muslims should be implemented in 
Britain?  
P: People keep saying masjids should do more but they shouldn’t be seen as the wrong doers. You 
can’t start screening every Muslim. It needs to be fair. Don’t just pick on Muslims.  
I: Have you heard about the UK counter-terrorism strategy called PREVENT? Like stop and search 
laws of stopping and searching people. What are your views on it? 
P: I don’t see a problem as long as they don’t give them grief. But they need to have a real reason to 
stop someone and proper criteria. They can’t assume that if you’re wearing a Muslim attire or have a 
bead you’re a terrorist because that could make Muslims feel like they’re being targeted and may 
cause them to become terrorists. 
How would you approach reducing this idea of radicalisation and what would you do to counter 
the threat from terrorism? 
P: everyone has to play a part, whether it’s school or mosques. They should be given talks in schools 
and use the same strategy everywhere. Kids are unaware and don’t even know the real meaning of 
terrorism so yeah more needs to be taught at schools.  
 
 
Interview 5  
ISIS & Syria 
I: Are you aware of the current situation in Syria and the terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS? 
P: Kind of 
I: What are your views on men/women who join Islamic extremist groups such as ISIS? 
P: I don’t agree with it and I think they get brainwashed to do it. But I think they must already have 
some extremist views to get brainwashed because if someone was trying to brainwash me on 
facebook, id block them.  
I: What do you think is the main reason behind young Muslims travelling abroad and fighting in 
Syria?  
P: They think they’re doing something good, They’re told that the life there is amazing and young 
boys are attracted to the idea of using weapons. These people could be here or there. And use Islam 
to brainwash them and tell them they’ll go to Jannah if they go fight. It’s nothing to do with Islam. 
They’re killing in Islam’s name. 
 
Jihad & religion 
I: What is your understanding of the terms radicalisation and extremism? 
P: Brainwashing someone into thinking their opinion is right and getting them to do thing that aren’t 
right. What was the next one? Extremism. Having extreme views about something. 
I: What does the word jihad mean to you? 
P: Battle, wars, fighting.  
I: Yeah some terrorists have used extracts of the Quran to justify acts of terrorism, do you think 
that it is in any way understandable? 
P: No. it’s made up and twisted the Quran because it doesn’t represent that at all.  
I: Do you think there are any Islamic teachings that may be interpreted in such a way that they can 
be used to justify Islamic terrorism? 
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P: No. Back in those days when there were wars, it was understandable because non-Muslims were 
killing Muslims but right now, it’s not relevant. But people twist things and make out Islam 
encourages violence when it doesn’t. 
 
Examples of young people  
I: Why do you think some young men decide to join ISIS?  
P: I think they’re brainwashed. Or maybe they’ve grown up in such a way to have extreme views and 
gone to mosques that don’t represent Islam properly. 
I: What is Isis’ appeal for young people? Why does Isis appeal to teenage girls and boys? 
P: younger people are easier to brainwash than older people.  
I: Have you heard of Talha Asmal from Dewsbury who joined Syria in ISIS? 
P: Yeah I went to college with him. 
What do you think led him to do what he did? 
He was a really nice and quiet guy and really Islamic. He was a hafiz. So maybe he was talking to the 
wrong people and he thought what he was doing is right think because I don’t think he’s do 
something like that knowing that it’s so wrong. We were all so shocked because he was a really nice 
and quiet guy. Anyone could be walking on the street and they could have extremist views and you’d 
never know so how are you supposed to stop people from going to Syria because they seem like 
normal people.  
P: Have you heard about the 3 school girls from east London who went to Syria?  
yeah 
I: There’s been speculations that these girls and many other young girls have left the UK to marry 
ISIS fighters in Syria. Do you think mean and women have different motivations for joining ISIS? 
P: Maybe women go so they can have children and raise them to fight and to take care of ISIS 
fighters. 
I:Why do you think it is that only some men/women leave for Syria and not the vast majority of 
young Muslims? 
P: People that go are quite naïve but I wouldn’t blame it all on their naivety. Some people are more 
intelligent and but someone who doesn’t have much knowledge would fall into the trap of isis.   
I: What do you think should be done with people who go to Syria but then wish to return back to 
the UK? 
P: Yeah because they’ve been lied to and don’t know what they’re doing. 
I: Do you have any sympathy for these young people? 
P: Yes and no. Because I knew Talha I had sympathy for him because I thought that’s not him and 
maybe he got brainwashed. But people that have extreme views and know what they’re doing, I 
don’t have any sympathy for them. People that go and change their mind, I do have sympathy for 
them. 
I: What part do you think older Muslims play in the recruitment of younger Muslims? Do you think 
they have any role? 
P: I feel like other people are involved in the whole situation. How would a young person even go to 
isis? Obviously someone is telling them to come to this place and where to meet. I don’t think 
someone can just decide to go by themselves. I feel like older people are sending younger people 
because they’re healthier and know that they can fight and young boys are more interested in 
weapons so it appeals to them more. ISIS know that young men would be attracted to this whole 
idea of fighting because it’s masculine. 
Do you think these people are here on in Syria? 
I think its here too. How can someone you’ve never met have such a big impact on you and influence 
you to leave your family and travel to join isis. It must be someone that they know or became close 
to because you wouldn’t just trust someone over social media. 
 
Social Networks 
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I: How do you think young Muslims are being targeted by terrorist groups? 
P: Through someone they already know. In order to be targeted, they must exhibit extreme views.  I 
knew that Talha was Islamic and wanted to help the Syrians so maybe that’s why he was targeted 
because he expressed those views but with me, I don’t think anyone would because I don’t have 
extreme views. 
What do you mean by extreme? 
Say if you saw someone wasn’t wearing hijab, you started saying horrible things about them. But 
Talha wasn’t like that at all. I feel that if a terrorist group though that somebody held such views, 
they’re more likely to target them. I feel like Talha was really normal who talked about Islam in a 
positive way but didn’t hold any extremist views. He just used to mind his own business. 
 
Counter-terrorism strategies 
I: What proposals to tackle radicalisation among young Muslims should be implemented in 
Britain?  
P: Raise more awareness. If you suspect something from a friend, you should know who you can 
report it. Just let people know that it’s happening and do something with the borders. Be stricter on 
the border from turkey to Syria.  
I: Have you heard about the UK counter-terrorism strategy called PREVENT? Like stop and search 
laws of stopping and searching people. What are your views on it? 
P: For someone who doesn’t have extreme views, it can be hurtful.  I think some people just use it to 
be racist. I wouldn’t like it if I was stopped and questioned for no reason. How many terrorists have 
they actually managed to stop with this strategy. I think it can intimidate innocent Muslims. 
How would you approach reducing this idea of radicalisation and what would you do to counter 
the threat from terrorism? 
P: More tight security in turkey. More awareness in schools and the community. Have it on social 
media more so that they know who they can speak to if they felt like they were being targeted by a 
terrorist or knew someone else that was.  
I: Can parents/schools/mosques do more to prevent youth from being radicalised? 
P:  mosque yeah. Kids look up to Islamic teachers and if they taught kids that ISIS are terrorists, these 
children would take that into account.  
 
 
Interview 6  
 
ISIS & Syria 
I: Are you aware of the current situation in Syria and the terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS? 
P: Yeah. When I go onto facebook, I see a lot about it. 
I: What are your views on men/women who join Islamic extremist groups such as ISIS? 
P: I think it’s wrong because these groups are not doing anything goof got the world and the women 
that are doing it to have babies to keep ISIS growing and contribute to destroying other parts of the 
world. 
I: What do you think is the main reason behind young Muslims travelling abroad and fighting in 
Syria?  
P: Its down to brainwashing. Religion doesn’t teach them to be violent but some scriptures may be 
misinterpreted. These extremist groups target young and naïve people and brainwash them into 
thinking that there’s a greater good in the hereafter when that’s not the case. They brainwash them 
into thinking there’s more benefits than costs to this. 
I: What do you think are the key motivators for joining such groups? 
P: The benefits are more than the costs. So maybe not in this world but in the hereafter. They think 
they’re pleasing god and that’s the main thing these terrorists say to brainwash young Muslims. 
They say to them forget about all these disbelievers, it’s all about god.  
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Jihad & religion 
I: What is your understanding of the terms radicalisation and extremism? 
P: when I hear radicalisation, I just think of bombs and suicide bombers and Muslims, killing and 
violence. Being extreme in their beliefs. 
I: What does the word jihad mean to you? 
P: Fighting ones desires or fighting against oneself. Jihad means fighting in the way of god but that 
doesn’t mean god is telling us to fight other people that aren’t believers. It’s a personal thing and 
means when you want to do something evil, fight against yourself. Terrorists only look at the literal 
meaning and think they need to go out and physically fight.  
I: Yeah some terrorists have used extracts of the Quran to justify acts of terrorism, do you think 
that it is in any way understandable? 
P: If you take any line out of its context, then yeah it can be used in their favour. For example, in the 
Quran, there’s an extract which talks about killing the non-believers but it’s not saying to do it for no 
reason, it’s because they’re at war with them. 
  
 
Examples of young people  
I: Why do you think some young men decide to join ISIS?  
P: Men are naturally more prone to fighting. It’s like survival of the fittest. Men want to be seen as 
stronger and acts of violence may excite them. They’re more easy to lure men in than females. 
Females will go and marry ISIS fighters so they can look after ISIS babies and breed more violence. 
I: What is Isis’ appeal for young people? Why does Isis appeal to teenage girls and boys? 
P: They’re more naïve and gullible. Living in this generation, there’s a lot of hate against Islam and 
ISIS might use that to their advantage and say that this world isn’t for us. 
I: Have you heard of Talha Asmal from Dewsbury who joined Syria in ISIS? 
P: Yeah I have. 
What do you think led him to do what he did? 
He’s from a Muslim area, there’s a big famous mosque there – Markaz. So he’s in a situation where 
it’s really easy to meet the wrong people. Someone had a very strong influence on him so I don’t 
think it was his decision alone. I think he was in contact with the wrong people who sold it to him 
very well. It comes down to personality. ISIS are intelligent and good at mind games and if they saw 
someone and thought they looked young and naïve, they could mislead them by saying you’re doing 
really well why don’t you come and help us.   
P: Have you heard about the 3 school girls from east London who went to Syria?  
yeah 
I: There’s been speculations that these girls and many other young girls have left the UK to marry 
ISIS fighters in Syria.  
P: They’re thinking that they’re helping Islam grow. These girls are nurturing children so they can 
grow them into soldiers for ISIS. Because women can’t physically fight, by marrying ISIS fighters, they 
feel like they’re contributing. The only way they can do that is by marrying and supporting ISIS 
fighters.  
Do you think men and women have different motivations for joining ISIS? 
It boils down to the same motive of helping ISIS and trying to fight against non-Muslims. The same 
motive is there but they do it in different ways.  
I: Why do you think it is that only some men/women leave for Syria and not the vast majority of 
young Muslims? 
P: it’s a very secular society that we live in and many Muslims are not as practicing. When you’re 
practicing, its really easy to be influenced and become extreme and passionate about what you 
believe. I think it depends on what stage of practice you’re in.  
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I: What do you think should be done with people who go to Syria but then wish to return back to 
the UK? 
P: Its very scary for them, to be let back into the country because of what they’re capable of. They 
should be put under interrogation to see why and use them to our advantage and find out what’s 
actually happening in Syria and if they have any contacts and to get to the bottom of it.  
I: Do you have any sympathy for these young people? 
P: I am a sympathetic person but the only sympathy I can give them is that they’re naive and stupid. 
Why would they put themselves in such a risky situation. I feel sorry for them because they don’t 
know that they’re being fooled and tricked into it. 
 
Social Networks 
I: How do you think young Muslims are being targeted by terrorist groups? 
P: Social networks. Twitter. Isis have tweets and they see people and message them in a 
manipulative way. They might post something that a Muslim can relate to and make them think that 
it’s about us and look what the west is doing to us and make them think that Islam is hated. 
I: What part do you think older Muslims play in the recruitment of younger Muslims? Do you think 
they have any role? 
P: It comes down to naivety. Younger Muslims have more energy and old Muslims take a back seat 
because they’re not going to be around for long so they need to keep this generation of ISIS going. 
They can’t send an old person over because in a few years they might be dead and they won’t have 
anyone to pass these terrorist views onto the younger generation. If they recruit younger people, 
they can keep the cycle going. 
 
 
Counter-terrorism strategies 
I: What proposals to tackle radicalisation among young Muslims should be implemented in 
Britain?  
P: There should be more youth clubs, more teaching in schools. If children are getting this 
information from a young age, maybe it would reduce terrorism.  
I: Have you heard about the UK counter-terrorism strategy called PREVENT? Like stop and search 
laws of stopping and searching people. What are your views on it? 
P: It could be beneficial but is also racist. I have friends who have beards and they’re more likely to 
get stopped. Its hurtful and can isolate young Muslims. 
How would you approach reducing this idea of radicalisation and what would you do to counter 
the threat from terrorism? 
Try talking them out of it and report any behaviour that is suspicious. 
I: Can parents/schools/mosques do more to prevent youth from being radicalised? 
P:  mosques need to emphasise the positive side to Islam and teach them what the media doesn’t 
show. A lot of it comes down to upbringing. So parents need to speak about it and teach their kids 
about how bad it is.  
 
 
Interview 7  
ISIS & Syria 
I: Are you aware of the current situation in Syria and the terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS? 
P: Yeah. 
I: What are your views on men/women who join Islamic extremist groups such as ISIS? 
P: I think they’re very misguided. Those that join the war there don’t really know what’s going on 
there and they get carried away in the hype. I do believe its brainwashing because if you knew Islam, 
you’d know that it’s not about violence. They’re not Muslims. I think it’s a cry for attention. It might 
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even be good intentions that have been misplaced. They don’t know how to help but they can’t truly 
know what they’re doing, surely. 
I: What do you think is the main reason behind young Muslims travelling abroad and fighting in 
Syria?  
P: I think misinformation. There’s people in ISIS that get in contact with people from here and make 
them believe that they’re doing something good but these young people don’t do their own 
research. I think they’re angry and trying to make a difference but go about it the wrong way. But 
they might not know that 
I: What do you think are the key motivators for joining such groups? 
P: There’s a narrative of the west being against Muslims. So maybe they want to fight for the ummah 
and fight against the unfair treatment of innocent Muslims. They’re doing it in the name of Islam but 
that’s not what Muslims believe.  
 
 
Jihad & religion 
I: What is your understanding of the terms radicalisation and extremism? 
P: Now I don’t think the meaning is even close to what those words mean. I don’t think you’re an 
extremist if you believe in your religion but nowadays its linked to Muslims and some people might 
think that just by praying 5 times a day is extreme. But I think extreme is thinking of joining ISIS and 
killing people. Those terms are mainly associated with Islam. If you were to say extremist, even for 
me as a Muslim, the first thing that would come to mind is a Muslim. And that’s just the way we’ve 
been conditioned now. In the media if you see extremist or terrorist, you automatically think 
Muslim. And I think the media is to blame for that. 
I: What does the word jihad mean to you? 
P: the meaning has completely changed. Now even my brain thinks of it in a negative way. It means 
to struggle and fight but not for the wrong reasons or for murdering innocent people. It’s not a 
negative thing but it’s wrongly translated in the climate we’re in and through the media and films.  
I: Some terrorists have used extracts of the Quran to justify acts of terrorism, do you think that it 
is in any way understandable? 
P: No. You can’t take one ayah out of context. Times have changed since then anyway. They ignore 
the ayahs that say if you kill one innocent person, then it is like you have killed the whole of 
mankind. You can’t pick and choose a surah that fits your purpose.  I don’t think ISIS are true 
Muslims and believe they’re doing it to destroy Islam. They’re fighting in the name of Islam but it’s 
for their own political gains. They don’t care about Islam because if they did, they would follow the 
ways of the prophet. The just and fair way he dealt with war.   
I: Do you think there are any Islamic teachings that may be interpreted in such a way that they can 
be used to justify Islamic terrorism? 
P: I could never read the Quran and feel angry or think that I need to go and fight someone. But I can 
see how it can get twisted along the line. Someone with bad intentions can take something and go 
to someone who’s vulnerable or impressionable and say look this is why you need to fight. It’s 
people with wrong intentions who misinterpret. We have to account for our own cations and I feel 
sorry for those who are going to Syria and fighting because they’re going to have a lot to answer for. 
And they don’t have the fear of Allah in them. They’re not aware of Islam. They’re deluded and think 
they’re promised paradise but they’re looking at it from a very biased view point. 
 
Examples of young people  
I: Why do you think some young men decide to join ISIS?  
P: It might be due to peer pressure like those three school girls left together and the two boys from 
Batley were friends. I think men also get influenced and wrapped up in it especially if their friends 
are doing it. Or they don’t see themselves tied to anything here where they’ve got a good job or 
their family is close which makes it easier for them to go. So, if you get a few vulnerable people 
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together, who are all in a similar situation and don’t care about being here, they’re not going to 
value their life enough. 
I: What is Isis’ appeal for young people? Why does Isis appeal to teenage girls and boys? 
P: I cannot see the appeal. I tried to see what good could come from those three girls who went to 
turkey and crossed the border. They risk dying and never being allowed back. I think the most 
obvious thing would be that they think if they die, they die a martyr and go straight to heaven. 
I: Have you heard about the 3 school girls from east London who went to Syria?  
P: yeah  
I: There’s been speculations that these girls and many other young girls have left the UK to marry 
ISIS fighters in Syria. Do you think mean and women have different motivations for joining ISIS?  
P:  I think it’s stupid and irresponsible. As a girl, I could never imagine leaving home and my family 
without telling them. They know that Britain will never let them back in so the chances are they’re 
never going to see their families again. So, they must be brainwashed.  
Talha asmal? 
I get upset and annoyed when I read the news and feel that there are many injustices so maybe he 
felt the same but it might have just been that he wanted to make a difference. He might have been 
upset and angry at what is going on over there. I see what’s going on in Syria and Yemen and it 
makes me upset and I feel helpless. Maybe he felt like that was his only option to help and do 
something for the ummah. 
Do you think men and women have different motivations for joining ISIS? 
Yeah because he will have known that he was going to fight and I’m assuming women don’t go to 
fight. They’re going to get married. I think they’re both irresponsible.  
I: Why do you think it is that only some men/women leave for Syria and not the vast majority of 
young Muslims? 
P: It not Islam. It has nothing to do with Islam. The world should be scared if that is what Islam 
teaches because there’s, millions of Muslims and if that was what we were taught from a young age, 
we’d all be over there and there would be riots everywhere. I think it’s a psychological thing and 
you’ve got to be a very special kind of person to go over there and do this. It must be combination of 
factors like upbringing and also your mental health. You’ve got to be deluded.  
I: What do you think should be done with people who go to Syria but then wish to return back to 
the UK? 
P: I don’t have as harsh of a viewpoint as the majority of Britain would where in that case of the 
three girls, people were saying don’t let them come back and that isn’t going to solve the problem. 
They’re kids, I see my sister as a kid. My sister is 16 and if she was to do something like that, she 
wouldn’t but if she was, I would argue that she is too young to understand and be held responsible. 
And if it is brainwashing, that’s serious. But I can understand the worry that if you let them back, 
they could do something really bad. But I think they need to be educated on why they shouldn’t go 
rather than trying to persuade people to let them back in. 
I: Do you have any sympathy for these young people? 
P: I feel sad that they think this way. If they understood Islam. They wouldn’t do that. And if they 
were close to their families, maybe they wouldn’t do that. I just feel sad for them.   
Do you think these people are being groomed or do you think that they are fully aware of the 
consequences of their actions? 
100% being groomed. Depends on their age, especially the girls. I don’t think they would do it if they 
knew the consequences.  
 
Social Networks 
I: How do you think young Muslims are being targeted by terrorist groups? 
P: I’ve heard that there’s a lot of stuff online like encrypted messages where others can’t pick up on 
what they’re saying and apps like WhatsApp. But I always wonder how they get in contact with them 
anyway. Maybe it’s a case of people here going out and looking for these people. I think they show 
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interest first. Like I don’t see how someone could come up to me and be like do you want to go to 
Syria. I would have to contact them.  
How do they convey? 
Twitter and Facebook. You can share whatever you want to. You can be a bit sly and not say 
anything that’s too extreme and once you’ve got their trust, you move onto messaging directly. I 
don’t think these young Muslims have bad intentions but the people that they’re speaking to do 
have bad intentions.  
I: Are young Muslims being targeted on the internet through social media networks? 
I still don’t understand how someone can know how someone is vulnerable. Maybe they strike up a 
relationship with them and get their trust. 
I: What part do you think older Muslims play in the recruitment of younger Muslims? Do you think 
they have any role? 
P: I think older Muslims are more grounded and have more will power. They know more about Islam 
about young kids. The older you get the more rational you get and think more clearly, whereas the 
things these kids are doing is very rash. Older people have families and children that they could 
never leave. So, if young people feel lonely or isolated, they’re more likely to join ISIS. There’s people 
in this country that are targeting Muslims and not just doing it from Syria. I could see how they 
might make it seem attractive, kind of like how young men are encouraged to join the army and fight 
for their country. In the same way, ISIS may be glorifying fighting.  
 
 
Counter-terrorism strategies 
I: What proposals to tackle radicalisation among young Muslims should be implemented in 
Britain? P: the government need to address why Muslims are so angry. The media is setting up 
Muslims to fail. Think about the way media is. Communities can educate more and learn to fight 
with knowledge rather than actions.  It’s not a war like it was in the time of the prophet where it was 
Muslims versus non-Muslims. This is ambiguous. Innocent people are dying in Syria every day and 
it’s not a clear battle. Education is key. They’re just ruining their own life. 
I: Have you heard about the UK counter-terrorism strategy called PREVENT? Like stop and search 
laws of stopping and searching people. What are your views on it? 
P: I think that that’s going to stir up more hate and annoy Muslims.  We got stopped randomly and 
that annoyed me, the whole plane was full of white people and they didn’t stop anyone but us. 
Why? That’s irritating. They’re painting everyone with the same brush. I’ve seen so many tweets and 
stories about people getting stopped if they’re wearing a turban and Sikhs are getting annoyed 
because people think they’re Muslims and they hate that because they don’t want to be associated 
with us. This is why there’s so many people in UKIP and EDL because they want everyone to know 
that they’re not associated with Muslims. 
How would you approach reducing this idea of radicalisation and what would you do to counter 
the threat from terrorism? 
P: I think they need to look at the government. The world leaders aren’t doing enough to get rid of 
world leaders. President Assad id a joke, it’s not simple as let’s get rid of ISIS. It’s all come from 9/11. 
It’s just been stirring and stirring and stirring but we need to tackle getting corrupt leaders out. 
These leaders should be going to jail for war criminal charges. When you can see that the 
government is so corrupt, they need to address getting rid of those leaders first.   
I: What actions do you think should be taken to stop young men and women from going to Syria 
and joining ISIS? 
P: People aren’t going directly to Syria. They go from turkey a l lot. So more border controls. You can 
change our mind-set to theirs so how can you change theirs to ours. It’s hard.  
I: Can parents/schools/mosques do more to prevent youth from being radicalised? 
P:  I think in Asian communities, I don’t think they have strong relationships. So, parents need to be 
close to their kids so they could never feel like they want to leave you. Have stronger relationships 
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with kids so they don’t want to leave you. Schools don’t do enough. We only learn the basics. Maybe 
be more inclusive and don’t make it seem like its Muslims versus non-Muslims. Make sure that 
everyone is mixing. Every religion and race, and that will tone down all this. You see in schools all the 
time, there’s so much segregation and nothing seems to be done about it. Like my non-muslim 
friend will defend my religion and that means more to me than a Muslim doing that. So, everyone 
needs to mingle. Speak to people that aren’t Muslim and see what their views on terrorism. And 
have healthy debates.  
 
Interview 8  
ISIS & Syria 
I: Are you aware of the current situation in Syria and the terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS? 
P: Yeah. 
I: What are your views on men/women who join Islamic extremist groups such as ISIS? 
P: I think that they are easily impressionable young people who don’t have an accurate 
representation of Islam maybe or what ISIS even stands for. 
I: What do you think is the main reason behind young Muslims travelling abroad and fighting in 
Syria?  
P: mixed messages. So, getting the wrong impression through maybe social media or maybe people 
are lacking in their own intelligence or their own research. They’ve been easily influenced and what 
to do right by their religion but they don’t really know what their religion means.  
I: What do you think are the key motivators for joining such groups? 
P: some sort of religious gratification. Their warped perception of Islam. Getting gratification from 
their religion but they’ve got the wrong idea of it basically.  
 
Jihad & religion 
I: What is your understanding of the terms radicalisation and extremism? 
P: Radicalisation is when somebody has wrong been exposed to messages and they become 
desensitised to the wrongness of something. Extremism is when they take something from the 
Quran and become extreme in their views. They take the literal meaning of something. For example, 
in the prophet’s time it might have been relevant but now it’s taken out of context. 
I: What does the word jihad mean to you? 
P: Internal struggle for the sake of god.  
I: Some terrorists have used extracts of the Quran to justify acts of terrorism, do you think that it 
is in any way understandable? 
P: no. but everything is open to interpretation. So, it’s how each individual interprets it, you can’t 
really control that. 
I: Do you think there are any Islamic teachings that may be interpreted in such a way that they can 
be used to justify Islamic terrorism? 
P: no. there are verses in the Quran that talk about fighting enemies but for every verse like that, 
there’s another verse that will negate it. Like there’s a verse in the Quran that says if you were to kill 
one innocent person, it’s like you killed all of mankind. So I think people pick and choose which parts 
of the Quran they want to follow and take them out of context.  
 
Examples of young people  
I: Why do you think some young men decide to join ISIS?  
P: maybe alienation. They feel like they don’t fit in the western world. Maybe they want to go to a 
place that they feel like they belong to for a sense of identity.  
I: What is Isis’ appeal for young people? Why does Isis appeal to teenage girls and boys? 
P: I think they go because they’re at that point in their life where they’re the most vulnerable. So it’s 
probably vulnerability and their age and the lack of the external world really.  
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I: So what do you think ISIS offer to these people? 
P: I’m not sure. I don’t know what they could possibly offer to anyone. 
I: Have you heard about Talha Asmal from Dewsbury?  
P: yeah 
I: What do you think led him to do what he did? 
P: I think he might have wanted a sense of belonging. Obviously Islamic state is related to Islam so 
maybe he thought he would be benefitting his religion or his afterlife. Or maybe he would get 
rewarded for it in some way. 
I: Have you heard about the 3 school girls from east London who went to Syria?  
P: yeah  
I: There’s been speculations that these girls and many other young girls have left the UK to marry 
ISIS fighters in Syria. What is your view on jihadi brides? 
P; I think they’re really confused because I don’t understand the logic behind it. I don’t know what 
they would gain from it. Again, I think it’s that sense of maybe wanting to belong to something or be 
a part of something. Maybe they want to do right by their religion but they don’t know how to.  
Do you think mean and women have different motivations for joining ISIS? 
Maybe in the roles that they play when they go to Syria but in the end goal I think it is to gain some 
sort of reward in the afterlife. I think they both want to help other Muslims around the world that 
they believe are oppressed or suffering. 
I: Why do you think it is that only some men/women leave for Syria and not the vast majority of 
young Muslims? 
P: the vast majority of Muslims know what jihad really is. They try to get that religious gratification 
through more appropriate means like the things that Islam prescribes like the 5 daily prayers, 
praying the Quran, and things like that rather than going to that extreme version. I think most 
Muslims want to live in harmony with the west without compromising their religion.   
I: What do you think should be done with people who go to Syria but then wish to return back to 
the UK? 
P: I don’t think they should be allowed back because. It depends on their age. If they’re really young 
and they want to come back to their parents because they’ve been misled. But I think there’s a 
massive risk with that because if they’ve gone to Syria, you don’t know what kind of extremities 
they’ve been exposed to, what they’ve seen or how far they’ve been radicalised. But it shouldn’t be 
completely non- negotiable.   
I: Do you have any sympathy for these young people? 
P: in some ways. If they don’t have a supportive network then unfortunately, it can turn out like this 
for some people where they become extreme. I think maybe if Talha had support, things could have 
been different. If he had spoken to someone about his intentions. Someone could have helped him 
out. So u feel like a lot of these young people don’t have anyone to talk to that they can confide in.  
Do you think these people are being groomed or do you think that they are fully aware of the 
consequences of their actions? 
I think it depends. Some make very intelligible choices and do it on purpose but others get caught in 
the hype, but I think that a lot of them are making a well informed decision.  
 
 
Social Networks 
I: How do you think young Muslims are being targeted by terrorist groups? 
P: I think they’re attacking Muslims countries. 
How do they convey their message? 
Not very well. Like I don’t know what their message is. I don’t understand what their motive is or 
what they’re trying to achieve by committing these acts of terror. 
I: Are young Muslims being targeted on the internet through social media networks? 
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P: didn’t ISIS send messages through social media? I think there’s groups online that promote their 
cause. Because social media is so prevalent in everyone’s life nowadays, I feel like you can be easily 
influence or impressionable if you follow these groups. Facebook mainly. I think these people must 
show interest to these groups first for ISIS to track them down. But I don’t think it’s difficult for ISIS 
to seek vulnerable people out either. 
I: Why is it young Muslims and not older? 
P: older ones have more knowledge and understanding of Islam.   
I: What part do you think older Muslims play in the recruitment of younger Muslims? Do you think 
they have any role? 
P: I think some people might secretly hold extremist views. You have to go through a lot of obstacles 
to get there which I don’t think these young people can overcome by themselves. Maybe they had 
an older influencer.  
 
 
Counter-terrorism strategies 
I: What proposals to tackle radicalisation among young Muslims should be implemented in 
Britain?  
P: Knowledge and support. I think a lot of people that join ISIS feel alienation and a lack of support. If 
that was put in place through schools, youth centres and even mosques, if they were educated 
properly and issues were addressed and not brushed under the carpet then that would be very 
beneficial.  
I: Have you heard about the UK counter-terrorism strategy called PREVENT? Like stop and search 
laws of stopping and searching people. What are your views on it? 
P: yeah. They came to our school to do a workshop. I thought it was really good. They came and 
showed us videos of two scenarios where children may have been radicalised. It was really eye 
opening for me. I knew very little about how people might get radicalised so I thought the training 
was really good. The only problem is that I think with young people, some wouldn’t take on the 
message. They might idolise the person in the video and want to be like that. If a pupil was quiet and 
they became loud, they might have support from external bodies. They might feel a new sense of 
confidence. Or if they were very loud and suddenly became quiet or submissive, that might indicate 
that they have something to hide and don’t want anyone to know what they’re doing. And generally 
looking for more vulnerable kids because somebody might not have a father figure, they might seek 
a father figure through ISIS leaders or that kind of thing. But it’s generally the same kind of signs 
you’re looking for when you’re looking at child protection cases. But they haven’t shown the video 
to our kids yet. The majority of our pupils are non-Muslim. I think that if these children were to see 
the material that we’ve seen. It might have a negative effect on non-Muslims. I was unaware of how 
people become radicalised until I watched the video and after watching it, non-Muslims might think 
is this what goes on in non-Muslim communities. I think it might make them think negatively of 
fellow Muslim pupils and incite racism.  
What do you think about the checks at airports? 
I think they’re negative because everyone goes through the security checks anyway and how many 
terrorists do they actually manage to stop at airports. For you to pinpoint somebody out and target 
them will build resentment I think. Some people might think well if you think I’m a terrorist, I might 
as well be like that because you’re treating me like that anyway. I think it does marginalise Muslims 
but you’ve got to be realistic too. The problem is with Muslim communities. Obviously there can be 
other terrorist groups but ISIS is the biggest threat at this moment.  
How would you approach reducing this idea of radicalisation and what would you do to counter 
the threat from terrorism? 
P: education is key. If you educated pupils, not just pupils but children in general, I think there’s less 
likelihood of things like this happening. Other than that I don’t think there’s anything else we can do. 
Airports should be checked just as regularly but realistically what else can you do because then 
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comes a question of human rights. Like the Trump travel ban is taking away people’s rights and its 
discriminatory. I think rules like that are a bigger threat than ISIS because that is what allows anger 
and terrorism to breed in young Muslims.  
I: What actions do you think should be taken to stop young men and women from going to Syria 
and joining ISIS? 
P: maybe monitor people who seem to be threat and make it more difficult for people to get to 
Syria. It can’t be difficult to get to Syria f young kids are doing it.  
I: Can parents/schools/mosques do more to prevent youth from being radicalised? 
P: definitely. I don’t think we talk about it enough in the community. It feels like we’re distant. It 
happens around the corner from us. So maybe if we talk about it more, then young Muslims will feel 
like they can speak about it too and that way they’re less likely to become radicalised. I think 
mosques have a responsibility. They shouldn’t just be there to learn the basics. Mosques should be 
the place where you do talk about religion and all forms of it.   
 
Interview 9  
ISIS & Syria 
I: Are you aware of the current situation in Syria and the terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS? 
P: Yeah. 
I: What are your views on men/women who join Islamic extremist groups such as ISIS? 
P: I think they’re vulnerable people that actually want to do the right thing but they’re misled by 
extremists. Extremists take advantage of these vulnerable people. They don’t know what they’re 
letting themselves in for. 
I: What do you think is the main reason behind young Muslims travelling abroad and fighting in 
Syria?  
P: I think ISIS use the suffering of Muslims and the fact that Muslims are dying across the world, in 
Syria. Like last week there was a bombing in Pakistan and I think extremists use this to their 
advantage.  
I: What do you think are the key motivators for joining such groups? 
P: fight for Islam. Well what they think is fighting for Islam when in fact they’re fighting for terrorism. 
They think they’re doing a good thing, almost like a charity and they’ll be rewarded for it by God.  
 
Jihad & religion 
I: What is your understanding of the terms radicalisation and extremism? 
P: extremism is taking the literal words of Islam and how it was perceived back in the prophet’s time. 
Taking that and using it to make young naïve Muslims turn extreme. Radicalisation is using that to 
get the most out of these vulnerable people. I think both the words are mainly associated with just 
Islam even though there are other terrorist groups out there. You automatically think of Islam when 
you hear these words. There’s other groups like IRA trying to radicalise other people but now the 
way it has been perceived in the media, people only associate these words with Islam.  
I: What does the word jihad mean to you? 
P: to me as a Muslim, it’s defeating your inner demons. 
Do you think that others see it as the same? 
No I think for a lot of people, they see it as dying for your religion but I think most scholars would 
agree that the greatest jihad is fighting your inner demons and it’s a personal struggle.  
I: Some terrorists have used extracts of the Quran to justify acts of terrorism, do you think that it 
is in any way understandable? 
P: no. because the literal words of the Quran were written in a time where it was completed 
different to our life today. 
I: Do you think there are any Islamic teachings that may be interpreted in such a way that they can 
be used to justify Islamic terrorism? 
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P: yeah but they are misinterpreted.   
 
Examples of young people  
I: Why do you think some young men decide to join ISIS?  
P: because they think they’re doing the right thing.   
I: What is Isis’ appeal for young people? Why does Isis appeal to teenage girls and boys? 
P: because they think that the western world is not the Islamic world and they think they’re going 
into a place that Allah thinks is right for them. So they think they’re going towards Islam but they’re 
going a completely wrong way.  
I: Have you heard about Talha Asmal from Dewsbury?  
P: yeah 
I: What do you think led him to do what he did? 
P: from what I’ve heard, he thought the Western world was disillusioned and he had to fight against 
it. I think there was that chance that if he had been guided, he could have been stopped. But 
someone definitely took advantage it. I think he was religious but someone definitely played on it.  
I: Have you heard about the 3 school girls from east London who went to Syria?  
P: yeah  
I: There’s been speculations that these girls and many other young girls have left the UK to marry 
ISIS fighters in Syria. What is your view on jihadi brides? 
P: I think they’re not very smart. They’ve been taken advantage of as well. They think that they’re 
doing the right thing as well. They must think that there’s so many men out there fighting for Islam 
and dying, they need to go out there and play their part.  
What do you think their part is? 
Repopulating. Creating more fighters.  
Do you think mean and women have different motivations for joining ISIS? 
No. I think there’s some that think they’re going to fight for the right cause – Islam. but there’s other 
that just want to go and cause terror. I think they both have same motives but different roles. 
I: Why do you think it is that only some men/women leave for Syria and not the vast majority of 
young Muslims? 
P: because the vast majority realise it’s the wrong thing to do and those that do go, they go out 
seeking answers themselves and get caught up in the wrong crowd of people.   
I: What do you think should be done with people who go to Syria but then wish to return back to 
the UK? 
P: I think they should be let back in. You could probably use them to identify other terrorists and 
stop other Muslims from being radicalised. They’ve gone thinking they’re doing the right thing but 
then realise they’ve done wrong but when they get there so they should be forgiven.  
I: Do you have any sympathy for these young people? 
P: yeah because they’ve been misguided.  
Do you think these people are being groomed or do you think that they are fully aware of the 
consequences of their actions? 
I think they’re being groomed. They know the consequences of their actions but they’re led to 
believe that they’re not consequences, it’s a reward.  
 
Social Networks 
I: How do you think young Muslims are being targeted by terrorist groups? 
P: I think some mosques and the internet. They know who to target because of what people search 
on the net. There will be certain people at mosque that are teaching younger people and if they 
have extreme views, they’ll pass them onto young people.  
How do they convey their message? 
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They make videos of people from ISIS talking and promotional videos. I’ve actually seen one myself 
on twitter. There people on twitter saying things like I hate westernisation but I love your 
sandwiches. 
I: Are young Muslims being targeted on the internet through social media networks? 
P: I think through Facebook videos. Twitter is the same. The message ISIS put out gets spread on 
there. I don’t think it’s the beheading videos that attract people, it’s the videos that promote the 
good things about living in Syria is what attracts them and the lifestyle and their aim, not their 
methods.  
I: Why is it young Muslims and not older? 
P: because they’re naïve.    
I: What part do you think older Muslims play in the recruitment of younger Muslims? Do you think 
they have any role? 
P: I think they know which buttons to press and what info to put out infront of them. I saw a video a 
few years ago of live chats where people from ISIS were answering questions for people. This little 
girl who has joined know she was western at first but then she started researching ISIS and ended up 
on this chat. They convinced her to move. If someone doesn’t show any interest, they’re not going to 
get influenced. It’s when people start looking into it, they become victim to ISIS.  
 
 
Counter-terrorism strategies 
I: What proposals to tackle radicalisation among young Muslims should be implemented in 
Britain?  
P: I think there needs to be elder Muslims and scholars to send out the right message.  
I: Have you heard about the UK counter-terrorism strategy called PREVENT? Like stop and search 
laws of stopping and searching people. What are your views on it? 
P: it’s giving ISIS ammunition. Say if people get stopped, it’s making it easier for ISIS to see out 
people. It’s giving ISIS another thing to play on. That is helping ISIS’ cause of creating that us and 
them divide.  
How would you approach reducing this idea of radicalisation and what would you do to counter 
the threat from terrorism? 
P: I think it’s all about what we’re fed. I think the media doesn’t help because it creates a more 
negative view of Islam. You need schemes and get Islam more involved in schools. Like people learn 
so much about Christmas and things like that so schools need to teach in schools that being a 
Muslim doesn’t make you an outcast.  
I: What actions do you think should be taken to stop young men and women from going to Syria 
and joining ISIS? 
P: border patrol. But then that goes back to the issue of stopping people at airports and 
discriminating against Muslims.  
I: Can parents/schools/mosques do more to prevent youth from being radicalised? 
P:  yeah. Especially mosques. That’s where you go to learn about Islam and if they’re only teaching 
the basics, that’s all you know. I think growing up you need to know what Islam is truly about and 
also be taught about the risks of radicalisation.  
 
 
 
Interview 10  
ISIS & Syria 
I: Are you aware of the current situation in Syria and the terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS? 
P:  I have some knowledge on it.  
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I: What are your views on young men/women who join Islamic extremist groups such as ISIS? 
P: I feel like a lot of them don’t know what they’re getting themselves into and a lot of its down to 
influence by people who they think are guiding them on the right path. 
I: What do you think is the main reason behind young Muslims travelling abroad and fighting in 
Syria?  
P: I think they think they’re doing it for a good cause. People give them false promises and they don’t 
know what they’re getting themselves into.  
I: What do you think are the key motivators for joining such groups? 
P: I think they think they’re gonna get rewarded for what they’re doing in that they’ll go to Jannah. 
They think they’re going to be martyrs.  
 
 
Jihad & religion 
I: What is your understanding of the terms radicalisation and extremism? 
P: radicalisation is when you have a strong belief about something and extremism is imposing your 
views on someone else in the wrong manner.  
I: What does the word jihad mean to you? 
P: I’ve heard it but don’t really know what it means. Isn’t it fighting for your beliefs?  
I: Some terrorists have used extracts of the Quran to justify acts of terrorism, do you think that it 
is in any way understandable? 
P: no. I think that what the Quran promotes and what IS promotes are 2 different things. The fact 
that they’re using things for the Quran and saying that they’re doing it in the name of Allah, is 
wrong. Islam has nothing to with what ISIS do.  
I: Do you think there are any Islamic teachings that may be interpreted in such a way that they can 
be used to justify Islamic terrorism? 
P: no I don’t think so.  
 
Examples of young people  
I: Why do you think some young men decide to join ISIS?  
P: men go to fight for what they think is a good cause.    
I: What is Isis’ appeal for young people? Why does Isis appeal to teenage girls and boys? 
P: I think younger people have less of an understanding of these things and young people are easily 
influenced.   
I: Have you heard about Talha Asmal from Dewsbury?  
P: yeah 
I: What do you think led him to do what he did? 
P: well I know about Talha and his friend. I’m friends with Munshi’s cousin who went with Talha. 
They thought that they were going for a good reason. They thought they were going to fight for a 
good reason. One of them is dead now. His family had no idea. I think they came into contact with 
people wo tricked them and led them to go to Syria. I know that his family was quite religious but I 
think for you to make a decision like that, it needs the influence of someone else to make you go 
fight for ISIS.  
I: Have you heard about the 3 school girls from east London who went to Syria?  
P: yeah  
I: There’s been speculations that these girls and many other young girls have left the UK to marry 
ISIS fighters in Syria. What is your view on jihadi brides? 
P: It doesn’t make sense to me. I don’t understand why anyone would want to do that.  
Do you think mean and women have different motivations for joining ISIS? 
When I think of people going to ISIS, I don’t think of women. In my head, I think people go to fight. 
What you hear about ISIS is all terror so I don’t see what the motive for women could be. I think 
extremist religious beliefs are the motives. They use religion as an excuse to do these things. I think a 
lot of people that are part of ISIS are non-believers. 
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I: Why do you think it is that only some men/women leave for Syria and not the vast majority of 
young Muslims? 
P: because you hear about ISIS commit acts of terrorism and Islam does not promote that. And I 
think the vast majority are knowledgeable and a small minority can get influenced. 
I: What do you think should be done with people who go to Syria but then wish to return back to 
the UK? 
P: I think they should be let back. It’s a tricky one. There’s a chance they might come back and 
commit a terror attack but you have to speak to them. It’s a tough call. But they should be given a 
chance to give their side of the story or repent. 
I: Do you have any sympathy for these young people? 
P: yeah because a lot of people that do go have been given a wrong impression of Islam and haven’t 
been taught that Islam promotes peace.  
Do you think these people are being groomed or do you think that they are fully aware of the 
consequences of their actions? 
I don’t feel like they’re full aware. There being promised something else. They’re being told by 
someone who seems to have power that what they’re getting themselves into is a good thing.  
 
Social Networks 
I: How do you think young Muslims are being targeted by terrorist groups? 
P: I think when terrorist groups take the name of Islam, it’s giving a bad name to Islam.  
I: How are ISIS seeking these people? 
P: Probably through mosques and stuff like that. There might be someone who has extreme views 
and secretly pass their message in. they probably speak to individual people and see what’s going on 
in their minds.  They might mention something to someone and see who shows interest and build 
their trust and convince them to join ISIS.  
I: How do they convey their message? 
P: people who have strong opinions about something may posts their opinions online and ISIS use 
that as a gateway for people to reach them.  
I: Are young Muslims being targeted on the internet through social media networks? 
P: most likely. Like I said, normal will express their views say there’s a major terror attack and they 
tweet about it, they might be sympathetic towards why someone did what they did and ISIS could 
message them and say I agree with you.  
I: Why is it young Muslims and not older? 
P: because older people have seen a lot more and older people don’t use social media as much. 
Social media is the easiest way to attract younger people. Younger people don’t have enough 
knowledge. And younger people have more respect for the older people who are preaching to the 
younger ones.   
I: What part do you think older Muslims play in the recruitment of younger Muslims? Do you think 
they have any role? 
P: I think the people that are getting younger Muslims to join ISIS are older. I think older people have 
a part to play. I think there are older Muslims here are passing on the wrong message. They’re 
sending young people over. The only other way is over social media and you are less likely to listen 
to someone online.  
 
 
Counter-terrorism strategies 
I: What proposals to tackle radicalisation among young Muslims should be implemented in 
Britain?  
P: I think they need to monitor younger people at the border on the route to get to Syria. they spend 
too much time asking the people who have nothing to do with Syria who are perfectly fine.   
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I: Have you heard about the UK counter-terrorism strategy called PREVENT? Like stop and search 
laws of stopping and searching people. What are your views on it? 
P: I think that they spend too much time questioning innocent Muslims. I’m okay with being stopped 
but that’s my personal experience. But one of my friends got stopped for 3-4 hours with his family 
and that ruined their journey. 
How would you approach reducing this idea of radicalisation and what would you do to counter 
the threat from terrorism? 
P: well the online system keeps a track of everything. They need to find a way around people’s 
privacy but still being able to detect unusual online behaviour.   
I: What actions do you think should be taken to stop young men and women from going to Syria 
and joining ISIS? 
P: I think stopping people shouldn’t be stopped without a valid reason.   
I: Can parents/schools/mosques do more to prevent youth from being radicalised? 
P:  you can’t tell parents what to do and how to raise kids but they’re an important a factor. If 
parents give you the right guidance, they can go the right way. I don’t think schools can do much 
because it would cause a lot of controversy if only Muslims are being targeted. I don’t think schools 
can detect signs of radicalisation. I think friends can see these signs but not many people would tell 
on their friends. There could be an ISIS member running a mosque so I think it would be difficult to 
stop people from being radicalised. I think you can’t completely eradicate terrorism. I think more 
efforts should be paid to finding people who are radicalising youth as they’re the root cause. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 – Information sheet 
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INFORMATION SHEET  
 
You are being invited to take part in a study about Islamic terrorism. Before you decide to take part it is important 
that you understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to read the 
following information carefully and discuss it me if you wish.  Please do not hesitate to ask if there is anything that 
is not clear or if you would like more information. 
 
What is the study about? 
The purpose of this study is to explore people’s views on young Muslims who have been linked with terrorist 
organisations such as ISIS to gain a better understanding of why Muslim youth may be drawn to Islamic 
terrorism. 
  
Why I have been approached? 
You have been asked to participate because I am interested in what Muslims’ think about other Muslims who 
have left their homes and families and travelled to Syria. As more and more young Muslims are leaving their 
families and travelling to Syria, it is necessary to gain a better understanding of what Muslims believe ISIS’ 
appeal is for young people in order to prevent more youth from being radicalised. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is your decision whether or not you take part.  If you decide to take part you will be asked to sign a consent 
form.  
 
You can withdraw at any point prior to the work being submitted or published whether in print or at conferences. 
and you will be free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason.   
 
What will I need to do? 
If you agree to take part in the research you will be asked a few questions in relation to Islamic terrorism, ISIS 
and the current war situation in Syria. You will be asked about what your views are on Muslim men and women 
who join Islamic extremist groups such as ISIS. 
 
The interview will be recorded and last approximately 30 minutes. Should you feel distress at any point during the 
experiment, you may withdraw from the study, without giving reason. Due to the nature of the study, you may 
have further concerns and wish to speak to speak to either my supervisor, or a confidential emotional support 
helpline. Details will be provided at the end of the study. 
 
Will my identity be disclosed? 
The data collected will be kept confidential and used solely for the purpose of my research project, and your 
identity will remain anonymous. All information disclosed within the interview will be kept confidential, unless you 
indicate that you or anyone else is at risk of serious harm, in which case I would have a duty to report this 
information to the authorities in accordance with counter terrorism legislations. 
 
What will happen to the information? 
All information collected from you during this research will be kept secure and any identifying material, such as 
names will be removed in order to ensure anonymity.  It is anticipated that the research may, at some point, be 
published in a journal or report.  However, should this happen, your anonymity will be ensured, although it may 
be necessary to use your words in the presentation of the findings and your permission for this is included in the 
consent form. 
 
Who can I contact for further information? 
If you require any further information about the research, please contact me on: 
U0957618@unimail.hud.ac.uk  
 
 
 
Appendix 3 – consent form  
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Consent form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you require any further information about the research, please contact me on: 
U0957618@unimail.hud.ac.uk  
 
 
Name of participant: 
Signature: 
Date: 
 
Name of researcher: 
Signature: 
Date: 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 – Debrief 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the 
information sheet for the study, and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 
am free to withdraw at any time, without giving reason. 
 
 
 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
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Debrief 
Thank you for taking time to participate in this research study.  
The aim of this research is to explore people’s views of Muslims who have been 
linked with terrorist organisations such as ISIS to gain a better understanding of why 
Muslim youth may be drawn to Islamic terrorism. I was interested in finding out what 
people understand to be the drivers of religious extremism and what people’s views 
are on men/women who travel to war torn countries such as Syria and join Islamic 
extremist groups. 
 
All of your data will be kept confidential. If you wish for your results to be retracted 
and destroyed, contact me before 15/3/16. If you would like a summary of the 
research findings once the data has been analysed, please leave your email address 
with the researcher. 
 
If you experienced any psychological distress or discomfort whilst undertaking part in 
this study and would like to speak to somebody regarding this, you can contact the 
Samaritans confidential emotional support helpline on 0845 790 9090, or visit their 
website http://www.samaritans.org/how-we-can-help-you. Alternatively, if you wish to 
speak to my supervisor, Dr Jason Roach, he can be contacted on: 
J.roach@hud.ac.uk 
 
Many thanks again. 
 
Zara Akbar 
U0957618@unimail.hud.ac.uk 
 
 
 
